ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION

Adjudication Reference:  ADJ-00050869

Parties:

Complaints:

Date of Adjudication Hearing:  02/09/2024

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer:  Gaye Cunningham

Procedure:

In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 and Section 79 of theEmployment Equality Acts, 1998 - 2015,  and Section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 and Section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 following the referral of the complaints to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaints and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaints.

Background:

The Complainant was employed as a Manager at a Sports & Leisure Centre (CB).   He was employed by the Respondent from 4 September 2023 until 21 March 2024 when he was dismissed from his employment.  He has submitted a number of complaints under the Employment Equality Act, the Organisation of Working Time Act and the Terms of Employment (Information) Act.

Summary of Complainant’s Case:

The Complainant gave sworn evidence and made oral and written submissions summarised as follows (in his own words):

Complaint Reference – CA-00064888-001 Employment Equality Act 1998

(In the following narrative, CB refers to the workplace, E is the Chair of the Board).

My dismissal is based on unreasonable grounds. During my time at CB, I was consistently a victim of discrimination for being a foreigner established on ground of race discrimination. Since English is not my first language, E excessively monitored my documents and emails to correct my grammar. I remember my first meeting with him on the 31st of August, after signing my contract. After being introduced to him, he mentioned that he wanted to meet me before I started because he was worried about my level of English. For the first few months, E asked me to send him drafts of my emails before I sent them to others. In documents and reports that I wrote in Google Workspace, he would often write sarcastic comments like "ChatGPT helped?" even when my texts were fine. Despite my Data Subject Access Request, these emails, documents, and reports were not provided to me. His comments typically criticized or were sarcastic about things I did correctly, demonstrating his pattern of discrimination and excessive scrutiny. E's behaviour frequently crossed the line of reasonable conduct, characterized by excessive criticism, micromanagement, and a lack of respect. As a manager, I received numerous complaints from staff about E, including his habit of texting or calling outside of work hours, sending abusive emails, and demanding excessive monitoring of flexitime schedules. Staff from the CE and TUS Schemes reported feeling ignored by him, especially when he would enter the building without introducing himself, despite some of these staff members having worked there longer than he had been on the board. Additionally, several board members resigned in conflict or because they were fed up with him. As this is a voluntary position, people are reluctant to engage with someone who behaves this way. E frequently made derogatory comments about people and displayed discriminatory behaviour, often undermining my proficiency based on my nationality and non-native English status. He would belittle me whenever I did not immediately understand something by asking if I needed him to translate, insinuating that my lack of understanding was due to my non-native English proficiency. This behaviour contributed to a hostile and discriminatory work environment, making it clear that my abilities were being unfairly questioned based on language rather than merit. He also made inappropriate insinuations during board meetings, suggesting that staff from the CE and TUS Schemes were prone to theft from the cash box, which created a deeply uncomfortable and unwelcoming atmosphere. Such actions not only undermine morale but also perpetuate a discriminatory work environment. These incidents represent the culmination of a series of improper actions by E towards both me and other staff members. On the 1st of March, during a staff meeting with E, concerns were raised about his behaviour, which was perceived as abusive. This behaviour included discrimination, talking down to people, excessive monitoring of work, manipulation of job contents and targets, and unfairly assigning blame for things beyond individuals' control. As the situation became increasingly confrontational, I attempted to mediate, emphasizing the importance of trust and collaboration within the team. I pointed out that E’s micromanagement was undermining my role as General Manager and creating discomfort among staff members. In response, E made veiled threats regarding my probationary status, attempting to assert dominance over the discussion. Despite our efforts to address the issues constructively, E persisted in individually criticizing staff members, creating a hostile environment. At one point, he demanded that I monitor L Comerford's hours, insinuating that she was not adhering to her contract. I firmly explained that L had a flexible time agreement, which she was following diligently and coordinating with me on a weekly basis. E’s insistence on scrutinizing L's hours caused her significant distress, leading her to tears. Ultimately, the staff members felt disrespected and unsupported, prompting them to leave the meeting. On the 6th of March, E mentioned in an email exchange with A  that I had "threatened with WRC action." Interestingly, the WRC deals specifically with the types of behaviors I have described above, corroborating my claim that I was opposing his discrimination. In this email, we can also see the authoritarian style E often uses to abuse his