Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Mariusz  Marcinkow

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Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

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Representatives

Roberta Urbon Peninsula Business Services Ireland

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00060115-001

19/11/2023

The Complainant is employed by the Respondent as a foreman. He stated that he was discriminated against by the Respondent because of disciplinary action instigated against him on foot of some absences by him from the workplace.

The Complainant stated in his evidence that he was discriminated against by the Respondent because of disciplinary action instigated against him on foot of some absences by him from the workplace.

The Complainant is employed by the Respondent as a foreman and the parties enjoy a good working relationship. Although it was acknowledged that disciplinary action was instigated against the Complainant in respect of some absences from the workplace, it was denied that the imposition of same constituted discrimination.

Discrimination

Discrimination in accordance with the Acts is set out in section 6 and states:

6.— (1) For the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to its provisions relating to discrimination occurring in particular circumstances discrimination shall be taken to occur where —

( a ) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as the ‘ discriminatory grounds ’ ) which —

(i) exists,

(ii) existed but no longer exists,

(iii) may exist in the future, or

(iv) is imputed to the person concerned,

( b ) a person who is associated with another person —

(i) is treated, by virtue of that association, less favourably than a person who is not so associated is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and

(ii) similar treatment of that other person on any of the discriminatory grounds would, by virtue of paragraph (a) , constitute discrimination.

(2) As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are—

( a) that one is a woman and the other is a man (in this Act referred to as “ the gender ground”),

( b) that they are of different civil status (in this Act referred to as “ the civil status ground ”),

( c) that one has family status and the other does not (in this Act referred to as “ the family status ground”),

( d) that they are of different sexual orientation (in this Act referred to as “ the sexual orientation ground”),

( e) that one has a different religious belief from the other, or that one has a religious belief and the other has not (in this Act referred to as “ the religion ground”),

( f) that they are of different ages, but subject to subsection (3) (in this Act referred to as “ the age ground”),

( g) that one is a person with a disability and the other either is not or is a person with a different disability (in this Act referred to as “ the disability ground”),

( h) that they are of different race, colour, nationality or ethnic or national origins (in this Act referred to as “ the ground of race”),

Section 85A of the Employment Equality Acts, sets out the burden of proof necessary in claims of discrimination. It provides "Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a Complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the Respondent to prove the contrary."

In the case of Melbury Developments and Valpeters (Det. No. EA AO917) the Labour Court stated in relation to Section 85 A as follows:

"Section 85A of the Act provides for the allocation of the probative burden in cases within its ambit. This requires that the Complainant must first establish facts from which discrimination may be inferred. What those facts are will vary from case to case and there is no closed category of facts which can be relied upon. All that is required is that they be of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination.”

The Labour Court in the case of The Southern Health Board v. Dr Teresa Mitchell DEE 011, 15th February 2001 considered the extent of the evidential burden which a Complainant must discharge before a prima facie case of discrimination on grounds of sex can be made out. The Labour Court stated that the Complainant must:

“.... “establish facts” from which it may be presumed that the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them. This indicates that a claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination. It is only if these primary facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, and they are regarded by the Court as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the onus shifts to the Respondent to prove that there was no infringement of the principle of equal treatment.”

It requires the Complainant to establish, in the first instance, a prima facie case of discrimination, that is, facts from which it can be established that he was discriminated against. It is only when he has discharged this burden that the burden shifts to the Respondent to rebut the prima facie case raised.

In the instant case, the Complainant in his evidence was unable to specify under which specific ground he was discriminated against by the Respondent. In the absence of any facts presented by him “from which discrimination may be inferred”, as set out in the Valpeters case above, I find that he was not discriminated against.

I find that the Complainant was not discriminated against for the reasons set out above.