ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00048167
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Brendan Connor | Irish Rail/Iarnrod Eireann |
Representatives | Stephen O’Sullivan BL instructed by Denis O Mahony Gallagher McCartney Barry Solicitors | John Brosnan HR Irish Rail |
Complaint(s):
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 | CA-00059218-001 | 04/10/2023 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973 | CA-00059218-002 | 04/10/2023 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 | CA-00059218-003 | 04/10/2023 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 | CA-00059218-004 | 04/10/2023 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 19/04/24 and 27/06/2024
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Janet Hughes
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 - 2015, Section 79 of the Employment Equality Act 1998 following the referral of the complaints to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaints and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaints.
The hearing was conducted over two days. The parties relied on submissions. At the conclusion of the first day of the hearing I advised the parties that having heard the submissions I was of the view that the Complainant had met the test as required under the burden of proof section of the Employment Equality Act as follows:
“85A. — (1) Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.”
The Respondent was advised that they now had the opportunity to make a further submission on the objective grounds justifying the treatment of the Complainant. This preliminary conclusion was reached on the basis that the Complainant was retired solely on grounds of his age and for no other reason and therefore the existence of a decision based on age was not a trivial matter but provided the fundamental reason for the decision.
At the conclusion of the first day of hearing the parties were also advised that in the event that I were to find that there was no discrimination on grounds of age I would then move to exercise my jurisdiction under section 101(2)(b) which states:
“Where an individual has referred a case to the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commissionunder section 77(1) and either a settlement has been reached by mediation or the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commissionhas begun an investigation under section 79, the individual—
(b) if he or she was dismissed before so referring the case, shall not be entitled to seek redress (or to exercise, or continue to exercise, any other power) under the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 to 1993 in respect of the dismissal, unless the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission, having completed the investigation and in an appropriate case, directs otherwise and so notifies the complainant and respondent.”
On the basis of the notification to the parties the Complainant was requested to provide a supplementary submission on a complaint of unfair dismissal to be considered in the event that the investigation into the complaint under the Employment Equality Act when entirely complete was determined to be not well founded.
The parties provided supplementary submissions as requested and the matter was fully debated out to conclusion on the second day of hearing.
Background:
The complaint under the Employment Equality Act 1998 is concerned with the decision of the Respondent to retire the Complainant shortly after the turned age 66, broadly on the basis that the Complainant was no longer employed as a gate keeper and the exception to work to age 70 for those employed as gatekeepers who were not members of the pension scheme did not apply in his case. The pension age of sixty-six which applied to those who were members of the Company pension scheme was applied to the Complainant as his retirement age. There are additional complaints in respect of pay in lieu of notice. Section 101(2)(b) is submitted as providing the basis for consideration of the main issue under the Unfair Dismissals Act, should the complaint under the EEA not succeed. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
The Complainant was employed as a gatekeeper by Irish Rail from the 27/03/00 until 02/06/23. He did not receive a contract of employment/terms of employment. The Complainant’s salary was €35,970.71 and he was contracted to work 48 hours.
In 2021 the Complainant was offered a voluntary severance to include redundancy in the total sum of €75,196.40. The Complainant turned it down on the understanding that he could work until age 70.
Following the automation of the Claremorris gates in August 2017 the Complainant went to Westport Station on an as required basis getting €20 per day expenses doing cleaning duties and covering for staff who were absent on leave. On or after 06/06/22 the Complainant was required to move to Westport Station on a gatekeeper’s salary to provide assistance with Westport including customer service and cleaning duties. The Complainant was paid travelling expenses. Based on service the Complainant was entitled to eight weeks’ notice of termination. The Complainant was dismissed by letter on the 29/05/23 for allegedly reaching retirement age 66. Termination was effective from the 02/06/23. He received an ex-gratia payment of €9,523 plus outstanding holidays.
It is the contention of the Complainant that the normal retirement age for him was not 66 but 70 years. There was an express or implied agreement by custom and practice that gatekeepers who were not a member of the Irish Rail Pension Scheme could work until 70. Many other gatekeepers worked beyond 66. In a previous ADJ in respect of the Complainant, 00002349, concerning access to the Irish Rail Pension, the adjudicator officer noted from the submission of Irish Rail that, “Mr Connor not being a member of the pension scheme has an option to remain working until 70 years of age.” Correspondence with the then SIPTU official in January 2006 which dealt with the issue of gatekeepers who were not part of the pension scheme stated, “The directive issued by the CMO is that gatekeepers must retire when they reach 70 years of age”. It is submitted that with the stated requirement comes the entitlement to work until reaching the age of 70 in the case of the Complainant who is not a member of the pension scheme.
In 2017 in a letter dated the 29th of September to a colleague of the Complainant it was stated:
“The normal retirement age is 65/66 for all roles within Iarnród Éireann, with the exception of gatekeepers who are not members of the pension scheme. They may work until age 70 provided they are medically fit and there is a role for them”.
On 09/06/22 the HR of Irish Rail (the representative in this hearing) stated, “The age of retirement in the company is 66 and this applies to all employees”. On 27/05/23 the Complainant emailed a Mr Walsh and claimed he could work to age 70. Mr Walsh replied to say gatekeepers who are not a member of the pension scheme could work to age 70 “on condition they were fit to work beyond normal retirement age and there was a level crossing still open”. It was submitted that this contradicted the earlier position of Mr Brosnan of HR. The Complainant submitted that the employer must put before the WRC all correspondence or agreements pertaining to retirement age disputing that the condition in the italicised part is as stated by Sean Walsh. Data sourced through a DSAR did not contain any data concerning his dismission or his terms of employment. It was submitted that the Complainant must prove the retirement age for him was not age 66 and must then show objective justification for a retirement age of 66. The Complainant relies on the Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Longer Working) (Declaration) Order 2017.
Regarding the claim in respect of notice under the Minimum Notice Act and the Payment of Wages the Complainant was entitled to eight weeks’ notice of dismissal with the letter of 29/05/23. In the event that the Complainant does not succeed in the EEA or UDA claim it is submitted that there was an implied term by express agreement or custom and practice to offer voluntary redundancy to gatekeepers who wished to continue to work to age 70. The Complainant therefore seeks the voluntary redundancy on the terms set out in paragraph 2.
The summary of the Complainant’s second submission (requested at the conclusion of the first day of hearing) was as follows:-
The Comparator Issue
The Complainant was dismissed because he reached the age of 66. It is clear that if the Complainant was younger than 66, he would not have been dismissed. Age was the sole reason for the termination. Reference was made to Bolger Employment Equality Law 2 Ed. States that it is permissible to show a hypothetical comparator in an age discrimination claim:
“The 1998 Act prohibits direct and indirect discrimination on the grounds of age. In a departure from Directives on sex discrimination, the comparator can be actual or hypothetical, as the complainant can by virtue of Art.(2)(a) of the Framework Directive argue that he or she has been treated less favourably than another would have been if in a comparable situation. In Perry v Garda Commissioner, the Equality Officer used the device of a hypothetical comparator to assess the effect of a criterion which it was alleged was discriminatory… and in Cox v RTÉ the employee was permitted to use two contractors – that is, those without the same employment status as she had – as comparators to show that other workers had been allowed to work beyond 65.”
The Complainant then went on to name relevant comparators in any event which are quoted directly hereunder:
“The following is the list of gatekeepers who worked beyond 66, to the best of the Complainant’s knowledge and belief. (i) KM worked to age 70 doing gatekeeper duties. She was not in the pension scheme. (ii) MH worked to age 67 doing gatekeeper duties until his gates were automated. After that, he did as required duties e.g., cleaning in Westport. He was not in the pension scheme. Mr H was offered a voluntary severance calculated to a RA of age 70. He received a severance payment for termination of his employment. (ii) AC was a gatekeeper at Claremorris. At age 65 he was not doing gatekeeper duties and was not in the pension scheme. He received voluntary severance aged 65 calculated to a RA of age 70. The following gatekeepers were under 66 at the date of dismissal (of the Complainant) 2nd/6/23 but have continued to be employed by Irish Rail. (iv) JC gatekeeper based in Claremorris going to Westport on an as required basis doing cleaning duties getting X expenses aged 62 in pension – he and the Complainant are the only two gatekeepers left in the West or Ireland”.
The Complainant chooses the first three named former employees and/or the remaining named employee as a comparator.
On the matter of the medical fitness which is raised as an objective ground by the Respondent the supplementary submission gave detail of the Complainant’s medical issues which commenced prior to his employment with the Respondent. In 2019 the CMO informed the Complainant orally that there was a risk that the auditors would come in and therefore he was deemed to be unfit for safety critical duties, however the CMO also noted that he was not doing safety critical duties at that time: “Mr Connor attended the medical department on the 8th of February 2019. He continues fit for his present duties. Please note that he would not be fit for safety critical duties”. In response to the CMO in February 2019 the Respondent sought clarification stating:
“Fit for present duties is nonspecific. We don’t know what the medical department are referring to. It may have been a private conversation between Brendan and the CMO doctor. Brendan’s grade is “gatekeeper”. Gatekeeping is safety critical. As it happens, the grade is no longer required in the IMO West area so this won’t pose a problem for that activity. However, we will be obliged to inform DTE’s and RU managers who may want to avail of Brendan’s surplus and available for redeployment status that he is not actually available to redeploy for safety critical duties. Could you clarify what the medical department are referring to as his “present duties”? Or is this just straightforward “unfit” and therefore prohibited from all safety critical duties? When we get clarification we will need to endorse the “Surplus” file where we record opportunities and options for surplus staff to redeploy or exit on VS, as Brendan may have to be excluded from redeployment opportunities involving Safety critical work.”
The CMO responded: “The Chief Medical Officer understands that Mr Connors present duty involves cleaning trains. His vision is below standard for safety critical duties such as forklift driving.” To this the management replied:
“We will ensure that the CMO Dept are contacted if there is an organisational requirement to consider Brendan for any duties outside of train cleaning which may carry safety critical risk, and we will inform relevant personnel to limit Brendan to Non Safety Critical duties immediately.”
There were further medical appointments in 2020 and 2021. The summary of the reports was that he was not fit for a platelayer job which he applied for and other references to necessary lenses. In the report on 14/04/21 the CMO stated, “He continues fit for his current restricted duties”. A face-to-face appointment was arranged for April and later May 2023 which did not take place. Summarising the impact of the medical reports the submission was that the CMO never provided a full report or detailed reasons as to why the Complainant was not suitable for safety critical duties or allowed the Complainant to challenge that conclusion by way of his own medical evidence or otherwise. At the time of his termination from 11/12/19 and the related medical report the Complainant was not required to do safety critical duties, and the medical issue did not debar him from working. The only occasion in the period 12/19 to May 2023 when the medical issue regarding his eyesight was relevant to his role was when he applied for the platelayer position, but the CMO deemed him unsuitable for level 3 duties. There was no medical issue regarding the duties in Westport at the time he was retired by the Respondent.
Regarding the documentation submitted by the Respondent, there is nothing in the 2004 agreement which imposes a requirement that a level crossing would remain open or that a worker would be deemed fit for level crossing duties or safety critical duties in order for the Complainant to be retained beyond age 65 (where they are not in the pension scheme). Reference to the Statutory Instrument 63/2006 did not apply to the Complainant as he was not a member of the pension scheme and the Statutory Instrument purports to change the retirement age to 66 only “for the purposes of this scheme”.
A letter to the Conciliation Officer dated the 26/01/2022 stating that the Complainant and one other do not have an option to work until 70 as neither of them had a gatekeeper’s position cannot of itself amount to a grade variation to the contract of employment. It is merely a representation by the employer. The Respondent must show the origin of an agreement to this effect, and it was submitted that no such agreement has been provided to this hearing. It is submitted that the Complainant’s terms and conditions as a gatekeeper remained despite his duties changing. He was still recorded by Irish Rail as a gatekeeper. The document dated the 29th of September 2017 wherein the Complainant was assigned to Westport duties (not as a gatekeeper) did not alter the retirement age of the Complainant. The Complainant worked beyond his date of birth (i.e., the 23/05/23) for at least ten days at Westport Station doing duties other than gatekeeping duties and duties that were not safety critical duties.
Responding to certain precedents and legal submissions the Complainant submitted as follows, “The principle of res judicata does not apply where the Claimant was not a party to those earlier proceedings.” Regarding John Coyle v Irish Rail can be distinguished where under the findings and conclusions it is stated:
“The Complainant’s complaint revolves around the key contention that, as part of his original contract of employment, he was entitled to work on to age 70 and that his 70th birthday was his normal retirement date. The key component in the Respondent’s submission is that, by joining the wages grade pension scheme in 2004, the Complainant is bound by the terms of that scheme, which sets retirement age for members at age 66.
While no documentary evidence was provided in respect of the Complainant’s original contract of employment, it is generally accepted that his terms accommodating working until age 70.”
It was submitted that the decision is therefore authority that the normal retirement age for a gatekeeper (who was not in the pension scheme) was 70 and that the Complainant’s retirement age in that other case was 65 because the Complainant therein had joined the pension scheme. The decision in Doreen Healy v Irish Rail can be distinguished for the same reason where it was stated:
“The employer disputes that there was a breach in the Complainant’s contract that details that the worker would have known that her retirement age had changed from 70 to 65 to no later than 66 and that the details of this pension scheme are governed by a statutory instrument as a result of her signing up to the pension scheme”.
The Complainant was not ever a member of the Irish Rail pension scheme nor was he eligible to join that scheme as he did not officially commence salaried employment with Irish Rail until he was over 50 years old. The following representation made by Irish Rail in earlier proceedings was unqualified, “Mr Connor not being a member of the pension scheme has an option to remain working until 70 years of age.” This makes it more difficult for Irish Rail to justify the dismissal under the EEA where the Complainant did not accrue a pension while working for Irish Rail.
The UDA Claim
It is submitted that if the Complainant fails on the EEA claim he wishes to proceed with the claim under the Unfair Dismissal Act on the basis that the dismissal was substantively unfair for the following reasons: (i) the dismissal was on the grounds of age (therefore contrary to s6.1 of the UDA; (ii) Irish Rail has failed to establish that [the] normal RA was 66 or that the Complainant could work until 70 only if certain conditions were satisfied (therefore cannot come within the exception in s. 2(1)(b)of the UDA. Further it is submitted that dismissal was procedurally unfair for the following reasons: (i) Irish Rail did not comply with the Code of Practice on Longer Working in material respects; (ii) Irish Rail failed to make the RA clear to the Complainant at the material times and well in advance of his reaching 66.
Reinstatement was sought by way of redress for the following reasons: (i) the Complainant lost out on a valuable voluntary severance package which he had previously turned down because he was confident, and had every reason to be confident, that his employment would continue to 70; (ii) the Complainant had long service, in excess of 23 years; (iii) the Complainant was excluded from the pension scheme and was excluded at that time because of his age; (iv) Irish Rail is a large employer with a large number of employees. There is no reason to think there would be acrimony between the Complainant and Irish Rail if reinstatement is ordered. Finally, regarding email correspondence in June 2022 where a Mr Philip O’Brien passed to Mr Brosnan a query from the Complainant with regard to his redeployment to Westport Station: “Regarding transfer to Westport, could I have a letter outlining my retirement age would be if I accept this offer signed by someone with the authority to do so. Thanks”. The response from Mr Brosnan was, “The age of retirement in the company is 66 and this applies to all employees” and Mr O’Brien in turn forwarded that email to an Irene O’Hara to be passed for the information of Mr Connor. Asked why the Complainant did not take any action following that disclosure, the hearing was informed that there was a response from Mr Connor dated April 2022-t hat response was subsequently submitted and copied to the Respondent. The response states as follows:
‘Thanks Irene. As I have it writing that I can work to age 70 this matter will have to be discussed further as part of the transfer.’ No further correspondence on this item or trail of communication in relation to same was provided by either party. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
In 2004 Iarnród Éireann concluded a new deal agreement for resident and non-resident level crossing keepers. Initially the resident level crossing keepers were the ones who had a once-off option to join the Wages Grade Pension Scheme for the first time. This was later extended to non-resident level crossing keepers. The agreement also provided that special arrangements might be made to retain level crossing keepers beyond age 65. In 2016 the Wages Grade Pension Scheme was amended by S.I. 63/2016 to raise the normal retirement age to 66. It was agreed that the retirement age for the CIÉ pension scheme would also be 66. As per the 2004 agreement a limited number of level crossing keepers who were not members of the pension scheme have remained working beyond age 65 but no later than 70 provided they are declared fit by the CMO for the role and that there is a valid business case for them to remain working, i.e., that the level crossing that they work at has not been automated. In 2011 the Complainant was provided with a voluntary severance estimate provided on the basis that his level crossing had been identified as one which could be automated into the future. He did not accept VS at this time. In September 2017 the Claremorris level crossing was automated and under the redeployment policy negotiations began with the Complainant. The Redeployment Policy was applied in his case. The Claremorris crossing had been automated since 2017 and therefore the Complainant had assumed a role supporting train cleaning in Westport on an as required basis. In 2019 the Complainant was deemed unfit for all safety critical roles including that of level crossing keeper by the CMO. In January 2021 the Complainant received a letter advising him that as his level crossing was now closed he must choose between redeployment, retraining and voluntary severance. The Complainant applied for a role in Athlone in 2021 but was unsuccessful. He also declined other offers of redeployment. Again, in May 2021 the Complainant was provided with a voluntary severance estimate which he declined in July 2021 the Complainant referred a matter to conciliation at the WRC concerning his entitlement to work until aged 70. There was no agreement reached at conciliation. During these engagements the company confirmed again that the retirement age for the Complainant would be 66 as he was no longer working as a level crossing keeper. Correspondence to the conciliation officer was submitted to the hearing in support of this contention and the Respondent is satisfied that the information contained in that correspondence was passed to the Complainant through his union official.
In December 2021 the Complainant was appointed to Westport Station carrying out train cleaning duties. He was appointed to the role on a red circle basis which meant that he retained his existing rate of pay but assumed the terms and conditions of his new role. The Respondent cited various precedents as determined by the Labour Court. Particular reference by way of a comparable case was made to the decision in Transdev Light Rail Limited v Michael Chrzanowski (EDA1632) where the Court found that a mandatory retirement age for tram drivers was “reasonable and appropriate and accordingly amounted to objective justification for that maximum retirement age”. Further, the Respondent relied on a decision in Transdev v Peter Doody (EDA243) as providing a legal principle for res judicata in the current case. The Respondent submitted that two virtually identical cases have previously been coursed through the State’s industrial machinery and this complaint should be estopped on the basis of res judicata. The complaints for payment in lieu of notice submitted under the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act and the Payment of Wages Act were rejected as having no validity. In summary, the Complainant was not selected for retirement. He retired upon reaching the mandatory retirement age for his role.
In this supplemental submission to the second day of hearing and in response to a request for further information and submissions the Respondent provided information on the treatment of comparable employees as in level crossing keepers. The following is the information directly provided by the Respondent:
“The company checked available records to see if there have been any employees who had retired in the same circumstances as Mr Connor, i.e., a level crossing keeper not in the pension scheme whose gate had been automated and was retired at 66 (or previously 65). There is only one employee in the records who retired in these circumstances. In 2008 X retired at the age of 65. She was not in the pension scheme and her gate had been automated. In all other cases level crossing keepers retired in one of the following circumstances:
· They were members of the pension scheme and retired at either age 65 or 66. · They were not members of the pension scheme and retired at or before the age of 70 in a gatekeeper position”.
Under objective justification as per the company main submission: “There is a mandatory retirement age for all staff to ensure that they are able to perform their roles safely to safeguard their colleagues and members of the travelling public”. Collective agreements provide that on redeployment the terms and conditions of a new role transfer with the redeployment and this protocol is in a collective agreement with the trade union group. There is a collective agreement with the trade union group regarding a mandatory age of retirement of 66. The only exception to the agreed mandatory age of retirement has been some level crossing keepers who were not in the pension scheme, were medically fit to continue working beyond 66 and that there was a valid business reason to do so, i.e., “special arrangements” that were part of a collective agreement.
The Respondent cited a recent adjudication decision ADJ-00040284 where the adjudication officer acknowledged the relevance of a mandatory retirement age being provided for in a collective agreement between the Respondent and the relevant trade unions. Notice of the age of retirement was provided to the complainant and confirmed in writing to the conciliation officer in January 2021.
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Findings and Conclusions:
The Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Longer Working) (Declaration) Order 2017 (S.I. 600/2017) sets out best industrial relations practice in managing engagement between employers and employees in the runup to a mandatory retirement age. It also sets out a number of potential legitimate aims for setting a mandatory retirement age in the first place. The Code of Practice identifies the following examples of what constitutes legitimate aims by an employer followed by a conclusion (in italics) based on the facts in this case:
· Intergenerational fairness (allowing younger workers to progress); this element doesnot apply and was not argued by the Respondent in this case.
· Motivation and dynamism through the increased prospect of promotion; this exampledoes not apply and was not argued by the Respondent in this case.
· Health and safety (generally in more safety critical occupations); this element was argued by the Respondent in this case. Factually however, the work performed and role filled by the Complainant at the time when his employment was terminated was not a health and safety critical role. The determination of a health and safety critical role applied to the previous role of level crossing keeper from which the Complainant was transferred. The Respondent cannot retrospectively apply health and safety criteria from a different post and a specific assessment in 2019 to the compulsory retirement of the Complainant in 2023.
· Creation of a balanced age structure in the workforce; this element was not argued bythe Respondent and does not apply in this case.
· Personal and professional dignity (avoiding capability issues with older employees); this element was not put forward by the Respondent and does not apply in this case.
· Succession planning: this element was not put forward by the Respondent and doesnot apply in this case.
Repeated reference was made to decisions in Transdev where the employees concerned were tram drivers. The current case is distinguished from Transdevon two critical grounds (a) the complainant in the primary Transdev case as determined by the Labour Court was a member of, or did have access to a pension scheme, and (b) more critically, the complainant in that case was performing a safety critical role. Neither of these elements apply in the current case in Irish Rail. A third distinction can be made with the situation in Transdev in that the Respondent in this case as in Transdev would have argued the overall retirement age within the employment at age 66 and any related collective agreement to that effect. In this case the Respondent is attempting to apply a wholly different collective agreement to the Complainant in that the Respondent in or around 2022 in consultation with Trade Unions determined that the pensionable retirement age would be extended to age 66 to coincide with the date of implementation of the statutory age-related pension. The terms and conditions of the Complainant were determined by an entirely separate and unique collective agreement involving the category of level crossing keeper with particular reference to those who were not in membership of the pension scheme. That agreement provided that those who were not in the pension scheme would be allowed to work to age 70 whereas those who held the position of level crossing keeper and were in the pension scheme would not be permitted to stay beyond the wider age of 65, later 66, in the company. This was provided for in the collective agreement reached in respect of level crossing keepers where they were permitted to enter the company pension scheme. For reasons of age the Complainant did not have that option or could not exercise that option during his employment. There is simply no documented agreement with the Trade Unions, nor is there a term of a contract which provided for a compulsory retirement of the Complainant at age 66 when he was not in the pension scheme on grounds that he was no longer on gatekeeper duties.
In terms of the comparator the Respondent has been unable to provide an example of a person who was from the level crossing keeper category whether a level crossing keeper or assigned to another position who was not in the company pension scheme who was compulsorily retired prior to age 70 without any additional payment outside of the ex-gratia payment for those who are not in the company pension scheme. The Respondent did provide certain information to the second day of hearing regarding comparators. My estimation of that information is that there is no person who was compulsorily retired at age 65 or 66 who was or had previously been a level crossing keeper and who was not in the pension scheme. The treatment of the Complainant stands out as unique and the most disadvantageous compared to other employees who were active of former gatekeepers on reaching age 65(or later 66).
The Complainant was not replaced in his red circled role. The facts in this case indicate that the Complainant was made compulsorily redundant and not replaced in his position at age 66 for no reason other than his age and no objective reason to justify that decision has been advanced such as overcome the burden of proof test in the Employment Equality Act. In arriving at this conclusion, I am satisfied that in industrial relations terms the Complainant’s general terms and conditions of employment remained undisturbed when he transferred to the position in Westport and there was no additional significant factor as suggested by the relevant Statutory Instrument nor in any collective agreement which justified the decision of the Respondent.
Based on the facts, the complaint of discrimination under the protected ground of age is well founded.
The primary case made on behalf of the Complainant is one of discrimination on grounds of age under the Employment Equality Act. As that complaint is well founded, I am not required to move on to consider the question of dismissal under section 101.2.B of the Act.
In terms of redress given that the Complainant was in a supernumerary position and a further year has elapsed since his enforced retirement I do not consider reinstatement to be appropriate redress in the circumstances. It follows therefore that compensation is the redress option to be selected. In arriving at a fair and equitable decision on the amount of compensation to be paid by Irish Rail, I am taking into account the fact that the Complainant did directly receive a notice of sorts in June 2022 of the Respondents opinion that a retirement age of 66 applying in his instance. While the communication did not specifically say that he would be retired at age 66 nonetheless he understood the communication to mean just that and declared his intention to pursue the matter further. In the event no evidence was provided that shows that he did pursue the matter further for a period of over a year until his employment was terminated by reference to age 66. Referral through the grievance procedure seemed the most suitable option in 2022. Mr Connor was someone who was well versed with the internal and external procedures open to employees of Irish Rail having utilised them previously.
Having regard to all the circumstances, I consider that the most appropriate and proportionate redress to be the payment of a lumpsum equivalent to statutory redundancy calculated by reference to the Redundancy Payments Act 1967,as amended, with additional provision for a period of pay in lieu of notice based on the service-related statutory provisions.
As the complaint under the Employment Equality Act 1998 is upheld, a separate decision under the Unfair Dismissals Act does not arise for consideration. In the event of an appeal, it would be a matter for the Labour Court to decide if or how any decision was to be determined under the relevant clause of the Employment Equality Act at section 101(2)(b).
As the payments claimed in complaints under the Payment of Wages Act 1991 and the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act are incorporated into the redress under the Employment Act, these complaints are disposed of as not well founded. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaints in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 82 of the Act(with a related reference to the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977) .
CA-00059218-001 Employment Equality Act 1998 The Complaint by the Complainant Brendan Connor against the Respondent Iarnrod Eireann is well founded. The Respondent is to pay the Complainant compensation of the amount of his entitlement to statutory redundancy based on his total service calculated under 1967 Act in addition to pay in lieu of notice calculated under the 1973 Act. CA-00059218-002 Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1978 This complaint is regarded as not well founded(see CA-00059218-001) CA-00059218-003 Payment of Wages Act 1991 This complaint is regarded as not well founded (see CA-00059218-001 and 002 CA-00059218-004 Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 As this complaint arose for consideration only if required under section 101(2)(b) of the EEA and as a decision in favour of the Complainant under that other legislation is deemed well founded, no decision is required or issued under the relevant section and/or the Unfair Dismissals Act.
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Dated: 12/09/2024
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Janet Hughes
Key Words:
EEA- protected ground of age-unfair dismissal section 101(2)(b)-notice pay |