power, repeatedly stating, "I’m his line-manager," and referring to me as "challenging my right to manage" simply because staff were constructively addressing issues and perceived his behavior as abusive. In another email that E sent to me you can see the same authoritarian style: "please revert to me as chair and your line-manager." He asked me to excessively monitor L, recommending that she report to me "with a weekly diary of tasks completed over the week" and "L’s times with a week in advance," even though L and I had always reached perfect agreement on her roster, and the staff handbook only requires a 48-hour notice, which allows L to manage her personal life. E also claims that I "don't accept criticism" when I pointed out that he didn’t trust my ability to ensure safety and manage rosters while I was on leave and that he was constantly overseeing my work. As further proof of his retaliatory behaviour toward both L and me for addressing our concerns about his conduct, E removed L from her role as Bookkeeper, as shown in the email from the 8th of March, and reassigned her as a receptionist at the gym. Since she was not on probation, he couldn't take further action against her. On the 4th of March, A asked me for a probation review meeting on the 7th of March. Based on other emails exchanged after the staff meeting on the 1st of March, E was pushing A to conduct a probation review. We can see that A asked, "Can we clarify the set agreed factors for extending the probation period vs permanent/fixed contract being offered this time?" until E presented his distorted version of events, which shows that a permanent/fixed contract was being considered before I opposed E's discriminatory behaviour. This contradicts what was written in the dismissal letter regarding poor performance and demonstrates that my dismissal was an act of retaliation for opposing his discrimination. Additionally, the extension letter dated January 29th, 2024, states, "we look forward to your continued success with our organization," which shows appreciation for my performance. The meeting on March 19th was a complete ambush. E proceeded to critique various aspects of my management, alleging incomplete management reports (despite adherence to approved templates and fulfilling all requested information) and questioning the validity of increased gym sales figures for January and February. Furthermore, I was unjustly blamed for not arranging personal training sessions during these months. Attempting to address the situation professionally, I suggested streamlining processes and consolidating data into a single spreadsheet to avoid redundancy. However, the chairperson immediately engaged in a heated argument, to which I calmly responded, "I'm sorry, but I won't engage in further argumentation," as confirmed by an email from C. In response, he abruptly requested my departure from the meeting. It is clear that E intended to ambush me in a situation that could be used to justify dismissing me in retaliation for opposing his discriminatory behaviour. The fact is, no disciplinary procedure was opened against me, and I did not engage in any misconduct that would warrant accusations of "poor conduct and repeated unwillingness to communicate and work with the Board and the Chair." I simply refused to engage in another discussion that I knew E was trying to use as a pretext for my dismissal. This clearly shows that my dismissal was unfair, based on unreasonable grounds, as E sought to cover up that my dismissal was an act of revenge for opposing his race discriminatory behaviour. The messages I received from the staff expressed strong disapproval of E's decision. One staff member wrote, "Just wanted you to know we are all disgusted with E’s decision and do not support him in any way." Another stated, "Just so unfair and beyond ridiculous. There was no need for what happened, and I am sorry on behalf of CB that you were treated this way." These messages clearly show that the staff unanimously recognize the injustice of the situation and stand in solidarity with me. Despite my efforts to have them testify today, they chose not to appear due to fear of reprisal.

Complaint Reference – CA-00064888-003: Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 - Annual Leave

During my tenure at CB from 4 September 2023 to 29 March 2024, I used a total of 17 days of annual leave. The days taken were as follows: 5 days from 13 to 17 November 2023 (Agreed prior the sign of contract) 3 days from 27 to 29 December 2023 2 days from 2 to 3 January 2024 1 day on 12 January 2024 1 day on 19 January 2024 1 day on 26 January 2024 1 day on 23 February 2024 3 days from 26 to 28 February 2024 On 15 March 2024, I worked from 10:30 to 18:00. I distinctly remember closing the gym with F. On that day, D was on annual leave, and J was off since it was the first week we started closing the gym earlier due to staff shortages. J started working Saturdays instead from 16 March 2024. Regarding my dismissal, it has been stated that I was on annual leave on 22 March 2024 after being dismissed, which I believe is an act of bad faith. According to my employment contract, Clause 2 (Appendix 1), "Salaries are paid on a weekly basis, every Thursday." Therefore, my salary should have been paid up to the Thursday following my dismissal, including any accrued annual leave, as annual leave is a right of the employee and should not be used to reduce final pay. Furthermore, the company's calculation of my annual leave is incorrect as it does not account for all the days I worked and the additional hours I accumulated. Specifically, it does not consider the 1 day worked on Saturday, 16 December 2023, as evidenced in the Hour Roster and Timesheet. The extra hours worked are as follows:

2.5 hours extra on 4 January 2024

2 hours extra on 30 January 2024

4.5 hours extra on 6 February 2024

3.5 hours extra on 16 February 2024 1 hour extra on 19 February 2024

4.5 hours extra on 21 February 2024 0.5 hours extra on 22 February 2024

1 hour extra on 29 February 2024

0.5 hours extra on 4 March 2024

0.5 hours extra on 5 March 2024

0.5 hours extra on 7 March 2024.

This totals 21 extra hours, equivalent to approximately 3 days of work. As stated in Clause 2 of my employment contract, my standard working hours are 37.5 per week. The Hour Roster and Timesheet demonstrate these additional 21 hours beyond my contracted hours. Consequently, 6 days of my annual leave are effectively being withheld. According to Section 23 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997, "If the employment ends in the first half of the leave year, the employee should be compensated for any annual leave in that leave year and the previous leave year." Thus, my annual leave should have been appropriately compensated.

Complaint Reference – CA-00064888-004: Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994

Clause 3 of my employment contract is not in compliance with the European Union (Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions) Regulations 2022. As of 1 August 2022, if an employee is subject to a probationary period at the commencement of employment, that period shall not exceed six months. An extension of the probationary period may only occur under exceptional circumstances for up to a further six months (up to a maximum of 12 months in total). Such an extension must be deemed in the employee's interest or if the employee has been on extended leave. In my case, the extension of my probationary period beyond six months was not justified, as it was neither in my interest nor did I take any extended leave during my tenure at CB. The extension letter cites "taking into account the study leave you have taken during this period" as the reason for the extension. However, study leave is not included in the exceptions for extending a probation period. Furthermore, I only took 3 days of annual leave in January 2024, as evidenced by the Hour Roster  and Timesheet, which does not constitute extended leave. Additionally, I requested to work from home on Thursdays and Fridays in January to attend my Ph.D. classes, as noted in the Board meeting of 14 December 2023. This request was denied with the suggestion of taking annual leave instead. Consequently, I had to take 3 days of annual leave to attend my classes, with the board's knowledge. Despite being for educational purposes, this leave cannot be considered study leave, as the employer did not facilitate any support for my educational development. This is contrary to Clause 10 of my employment contract, which states that "Waterford LEDC CLG, insofar as practicable, will support your private educational development around a flexible work schedule where agreed in advance." For these reasons, the extension of my probation period is based on unfair treatment and bad faith. I acted in accordance with the board's directives and approval, yet my probation was extended based on unreasonable grounds. Moreover, this extension beyond the six-month period constitutes a breach of the European Union Regulations 2022 (Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions).

Summary of Respondent’s Case:

CA-00062536-001 Employment Equality Act 1998

It is respectfully submitted that on the face of the Complaint forms lodged on 2 April 2024 and on 20 July 2024 the Complainant alleges that he was “…dismissed for a discriminatory reason or for opposing discrimination” which is/ are denied. It is denied that Complainant was discriminated against and furthermore it is denied that he was constructively dismissed or dismissed “for a discriminatory reason or for opposing discrimination” at all. It is respectfully submitted that the Complainant bears the burden of proof in respect of his complaint to the WRC, which is denied and disputed. Furthermore, it is respectfully submitted that on the face of the Complaint forms lodged on 2 April 2024 and on 20 July 2024 the Complainant has not specified on what ground(s), as set out in s6 of the said Act (Discrimination for the purposes of this Act), he is making the purported complaint (s). In view of this it is respectfully submitted that as the Complainant has not pleaded any ground(s) of discrimination as per s6 of the said Act he has not pleaded any cause of action.                   Relevant case law is submitted – Louth VEC v Brannigan 2016 IESC 40 1 (Mr Justice McKechnie) and 2016 IESC 40 2 (Mr Justice MacMenamin).

