ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION

Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00046953

Parties:

	Complainant	Respondent
Parties	Mark Keenan	Workplace Relations Commission

	Complainant	Respondent
Anonymised Parties

Representatives

Complaint:

Act	Complaint/Dispute Reference No.	Date of Receipt
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000	CA-00057738-001	17/07/2023

Date of Adjudication Hearing: N/A

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Eileen Campbell

Procedure:

In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 and/or Section 25 of the Equal Status Act, 2000, following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaint.

Background:

This matter came before the WRC dated 17/07/2023 as a complaint submitted under section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000. The aforesaid complaint was referred to me for investigation. A hearing for that purpose was scheduled to take place on 02/12/2024.

The specific complaint is one of discrimination against by a person, organisation/company who provides goods, services or facilities alleged to have taken place in the first instance on 03/07/2023 and the most recent date of alleged discrimination is cited as 12/07/2023 by reason of disability and by reason of failure to provide reasonable accommodation as set out in the Complainant’s WRC complaint form.

As part of my statutory duty to make all relevant inquiries into this complaint I am obliged in the first instance to ascertain that I have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the complaint as presented and as referred to me for investigation.

The Complainant alleges discrimination on the grounds of disability and failure to provide reasonable accommodation in circumstances where the Complainant alleges the Respondent forced him to work “every single day of his medical certificate to the meeting date of what was possibly the biggest meeting of my life.”

Preliminary Matter: Correct identity of Respondent

I note it is an employee of the Respondent who is named by the Complainant on his WRC complaint form.

The Relevant Law on the matter of vicarious liability

Section 42(1) of the Equal Status Act 2000, provides the following definition of vicarious liability:

42.— (1) Anything done by a person in the course of his or her employment shall, in any proceedings brought under this Act, be treated for the purposes of this Act as done also by that person’s employer, whether or not it was done with the employer’s knowledge or approval.

In ruling on this matter I am guided by the findings of the Equality Officer in Michael Mongans & others v Clare County Council DEC-S2006-084 where she found as follows:

“The named officials are all employees of Clare County Council and acted in the course of their employment with the Council. In considering this application I have taken account of a Judgment in the High Court in the case of Faughnan v. Maguire concerning an application to have a named defendant removed from medical negligence proceedings. O' Sullivan J stated:

"From the point of view of the Plaintiff, if it does transpire that a court can be satisfied that Dr. O'Brien is in some way legally responsible for his injury, prima facie (and I accept that this point has not been conceded by the Plaintiff) the first Defendant as employer of Dr. O'Brien, would be “accountable”.

O'Sullivan J went on to hold that:

"In my opinion therefore, the balance of justice favours the discontinuance of the action against Dr. O'Brien..."

The reasoning in this judgment is relevant to the application in this case. If the complainants' application for redress is successful Clare County Council will be "accountable". The Equality Officer therefore, considered it appropriate that Clare County Council should be the only named respondent and informed the parties that this is how the cases would proceed.”

Following the above precedent, it is my view that the provisions of section 42(1) of the Equal Status Act, 2000 require that I record the correct name of the parties in my Decision. I am not satisfied that the name listed as the respondent on the complaint form is the correct respondent as the named respondent worked for the Workplace Relations Commission at the time of the alleged contravention and did not provide goods and services in their own right.

I find, therefore, that, in accordance with section 42(1) of the Act, the correct respondent for the purpose of this decision is the Workplace Relations Commission and not the individual named on the complaint form.

Preliminary Matter of Jurisdiction

I note this complaint was filed with the WRC on the 17/07/2023.

This complaint as presented relates to interactions the Complainant had with the Respondent (the Workplace Relations Commission), in seeking to bring other Equal Status complaints.

The Equal Status Act requires a claimant to ‘seek redress’ or to ‘make a claim’ to the Workplace Relations Commission. Prior to taking this step, a claimant is required to notify the respondent of the allegation and the intention to seek redress under the Act [emphasis added].

The WRC has prepared documents to cater for both steps: the WRC complaint form and the ES1 form. The forms themselves are not mandatory. However, the prior notification requirement is mandatory.

I note at the outset that the Complainant’s WRC complaint form is silent on the date of notification to the service provider / Respondent using the ES1 form and is equally silent on the matter of whether a reply was received from the service provider on an ES2 form. The service provider named in the within complaint is the Workplace Relations Commission. Accordingly, the Respondent in the Workplace Relations Commission.

I note matters complained were not notified to the Respondent prior to a complaint being submitted to the WRC.

I note the Complainant contacted the WRC by email on 10/09/2023 as follows:

“hi there

this is a notice of my claim for damages, punitive damages, loss of work, medical expenses, etc. as a result of my medical evidence being ignored as I have explained previously. Further information will be provided in conjunction with my legal representation.

Kind regards, Mark. -- Yours sincerely,

The subject line of the aforesaid email was titled “Issue of letter of claim to defendant” [emphasis added].

The WRC issued correspondence to the Complainant on 06/11/2023 as follows:

“I acknowledge receipt of your communication dated 10/09/2023. A copy has been forwarded to the Respondent.

Under the Equal Status Act, a complainant must notify the respondent regarding the alleged prohibited conduct under the Act prior to referral of the complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission.

Under the Act the notification must;

(i) be in writing

(ii) provide details of the nature of the complaint / alleged prohibited conduct by the respondent

(iii) state the complainant's intention to seek redress under the Equal Status Act if there is no satisfactory response and [emphasis added]

(iv) be sent to the respondent within 2 months of the alleged occurrence of the prohibited conduct or the last occurrence where there is more than one incident.

The 2 month deadline may be extended by the Director General to not more than 4 months, where a complainant sets out in writing, reasonable cause why the respondent was not notified within 2 months.

Where

- notification was sent more than 4 months after the alleged prohibited conduct

- or no notification was sent to the respondent,

the Director General may, where exceptional circumstances are shown in writing by the complainant, direct that the requirement to notify the respondent shall not apply.”

I note the Complainant responded by email as follows on 17/12/2023:

“Thank you for this. I Confirm the WRC are well aware of the complaint and it is actually incredibly straightforward. Can you please arrange for this to proceed at the earliest possible opportunity as this may be better suited to a different court given the gravity of the situation and amount of potential payout for and all the pain and suffering cost etc suffered as a result of the WRC so blatantly and clearly disgracing themselves contrary to law, Constitution and human rights.

Please let me know the next steps and I look forward to defending my rights to be best of my abilities and in the interests of not only myself, but individuals right across Ireland that continued to be shafted by a disgusting unequal Dublin biased system, built on sand and ran by very average individuals.

Kind regards etc”

I note the Complainant in his response makes no reference to the statutory notification requirement whatsoever apart from an assertion that the “WRC are well aware of the complaint” without providing a factual basis for said assertion or anything at all that might indicate that the Complainant had complied with the relevant statutory provisions.

Accordingly, in light of the above and in my capacity as the Adjudication Officer appointed to hear this case I wrote to the parties on 01/10/2024 as follows:

“I write in my capacity as the Adjudication Officer appointed to hear the above complaint under section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000 (“the Act”).

I have reviewed the Complainant’s file, and I note a preliminary issue that may impact on my jurisdiction to hear this complaint. Accordingly, there is a requirement that I seek to establish that this complaint is, in fact, properly before me for adjudication.

This complaint as presented relates to interactions the Complainant had with the Respondent in seeking to bring other Equal Status complaints.

I note the Complainant’s WRC complaint form is silent on the date of notification to the service provider / Respondent using the ES1 form and is equally silent on the matter of whether a reply was received from the service provider on an ES2 form.

Accordingly, I have reviewed the file in its entirety and I note that the Complainant’s file does not contain an ES1 form or an ES2 form. I note from the Complainant’s file the Respondent was not made aware of the complaint until such time as the Complainant filed a claim to the WRC on 17/07/2023. I am unable to find any prior notification to the Respondent in compliance with the Act on the Complainant’s file.

Under the Act, a complainant must notify the respondent regarding the alleged prohibited conduct under the Act prior to referral of the complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission.

Section 21 of Equal Status Act 2000 as amended requires that:

(2) Before seeking redress under this section, the complainant—

(a) shall, within 2 months after the prohibited conducted is alleged to have occurred, or, where more than one incident of prohibited conduct is alleged to have occurred, within 2 months after the last such occurrence, notify the respondent in writing of—

(i) the nature of the allegation,

(ii) the complainant’s intention, if not satisfied with the respondent’s response to the allegation, to seek redress under this Act.

Section 21(3) of the Act states:

(a) On application by a complainant the Director of the Workplace Relations Commission or, as the case may be, the Circuit Court may –

(i) for reasonable cause, direct that in relation to the complainant subsection (2) shall have effect as if for the reference to 2 months there were substituted a reference to such period not exceeding 4 months as is specified in the direction, or

(ii) exceptionally, where satisfied that it is fair and reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case to do so direct that subsection (2) shall not apply in relation to the complaint to the extent specified in the direction,

and where such direction is given, this Part shall have effect accordingly.

(b) In deciding whether to give a direction under paragraph (a)(ii) the Director of the Workplace Relations Commission or, as the case may be, the Circuit Court shall have regard to all the relevant circumstances, including –

(i) the extent to which the respondent is, or is likely to be, aware of the circumstances in which the prohibited conduct occurred, and

(ii) the extent of any risk of prejudice to the respondent’s ability to deal adequately with the complaint.

There is a prescribed form available (Form ES1) to assist complainants in regard to this matter. It is not mandatory to use this form, however, providing that the complainant complies with the requirements of section 21 of the Act. Therefore, prior to lodging a complaint, written notification must be forwarded to the service provider as provided for in section 21(2) of the Act.

While the ES1 form is the form most often submitted to comply with the notification requirement as set out in section 21(2) of the Equal Status Act 2000, as amended (‘ESA’), there is no obligation to send an ES1 form once the statutory provisions are complied with.

The notification must be sent within two month of the alleged discriminatory event and must state the name of the allegation and the complainant’s intention to seek redress under the Acts if not satisfied by any reply received. Both of these criteria are essential. [emphasis added]

In light of the foregoing, I invite the parties to address me on the preliminary issue as set out above in order that I may consider my jurisdiction to hear this matter and make a ruling on same. To this end I would be grateful if written submissions could be filed with the WRC before close of business on Friday 18 October 2024.

I trust you find the foregoing informative.

Yours sincerely etc.”

Submissions as requested on the preliminary issue highlighted to the parties were filed by the Respondent on Monday 21/10/2024 which were duly copied to the Complainant.

At time of drafting of this decision the Complainant has not addressed the WRC on the matter of the preliminary issue apart from an email of 22/10/2024 when the Complainant was in receipt of the Respondent’s submission on the preliminary issue where he states as follows: “I am in the process of seeking legal advice. I am afraid that I will not be in a position to comment until receiving such advice as is my right I understand. I must however state that this letter from the wrc is highly contested.”

I have waited a more than reasonable period of time for the Complainant to revert or indeed for his legal representative to come on record with the WRC and / or to file submissions on his behalf as requested by correspondence of 01/10/2024 before issuing my ruling on the preliminary issue.

I note the Complainant first makes reference to his legal representative as far back as 10/09/2023 and I can only assume that he has briefed his legal representative on the matter of the preliminary issue.

In circumstances whereby the preliminary issue of notification under the legislation may be determinative of the entire proceedings, it falls to be considered by me in advance of any consideration of the substantive matter.

There is a body of case law which suggests an Adjudication Officer is precluded by law from holding a substantive hearing until a decision on the preliminary matter is in fact reached. In Mary Sheehy v. Most Reverend James Moriarty [UD1264/2008] the Tribunal held as follows:

‘’the Tribunal was set up under statute by the Oireachtas and did not have the authority based on constitutional or natural law and justice principles to conduct a hearing where the claims were not instituted within the time periods set out in the legislation”.

In Brothers of Charity (Roscommon) Ltd. v. Marian Keigher [EDA101], the Labour Court considered the determination of an issue by way of preliminary decision. The Labour Court referred to the judgments of Kenny J in Tara Explorations and Development Co. Ltd v. Minister for Industry and Commerce [1975] IR 242; and Hardiman J in B.T.F. v. Director of Public Prosecutions 2 ILRM 367. In the latter case Hardiman J held as follows

"It is often a difficult and delicate decision as to whether to try a particular issue as a preliminary matter. In a case where a point is raised which in and of itself and without regard to anything else may terminate the whole proceedings, clearly a strong case can be made for its trial as a preliminary issue. The classic example is where the Statute of Limitations is pleaded. In other cases, however, the position may be much less clear".

I have regard to the case of Bus Eireann v. SIPTU[PTD8/2004] where the Labour Court indicated that a preliminary point should be determined separately from other issues arising in a case “where it could lead to considerable savings in both time and expense” and where the point was “a question of pure law where no evidence was needed and where no further information was required.”

In the case of Donal Gillespie v. Donegal Meat Processers[UD/20/135] the Labour Court dealt with the matter by expressing the view that in asking for the substantive issue and the jurisdictional issue to be heard together was “akin to asking the court to exercise its jurisdiction before it determines whether or not it has jurisdiction in the first instance.”

Furthermore, I am obliged at all times to consider that which constitutes the most efficient and effective use of the resources of the WRC.

Accordingly, I set out hereunder in Findings and Conclusions the relevant law and the relevant precedent in terms of the notification requirements pursuant to the Equal Status Act, 2000 in order to determine the matter of my jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the within complaint as presented.

Summary of Complainant’s Case as to Preliminary Issue:

The Complainant elected not to file any submission on the preliminary issue as invited to do so.

Summary of Respondent’s Case as to Preliminary Issue:

As per written submission

I write on behalf of the Workplace Relations Commission which is named as a Respondent in this matter. I refer to the Adjudication Officer’s letter dated 1 October 2024 and the request for submissions on the notification period in this Equal Status matter.

Section 21 of the Equal Status Act 2000, as amended, states that before seeking redress the complainant shall within 2 months after the prohibited conduct is alleged to have occurred notify the respondent of the nature of the allegation and their intention to seek redress under the Act.

In this matter, the Complainant did not notify the WRC that he intended to commence proceedings against the organisation prior to filing his complaint CA-00057738. On that basis the WRC simply does not have jurisdiction to hear the complaint unless exceptionally the Adjudication Officer is satisfied that it is fair and reasonable that the notification period does not apply per section 21(3)(a)(ii) Equal Status Act cited below for reference. No such circumstances apply here, and I note that the Complainant has provided none in his reply to the letter of 1 October 2024. “

(3) (a) On application by a complainant the Director of the Workplace Relations Commission or, as the case may be, the Circuit Court may— (i) for reasonable cause, direct that in relation to the complainant subsection (2) shall have effect as if for the reference to 2 months there were substituted a reference to such period not exceeding 4 months as is specified in the direction, or

(ii) exceptionally, where satisfied that it is fair and reasonable in the particular circumstance of the case to do so direct that subsection (2) shall not apply in relation to the complainant to the extent specified in the direction”

Furthermore, and without prejudice to the Respondent’s position on the notification point, the Complainant’s claim is misconceived. There is simply no evidence of the discrimination alleged.

The complaint relates to a postponement request concerning adjudication case reference number ADJ-00044294. The refusal of the postponement request was issued on 3 July 2023 and the Complainant names this as the date of the first incident of discrimination. The refusal was issued in relation to the named corporate complainant, LendRB Ltd., and not personally in relation to Mr Keenan in his capacity as a director and co-founder of the company LendRB Ltd. The reasons for the refusal were based on the fact that there were two other directors to attend the hearing scheduled for 7 July 2023.

Without prejudice to any further submissions which might be necessary, the allegation of discrimination on the grounds of failure to provide reasonable accommodation on grounds of disability is denied in its entirety and does not meet the legal definition of discrimination on any ground as a matter of fact or law.

Yours faithfully etc.

Findings and Conclusions:

CA-00057738-001

It is well settled that a complainant must establish they have complied with the notification requirements stipulated by the Equal Status Act, 2000 in order that an adjudicator officer can assume jurisdiction to hear the substantive matter.

This complaint of discrimination under the Equal Status Act is subject to a notification requirement in accordance with Section 21 of the Act. Accordingly, it is relevant and necessary to set out the germane provisions of Section 21 in order to inform an inquiry into this preliminary jurisdictional issue.

The Relevant Law

Section 21 of Equal Status Act 2000 as amended requires that:

(2) Before seeking redress under this section, the complainant—

(i) the nature of the allegation,

(ii) the complainant’s intention, if not satisfied with the respondent’s response to the allegation, to seek redress under this Act.

Section 21(3) of the Act states:

(a) On application by a complainant the Director of the Workplace Relations Commission or, as the case may be, the Circuit Court may –

and where such direction is given, this Part shall have effect accordingly.

(i) the extent to which the respondent is, or is likely to be, aware of the circumstances in which the prohibited conduct occurred, and

(ii) the extent of any risk of prejudice to the respondent’s ability to deal adequately with the complaint.

I note Ms Judy Walsh, in what is considered the seminal publication on the Equal Status Act cited by the Supreme Court and referenced by the WRC, namely Walsh, Equal Status Acts 2000-2011 Discrimination in the Provision of Goods and Services (Blackhall Publishing, 2012) states as follows “A complaint that is referred in another written format will still be valid since the forms are administrative rather than statutory in nature.”

Ms Walsh further states as follows:

“The notification must be sent within two month of the alleged discriminatory event and must state the name of the allegation and the complainant’s intention to seek redress under the Acts if not satisfied by any reply received. Both of these criteria are essential.”

I am mindful of the Equality Tribunal in Mongan’s v. Clare County Council DEC-S2008-39 where it was held the ES1 form is not mandatory, and a letter would suffice.

I note the Equality Tribunal in O’Brien and McCarthy v. Ruairi’s Bar, Tralee DEC-S2007-039 explained the purpose of the notification requirement as follows:

“The purpose of this notification is twofold. Firstly, it is designed to alert the respondent at an early stage to the nature of the allegation and the fact that a complaint is being considered against them and, secondly, it affords the respondent the opportunity of communicating directly with the complainant with a view to resolving the issue between themselves without recourse to the Equality Tribunal.”

The ES1 notification notifies the respondent of the allegations and seeks a response to same and furthermore it notifies the respondent that, if the complainant is not satisfied with the response to that notification, they will seek redress under the Equal Status Act.

The Relevant Facts

I note the Complainant filed his complaint on 17/07/2023. I note almost two months later the Complainant emailed what he terms his “Issue of letter of claim to defendant” on 10/09/2023 which provides as follows:

“hi there

Kind regards, Mark. -- Yours sincerely”

I note the Complainant makes reference to his legal representation in the email set out above. It is with some surprise I note the legal representative did not advise the Complainant that prior to lodging his complaint with the WRC there is a legal requirement that he notify the service provider / Respondent in this instance the WRC.

Furthermore, for the avoidance of any possible doubt, I note the “hi there” email set out above would not satisfy the notification requirements even if it had been forwarded to the service provider before the filing of the complaint rather than two months later as it does not notify the Respondent of the allegations, nor does it seek the Respondent’s response to said allegations and nor does it notify the Respondent that the Complainant intends to seek redress under the Equal Status Act.

I note the word ‘discrimination’ is not mentioned and the email is silent on the Equal Status Act which is the legislation impleaded by the Complainant in the within complaint.

For the avoidance of any doubt the notification must be sent within two months of the alleged discriminatory event, and it must state the name of the allegation and the Complainant’s intention to seek redress under the Equal Status Act if they are not satisfied the reply received [emphasis added].

Both of the aforementioned criteria are essential.

I am satisfied the fact that the Respondent in the within case is the Workplace Relations Commission does not allow a complainant to circumvent the legislative requirements of the Equal Status Act 2000 by filing a WRC complaint form and failing to take the necessary first step of notification to the Respondent as set out in the legislation by way of a condition precedent to the filing of a complaint with the WRC.

I am unable to find that the Workplace Relations Commission as a named Respondent should be treated any differently to any other Respondent and I note in particular the Complainant’s email to the WRC of 17 December 2023 in response to correspondence from the WRC advising him on the notification requirements where the Complainant sets out as follows:

“thank you for this. I confirm the WRC are well aware of the complaint and it is actually incredibly straight forward. Could you please arrange for this to proceed at the earliest possible opportunity as this may be better suited to a different court given the gravity of the situation and amount of potential payout and all the pain suffering cost etc suffered as a result of the WRC so blatantly and clearly disgracing themselves contrary to law, Constitution and human rights.

I find as fact the first the Respondent heard of the Complainant’s complaint was when it was filed with the WRC on 17/07/2023 and I am unable to reconcile this fact with the Complainant’s assertion the Respondent is “well aware” of his complaint in advance of the filing of same.

I have not identified that the Respondent was placed on notice of the claim of alleged prohibited conduct before the Complainant filed his complaint on 17/07/2023.

I find the Complainant did not comply with the notification requirements set out in section 21 before filing his complaint with the WRC on 17/07/2023.

Taking all of the foregoing into consideration, I am satisfied that the notification requirements set out in section 21(2)(a)(i)(ii) of the Act have not been met by the Complainant. The plain fact is the Complainant did not notify the Respondent at all prior to filing his complaint on 17/07/2023.

For completeness, in considering this matter I note the provision in section 21(3)(a)(ii) which provides for a discretion to set aside the provisions of section 21(2)(a)(i)(ii). I note, however, that this should only be applied “exceptionally”.

The Labour Court in the case of Gaelscoil Thulach na nOG v Fitzsimons-Markey [EET034], stated:

“The term exceptional is an ordinary familiar English adjective and not a term of art. It describes circumstances such as to form an exception, which is out of the ordinary course or unusual or special or uncommon, to be exceptional a circumstance need not be unique or unprecedented or very rare; but it cannot be one which is regular or routinely or normally encountered.”

It is clear therefore that any decision to apply this discretion should only be taken in circumstances that are out of the ordinary.

In carefully considering this matter, I note the Complainant did not avail himself of the opportunity to address me, as invited to by correspondence of 01/10/2024, on the matter of the jurisdictional issue as set out by me in the aforesaid correspondence.

The Complainant did not avail himself of the opportunity to submit any reasons or exceptional circumstances for my consideration that would support a position that “exceptional circumstances” exist in this matter such as to satisfy me that it would be fair and reasonable to invoke section 21(3)(a)(ii) Equal Status Act.

Finally, I note and I have regard the fact that the Complainant has previously impleaded the Equal Status Act in complaints filed with the WRC which would indicate that the Complainant is no stranger to and is familiar with the mandatory statutory notification requirements pursuant to the Act albeit in the within case he elected not to comply with same.

I do not find the set of circumstances set out above support the position that “exceptional circumstances” exist in this matter such as to satisfy me that it would be fair and reasonable to initiate the process of directing that subsection (2)(a)(i)(ii) not apply in respect of this complaint.

I find this failure on the Complainant’s part to comply with the statutory requirements deprives me of jurisdiction to hear the within complaint and to determine the substantive matter. In such circumstances I would be acting ultra vires if I were to assume a jurisdiction that I do not have.

I find the Complainant failed to apply due diligence to formatting the complaint he wished to make and to ensuring compliance with the mandatory statutory requirements thereto.

Furthermore, I find that the Complainant, when provided with the opportunity to address me on the preliminary issue, elected not to do so.

I have carefully inquired into the complaint and I have considered the matter under section 22 of the Acts which provides that the Director may dismiss a claim at any stage if of the opinion that it has been made in bad faith or is frivolous, vexatious or misconceived or relates to a trivial matter. Section 22 of the Equal Status Acts provides for dismissal of claims as follows:-

“22.— The Director may dismiss a claim at any stage in the investigation if he or she is of opinion that the claim has been made in bad faith or is frivolous or vexatious, misconceived or relates to a trivial matter.”

It is widely accepted by the Courts that the terms are legal terms which can be often used interchangeably as held by the Barron J in Farley v Ireland [1997] IESC 60

“So far as the legality of matters is concerned frivolous and vexatious are legal terms. They are not pejorative in the sense or possibly in the sense that Mr. Farley may think they are. It is merely a question of saying that so far as the plaintiff is concerned if he has no reasonable chance of succeeding then the law says that it is frivolous to bring the case.

Similarly, it is a hardship on the defendant to have to take steps to defend something which cannot succeed, and the law calls that vexatious”.

The terms “frivolous or vexatious” were carefully considered by the High Court in Patrick Kelly v The Information Commissioner [2014] IEHC 479 which is instructive as to the meaning of these terms:

“As a matter of Irish law, the term “frivolous or vexatious” does not, as noted by Birmingham J. in Nowak, necessarily carry any pejorative connotations but is more concerned with the situation where the litigation (or, in this instance, application) can be described as futile, misconceived or bound to fail.”

In conclusion, based on all of the foregoing, I am satisfied that this claim as presented is futile and bound to fail because I do not have jurisdiction in the first instance to determine on the substantive matter due to the Complainant’s failure to comply with the mandatory statutory notification requirements regarding the notification of a complaint as set out in section 21(2) of the Equal Status Acts, 2000 – 2015. under the Act.

On that basis I dismiss the complaint in accordance with section 22 of the Acts.

Decision:

Section 25 of the Equal Status Acts, 2000 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 27 of that Act.

CA-00057738-001

For the reasons set out above I dismiss this complaint in accordance with section 22 of the Acts.

Dated: 15th November 2024

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Eileen Campbell

Key Words: