Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

National Sales Manager

Payment Technology and Services Provider

Representatives

  Self-represented

IBEC

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00059612-002

16/11/2023

The Complainant has submitted a complaint against the Respondent alleging that he was bullied out of his job due to a difference of opinion with the Sales Director and General Manager of the Respondent company.

The Respondent rejects the complaint.

The Respondent submits as follows:

 The Acts refer to “reasonable cause” as permitting an extension of the statutory time-limits.

The tests applied by the Labour Court for extensions of time under the Organisation of Working Time Act (and other legislation with the same wording) have been well established. The Respondent cites the case of Cementation Skanska v Carroll DWT0338, where the Labour Court articulated the test as follows: 

“It is the Court’s view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the Complainant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the Complainant at the material time. The Complainant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the Complainant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.” 

The Respondent submits that the responsibility falls on the Complainant to submit the complaint on time. The Respondent submits that the Complainant has not discharged the burden of proof that reasonable cause exists for an extension to the six-month deadline and accordingly, this case must fail. 

The Complainant wrote to the WRC on 16 November 2023 requesting that a new complaint be added to the IR complaint which he had submitted on 25 October 2023.  The Complainant stated that he had misread the complaint form and did not include a complaint of unfair dismissal in his original complaint form.

At the adjudication hearing the Complainant said that after he submitted his IR complaint, he had been advised that he should also have submitted a complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended).

Preliminary Issue – Time Limits

The first matter I must decide is if I have jurisdiction to hear this complaint.  In making my decision, I must take account of both the relevant legislation and the legal precedent in this area.

The Complainant submitted a dispute under the Industrial Relations Act 1969 to the WRC on 25 October 2023. On 16 November 2023, the Complainant wrote to the WRC as follows:

“I wish to add a new complaint.  I apologise for the confusion. I misread the application and didn’t include the following. Unfair Dismissal/ Constructive is the option I wish to choose.”

The time limits for the submission of a complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as amended (the Act), are set out in section 8(2) of the Act which provides:

“(2) A claim for redress under this Act shall be initiated by giving a notice in writing containing such particulars (if any) as may be specified in regulations under subsection (17) of section 41 of the Act of 2015 the Director General —

(a) within the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the relevant dismissal, or            

(b) within such period not exceeding 12 months from the date of the relevant dismissal as the adjudication officer considers appropriate, in circumstances where the adjudication officer is satisfied that the giving of the notice within the period referred to in paragraph (a) was prevented due to reasonable cause, and a copy of the notice shall be given by the Director General to the employer concerned as soon as may be after the receipt of the notice by the Director General.”

On the complaint form in relation to his industrial relations complaint, the Complainant indicated that his employment with the Respondent ended on 9 May 2023.  The Respondent disputed this date and asserted that the Complainant’s employment ceased on 5 May 2023.  Following the adjudication hearing, the Respondent submitted a copy of a letter addressed to the Complainant dated 8 March 2023 in which it was stated that the Complainant’s last day of service would be Friday 5 May 2023. 

Regardless of which date of termination is correct, it is clear that the Complainant referred his claim to the WRC on 16 November 2023, outside the 6-month time limit provided for at section 8(2)(a) of the Act as cited above.  

Section 8(2) of the Act also provides that if a complaint is not submitted within six months of the alleged contravention, an extension may be granted by an Adjudication Officer up to a maximum time limit of 12 months where, in the opinion of the Adjudication Officer, a complainant has demonstrated reasonable cause for the delay in accordance with the provisions.  The general principles which apply are that something must be advanced which will both explain and excuse the delay. 

The concept of ‘reasonable cause’ is summarised in Salesforce.com v Alli Leech EDA1615 wherein the Labour Court stated:

“The established test for deciding if an extension should be granted for reasonable cause shown is that formulated by this Court in Labour Court Determination DWT0338 Cementation Skanska (Formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v Carroll. Here the test was set out in the following terms: -

It is the Court's view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.

In that case, and in subsequent cases in which this question arose, the Court adopted an approach analogous to that taken by the Superior Courts in considering whether time should be enlarged for ‘good reason’ in judicial review proceedings pursuant to Order 84, Rule 21 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986. That approach was held to be correct by the High Court in Minister for Finance v CPSU & Ors [2007] 18 ELR 36.”

“It is the Court's view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.”

I note that when submitting his complaint under the Act, the Complainant attributed the delay to misreading the complaint form.  At the hearing, the Complainant said that he was advised after he submitted his industrial relations dispute that he should also have submitted a complaint of unfair dismissal under the Act.

The Labour Court in its determination DWT1244 Avery Weigh-Tronix v Kindsley held that “Ignorance of one’s legal rights, as opposed to the underlying facts giving rise to a complaint, cannot provide a justifiable excuse for failure to bring a claim in time.”

Laffoy J. in Minister for Finance –v- CPSU and Others 2007 18ELR36 found that ignorance of one’s legal rights cannot constitute a reasonable cause for not observing a statutory time limit.

On the basis of the foregoing, I find that the Complainant has not shown reasonable cause to empower me to extend the deadline for the submission of a complaint under the Act.  

Taking all of the foregoing into consideration, I find that I have no jurisdiction to investigate this complaint.

Having carefully considered all evidence available to me, I find that the Complainant has failed to submit his complaint within the initial time limit provided for in section 8(2) of the Unfair Dismissals Act (as amended) and that no reasonable cause has been established to enable me to extend the time limit. Therefore, I do not have jurisdiction to hear the case.

Accordingly, I decide that this complaint is not well founded.

Unfair Dismissals Act – out of time – no reasonable cause