It is respectfully submitted that the Complainant must satisfy the requirement to establish a prima facie case of discrimination as required by s85A(1) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2015 which provides as follows: “Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.”

The issue of the burden of proof was addressed in the Adjudicator decision bearing reference number ADJ-00042623 in the following terms:

“In practical terms, issues related to the burden of proof were set out in the case of Minaguchi v Wineport Lakeshore Restaurant [DEC-E2002-020] as a requirement for a complainant to prove a prima facie case after which the burden would shift to a respondent. The steps to establishing a prima facie case were set out in Minaguchi and can be summarised as follows:

1. The complainant is a person with the relevant characteristic that brings them within the discriminatory round
2. The complainant has been subjected to specific treatment.

iii. The treatment in question is less favourable than that experienced or that would be experienced by a person that does not share relevant discriminatory ground and characteristic...”

The issue of the burden of proof was further addressed in the Adjudicator decision bearing reference number ADJ-00042623 in the following terms:

“...The Labour Court considered the extent of the evidential burden that a complainant must discharge before a prima facie case of discrimination can be made out in Teresa Mitchell v Southern Health Board [2001} ELR 201. In that case it was held that the first requirement is that the complainant must establish fact from which it may be presumed that the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them. This indicates that the complainant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which he will seek to rely in raising a presumption of unlawful discrimination. It is submitted that it is only if the primary facts are established and are regarded as of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination that the onus shifts to the respondent to prove that there is no infringement of the principle of equal treatment... As set out in Melbury Developments Ltd v Valpeters [2010] ELR 64, "mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn..." Notwithstanding that the circumstances of each case are different, it is respectfully submitted that only when the Complainant has discharged the burden of proof that the burden shifts to the Respondent. To do this “...the complainant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which he will seek to rely in raising a presumption of unlawful discrimination. It is submitted that it is only if the primary facts are established and are regarded as of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination that the onus shifts to the respondent to prove that there is no infringement of the principle of equal treatment...” In so doing the Complainant cannot rely on “..."mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn..."

In view of the foregoing and matters that arise at the hearing of the matter, it is respectfully submitted that the Complainant should not succeed in his complaint(s) under the Employment Equality Act 1998, as amended, and is not entitled to any form of redress provided for under the said Act, or otherwise.

CA-00064888-002 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

It is respectfully submitted that the Complainant has not particularised his complaint and bears the burden of proof in respect of his complaint to the WRC, which is denied and disputed. The Complainant generally alleges that he worked between 48 to 52 hours per week between 29 January 2024 to 1 March 2024, which is denied and disputed. A table was submitted containing an extract of the hours worked by the Complainant for the period he refers to which demonstrates that the Act was not breached.

CA-00064888-003 Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

It is respectfully submitted that the Complainant has not particularised his complaint and bears the burden of proof in respect of his complaint to the WRC, which is denied and disputed. The Complainant generally alleges that he worked 10 to 12 hour shifts over six days a week for a month, which is denied and disputed. It is respectfully submitted that the Complainant has not specified when this purportedly occurred. It is further submitted that the Complainant has not specified what the exact nature of his complaint as regards purported hours worked and leave accrued, which is denied and disputed. It is respectfully submitted that the Complainant accrued 12.5 days annual leave between 4 September 2023 and 29 March 2024 (29 weeks and 4 days = 29.57/ 52 = 0.57 * 22 = 12.5 days). The 12.5 days were taken as follows: 5 days from 13 to 17 November 2023; 3 days from 27 to 29 December 2023; 2 days from 2 to 3 January 2024; 1 day 12 January 2024; 1 day 19 January 2024; ½ day 26 January 2024- total of 12.5 days. It is respectfully submitted that the Complainant was granted the following: 1.5 days in lieu for Sunday 17 December 2023 and 1 day in lieu for each of Saturday 6 January, 3 February, 10 February, 17 February and 2 March 2024. This equates to a total of 6.5 days and these days were taken as follows: ½ day on 26 January; 1 day on 23 February; 3 days on 26 to 28 February; 1 day on 15 March; 1 day on 22 March. In view of the foregoing and matters that arise at the hearing of the matter, it is respectfully submitted that the Complainant should not succeed in his complaint(s) under the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997, as amended and is not entitled to any form of redress provided for under the said Act, or otherwise.

CA-00064888-004 Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994

The Complainant generally alleges that Respondent applied a period of probation to his contract of employment in contravention of the said Act, which is denied and disputed. It is respectfully submitted that in accordance with the Complainant’s contract of employment that his employment was subject to a probationary period of 3 months from the time that he undertook full time hours on or about 20 November 2023. It is further submitted that in accordance with the contract of employment at Clause 3 the probation period could be extended for up to a period of 11 months. The Employee Handbook addresses the matters of the contract of employment and the probationary period which sets out a 6 month period which can be extended by a further 3 months.

It is respectfully submitted that on 29 January 2024 the Respondent issued a letter to the Complainant extending the probationary period by 3 months effective from 30 January 2024. The reason for the extension was to take account time spent by the Complainant on study leave and to complete period of full time work to evaluate his performance. s6D of the said Act is entitled maximum duration of probationary period and reads as follows:

s6D (1) Subject to this section, where an employee has entered into a contract of employment with an employer which provides for a probationary period, such period shall not exceed 6 months.

(2) The probationary period of a public servant shall not exceed 12 months.

(3) The probationary period referred to in subsection (1) may, on an exceptional basis, be longer where such longer period –

(a) does not exceed 12 months, and

(b) would be in the interest of the employee...

It is respectfully submitted that the period of probation as provided for in the Complainant’s contract of employment was in compliance with s6D insofar as it did not exceed a period of 6 months. The period of 3 months to commence on or about 20 November 2023 would have expired on or about 19 February 2024 had the probation not been extended. It is respectfully submitted that this is within the period of the first 6 months of employment which commenced on 4 September 2023 and extended to 3 March 2024. It is further respectfully submitted that the extension of 3 months by way of letter dated 29 January 2024 meant that the probation period was for a period of under 6 months from 20 November 2023. 6 months from 20 November 2024 runs to 19 May 2024 whereas the 3 months from 29 January 2024 would have run to 28 April 2024. Furthermore, the entire period of probation, both initial and extended, was well within the first 12 months of the date of commencement of employment which was 4 September 2023. It is respectfully submitted this complies with s6D(3)(a). It is respectfully submitted that the adjustment of the probation period was due to taking into account study leave and to provide a complete period of time to evaluate the Complainant’s performance. It is respectfully submitted that this constitutes an exceptional basis and was in the interest of the Complainant. It is respectfully submitted this complies with s6D(3)(b). In view of the foregoing and matters that arise at the hearing of the matter, it is respectfully submitted that the Complainant should not succeed in his complaint(s) under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994, as amended and is not entitled to any form of redress provided for under the said Act, or otherwise.

Findings and Conclusions:

CA-00062536-001 & CA-00064888-001    Employment Equality Act 1998

The Complainant submitted a complaint “that he was dismissed for a discriminatory reason or for opposing discrimination”.  This was the wording used in the complaint form.  The Complainant subsequently produced a submission, claiming discrimination and victimisation for “being a foreigner”, as outlined in the Complainant’s case summarised above.  The Respondent submitted that on the face of the Complaint forms lodged on 2 April 2024 and on 20 July 2024 the Complainant had not specified on what ground(s), as set out in s6 of the said Act (Discrimination for the purposes of this Act), he is making the purported complaint(s). It was submitted that as the Complainant has not pleaded any ground(s) of discrimination as per s6 of the said Act he has not pleaded any cause of action.                    

The applicable law

The Employment Equality Act 1998 prohibits discrimination as between any two persons in employment on the following nine grounds as contained in Section 6 (2) of the Act as follows:

• (a) That one is a woman and the other is a man (in this Act referred to as “the gender ground”).
• (b) That they are of different civil status (in this Act referred to as “the civil status ground”).
• (c) That one has family status and the other does not (in this Act referred to as “the family status ground”).
• (d) That they are of different sexual orientation (in this Act referred to as “the sexual orientation ground”).
• (e) That one has a different religious belief from the other, or that one has a religious belief and the other has not (in this Act referred to as “the religion ground”).
• (f) That they are of different ages, but subject to subsection (3) (in this Act referred to as “the age ground”).
• (g) That one is a person with a disability and the other either is not or is a person with a different disability (in this Act referred to as “the disability ground”).
• (h) That they are of a different race, colour, nationality or ethnic or national origins (in this Act referred to as “the ground of race”).
• (i) That one is a member of the Traveller community and the other is not (in this Act referred to as “the traveller community ground”).

In order to have a complaint considered a Complainant must identify one or more grounds on which it is contended discrimination has occurred.  In this instant case, no ground was cited by the Complainant on his complaint form.   The complaint form outlined many complaints and grievances he had against the Respondent.  While no ground was selected, he did make a submission in which he stated “My dismissal is based on unreasonable grounds. During my time at CB, I was consistently a victim of discrimination for being a foreigner established on ground of race discrimination. 

Burden of proof

Section 85A of the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2011 sets out the burden of proof as follows:

“(1) Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a Complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to her or her, it is for the Respondent to prove the contrary.”

Put simply, the onus in the first instance lies with the Complainant to establish the primary facts from which it may be inferred that discrimination has occurred.  If these facts are established substantiated by evidence, the burden of proof then shifts to the Respondent to prove that discrimination did not occur.

The extent of evidential burden has been established by the Labour Court in The Southern Health Board v Dr Teresa Mitchell DEE 011 where the Court found that the Complainant must :

“establish facts from which it may be presumed that the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them.  This indicates that a claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination.             It is only if these primary facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, and they are regarded by the Court as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the onus shifts to the respondent to prove that there was no infringement of the principle of equal treatment”.

In Elephant Haulage Ltd v Garbacevs The Labour Court stressed that facts based on credible evidence were necessary to prove a prima facie case of discrimination and that “mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn.”  The Court observed that the language of Section 85A admitted of no exceptions to the evidential rule laid down.

The Complainant in this instant case has firstly not identified the ground on which he based his claim and then submitted general assertions that he had been dismissed “based on unreasonable grounds”. He stated that he “was consistently a victim of discrimination for being a foreigner established on ground of race discrimination”.  The Act prohibits discrimination as between any two persons where they are of a different race or national origin.  The Complainant has failed to establish any facts or identify a comparator where he was treated less favourably than another in respect of race or national origin.  

I find the complaint to be not well founded.

CA-00064888-002            Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

The complaint under this section of the Act is that the Complainant was required to work more than the maximum permitted number of hours. 

The applicable law

Section 15 of the Act provides:

“15.-(1) An employer must not permit an employee to work, in each period of 7 days, more than an average of 48 hours, that is to say an average of 48 hours calculated over a period (hereafter in this section referred to as a “reference period”) that does not exceed –

(a) 4 months…”

The Complainant submitted his own record of extra hours worked between the period 4 January to 7 March 2024.  This equated to 21 extra hours over a 2 month period.  The Respondent also submitted records in support of its contention that the Act was not breached in respect of the maximum number of hours.

I have reviewed the records provided and find no breach of the Act in relation to the relevant period.  I find the complaint to be not well founded.

CA-00064888-003            Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

The complaint is that the Complainant did not receive his paid annual leave entitlement.

The applicable law

Section 19 (1) of the 1997 Act provides that  

… an employee shall be entitled to paid annual leave (in this Act referred to as “ annual leave”) equal to—

( a) 4 working weeks in a leave year in which he or she works at least 1,365 hours (unless it is a leave year in which he or she changes employment)”.

Decision:

Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaints in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.

CA-00062536-001            Employment Equality Act 1998

Based on the evidence and findings, I find the complaint to be not well founded.  

CA-00064888-001            Employment Equality Act 1998

Based on the evidence and findings, I find the complaint to be not well founded.  

CA-00064888-002            Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

Based on the evidence and findings, I find the complaint to be not well founded.  

CA-00064888-003            Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

Based on the evidence and findings, I find the complaint to be not well founded.

CA-00064888-004   Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994

Based on the evidence and findings, I find the complaint to be not well founded.  

Dated:   11-11-24

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer:  Gaye Cunningham

Key Words: