ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00049229
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Adorjan Gimesi | Village At Lyons |
| Complainant | Respondent |
Anonymised Parties | {text} | {text} |
Representatives |
| Ryan McAllister ARAG Legal Protection |
Complaint(s):
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 | CA-00060478-001 | 11/12/2023 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 | CA-00060478-002 | 11/12/2023 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 26/02/2024
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Niamh O'Carroll
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, following the referral of the complaints to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaints and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaints.
Background:
The Complainant seeks redress pursuant to the Organisation of Working time Act. The Respondent argues that the Complainant is out of time.
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Summary of Complainant’s Case:
The Complainant filed his complaint on the 11.12.2023. He called the WRC and they informed him that they would carry out an inspection going back one week. He states that he did file his complaint on time. He thought the WRC would inspect everything and would deal with this complaint. He was out sick from 26.05.2023 and his employment ended on the 04.07.2023. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
The Complainant file his complaint on the 11.12.2023. His employment with the Respondent ended on the 04.07.2024. He was out sick from the 26.05.2024 and didn’t work at all during that period. The days for which he is claiming are outside of the six month period allowed by the Act. |
Findings and Conclusions:
Based on the information contained on the WRC file and on the submissions of both the Complainant and on behalf of the Respondent, I am satisfied that within complaints are statute barred. Section 41(6)Subject to the provisions of Section (8) an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to hm or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of sis months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates. Section 41(8) of the 2015 Act empowers an adjudication officer to extend the initial six months limitation period by no more than a further six months, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint within the initial period 'was due to reasonable cause'. Without prejudice to the above argument “reasonable cause” has been considered in a number of cases. In Salesforce.com v Alli Leech the Labour Court set out in detail the legal principles to establish whether reasonable cause has been shown for an extension of time. The Court stated “The established test for deciding if an extension should be granted for reasonable cause shown is that formulated by this Court in Labour Court Determination DWT0338 Cementation Skanska v Carroll. Here the test was set out in the following term; “It is the Court’s view that in considering if reasonable cause exists it is for the Claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context of which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the Claimant at the material time. The Claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the Claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability that had those circumstances had not been present he would have initiated the claim on time.” In that case, and in subsequent cases in which the question arose the Court adopted an approach analogous to that taken by the superior Courts in considering whether time should been enlarged for “good reason” in judicial review proceedings pursuant to Order 84 Rule 21 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986. That approach was held to be correct by the High Court in Minister for Finance v CPSU and others . The test formulated in Cementation Skanska v Carroll draws heavily on the decision of the High Court in Donal O’Donnell and Catherine O’Donnell v Dunlaoghaire Corporation . Here Costello J (as he then was) stated as follows; “The phrase “good reasons” is one of wide import which it would be futile to attempt to define precisely. However, in considering whether or not there are good reasons for extending the time I think it is clear that the test must be an objective one and the Court should not extend the time merely because an aggrieved Plaintiff believed that he or she were justified in delaying the institution of proceedings. What the Plaintiff has to show (and I think the onus under Order 84 Rule 21 is on the Plaintiff) is that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford a justifiable excuse for the delay.” It is clear from the authorities that the test places the onus on the Applicant on an extension of time to identify the reason for the delay and to establish that the reason relied upon provides a justifiable excuse for the actual delay. Secondly, the onus is on the Applicant to establish a causal link between the reason proffered for the delay and his or her failure to present the complaint in time. Thirdly, I must be satisfied, as a matter of probability, that the complaint would have been presented in time were it not for the intervention of the factors relied upon as constituting reasonable cause. It is the actual delay that must be explained and justified. Finally, while the established test imposes a relatively low threshold of reasonableness on an Applicant, there is some limitation on the range of issues which can be taken into account.” In particular, as was pointed out by Costello J in the passage quoted above, a Court should not extend a statutory time limit merely because the Applicant subjectively believed that he or she was justified in delaying the institution of proceedings. The Applicant didn’t apply to have the time extended but did state that he thought the matter was before the adjudication services because he had spoken to the inspectorate at the WRC and they informed him that would carry out an inspection for the period of one year back from his application. He accepts that he did not file his complaint with the WRC adjudication services until the 11.12.2023 and that his last day of work was 26.05.2023. It is based on that information that I find that the complaint is statute barred. The complaint fails. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
CA-00060478-001 – The complaint is statute barred. CA-00060478-002- The complaint is statute barred. |
Dated: 31st of July 2024
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Niamh O'Carroll
Key Words:
Time limits. Organisation of working time act. |