ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00050260
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Tinka Zapryanova | Borgo Accounting Ltd |
| Complainant | Respondent |
Anonymised Parties |
|
|
Representatives |
| Paul Carroll Solr., O’Mara Geraghty McCourt |
Complaints:
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 | CA-00061655-003 | 19/02/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 | CA-00061655-004 | 19/02/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 | CA-00061655-005 | 19/02/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 | CA-00061655-006 | 19/02/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 | CA-00061655-007 | 19/02/2024 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 25/04/2024 and 10/07/2024
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Penelope McGrath
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 41(4) of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 and following the presentation by an employee of a complaint of a contravention - by an employer - of an Act contained in Schedule 5 of the Workplace Relations Act of 2015 (or such other Act as might be referred to in the 2015 Act), made to the Director General and following a referral by the said Director General of this matter to the Adjudication services, I can confirm that I have fulfilled my obligation to make all relevant inquiries into the complaint or dispute. I have additionally and where appropriate heard the oral evidence of the parties and their witnesses and have taken account of the evidence tendered in the course of the hearing as well as any written submissions disclosed in advance of the hearing.
The Complainant herein has referred three matters for adjudication as provided for under Section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 in circumstances where a Contract of Service has commenced and where the said Employee employed by an Employer is entitled to have been provided (within two months of the commencement of the employee’s employment with the employer) with a Statement of certain Terms of the employment. The said terms are specified in Section 3 of the 1994 Act and include items such as names, addresses and place of work. There should also be a job title and a description of the nature of the work. The start date and the nature/duration of the Contract should be included in the statement as well as the terms of the remuneration. This statement should be dated and signed with copies retained by both parties.
The Complainant herein has brought two additional complaints under this Act including a claim of acontravention of section 5 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 – which concerns the obligation on the employer to notify the employee in writingwhenever a change is made to the contract of employment
The next complaint is in respect of an alleged contravention of section 6G of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 – which concerns Mandatory training.
The Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 implements an EU Directive and applies to all persons working under a Contract of Employment or apprenticeship (whether on a fulltime or part time basis). It includes persons working through an employment agency where the party remunerating is responsible for the provision of the said Statement of Terms.
In circumstances where I consider the complaint to be well founded, I may require a Statement of Terms be provided. In addition, I am entitled to direct a payment of compensation up to the value of four weeks remuneration such that is just and equitable in all the circumstances. This is provided for in Section 7.
The Act also provides that an employer must notify the Employee of any changes in the particulars already detailed in the Statement of Terms. This is set out in Section 5 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 which puts the onus on an employer to notify the employee in writing of the nature and date of change in any of the particulars of the statement as provided by the Employer. The obligation does not extend to a change occurring in provision of statutes and instruments made under statute.
The complaint was made on the 19th of February 2024, and I can consider such contravention of the Act which is alleged to have occurred within the six-month period prior to that date.
In addition to the foregoing the Complainant has raised a number of issues under the Employment Equality Acts 1998:-
In accordance with Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 (as amended) a complaint has been referred to the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission who has in turn deemed it appropriate that the Complaint be investigated with any appropriate and/or interested persons to be provided with an opportunity of being heard. In these circumstances and following a referral of this matter, by the said Director General, to the Adjudication services, I can confirm that I am an Adjudicator appointed for this purpose (and/or an Equality Officer so appointed). I confirm I have fulfilled my obligation to make all relevant inquiries into the complaint. I have additionally and where appropriate heard the sworn oral evidence of the parties and their witnesses and have taken account of the evidence tendered in the course of the hearing as well as any written submissions disclosed in advance of the hearing (and opened up in the course of the hearing).
In general terms, an Adjudication Officer cannot entertain a complaint presented after the expiration of the period of six months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates. Section 77(5) of the Employment Equality Act states:-
“…a claim for redress in respect of discrimination or victimisation may not be referred under this section after the end of the period of 6 months from the date of occurrence of the discrimination or victimisation to which the case relates or, as the case may be, the date of its most recent occurrence.”
In limited circumstances, a complaint presented outside the relevant period may be entertained if the failure to present was due to reasonable cause. This will not exceed a twelve-month period.
Where a person believes they have been discriminated against on one of the nine recognised grounds or in any other way has been treated unlawfully under the Employment Equality Acts they must write to the party that they believe has treated them unlawfully using the EE2 form asking for relevant information to determine their course of action. The proposed Respondent may reply by way of form EE3. No issue has arisen regarding this obligation.
The Complainant herein has referred a matter for adjudication as provided for under Section 77 of the 1998 Act (as amended). In particular the Complainant (as set out in her Workplace Relations Complaint Form dated the 19th of February 2024) seeks redress from the Respondent in circumstances where she claims that her Employer behaved unlawfully and discriminated against her in the course of her employment wherein she says that she was treated less favourably than another person has or would have been treated in a comparable situation on the grounds of her disability and/or on the grounds of race and/or on the grounds of her civil or family status (as detailed in Section 6 of the 1998 Act (as amended)). The Unlawful behaviour complained of includes failing to give reasonable accommodation for a disability, victimisation, and regarding how a promotion in the workplace was handled.
The Operative Section is Section 6 of the Employment Equality Act 1998 where: -
Sub Section (1) For the purpose of this Act…discrimination shall be taken to occur where -
(a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (referred to as the “discriminatory grounds”) …
Sub Section (2) As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory grounds ...are…
(g) That one is a person with a disability and the other is not or is a person with a different disability (the “disability ground”) …
(h) That they are of a different race, colour, nationality or ethnic or national origins (..the ground of race”),
(c) That one has a family status and the other does not (the “family status ground”)…
(b) That they are of different civil status (the “civil status” ground) …
The nature and extent of the Employer’s obligations, including the employer’s obligation to provide reasonable accommodation for an employee with a disability is governed by section 16 of the Employment Equality Act 1998 (the “1998 Act”).
In the event that the Complainant is successful in any of her claims under the Employment Equality legislation, it is open to me to make an award of compensation for the effects of the acts of discrimination and/or of the victimisation etc.. I can also give direction on a course of action which might eliminate such an occurrence in the future (per Section 82 of the 1998 Employment Equality Act), which can include re-instatement or re-engagement.
Guidance on quantum in relations to awards of discrimination has been given by the Labour Court in the case of Lee t/a Peking House -v- Fox EED036 :
“Effects which flowed from the discrimination which occurred. This includes not only financial loss suffered by the Complainant arising from the discrimination but also the distress and indignity which she suffered in consequence thereof”.
Section 85(A) of the Employment Equality Acts of 1998 to 2004 sets out the burden of proof which applies to claims of discrimination. In the first instance, the Complainant herself must establish facts which show that she suffered discriminatory treatment. It is only when these facts have been established that the onus shifts to the Respondent to rebut any inference of discrimination that has been raised. The inference must be such that the Complainant has established a Prima Facie case that she has been treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would have been treated in a comparable situation on one of the recognised grounds of discrimination.
The Last complaint that the Complainant has brought is brought under the Unfair Dismissals legislation: -
In accordance with Section 8 (1)(a) of the Unfair Dismissals Act of 1977 (as substituted) and where a claim for redress under the Unfair Dismissals legislation is being made, the claim is referred to the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission who in turn refers any such claim to an Adjudication Officer, so appointed, for the purpose of having the said claim heard in the manner prescribed in Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 and in particular the said Adjudication Officer is obliged to make all relevant inquiries into the complaint made. The Adjudication Officer will additionally and where appropriate hear all relevant oral evidence of the parties and their witnesses and will consider any and all documentary or other evidence which may be tendered in the course of the hearing.
The Complainant’s complaint is that she was Constructively Dismissed which means that the onus is on the Complainant to demonstrate that her Employer’s conduct or behaviour was such that she had no reasonable alternative other than to tender her resignation. The burden of proof shifts to the Complainant in a situation of Constructive Dismissal. The Complainant must demonstrate that she was forced to terminate her Contract of Employment in circumstances which, because of the conduct of the Employer, the Employee was entitled to terminate her employment, or it was reasonable for the Employee to terminate her employment (as defined in Section 1 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1997).
It is well established that there are two tests for constructive Dismissal in the Statutory definition provided. Either one of these tests can be invoked by the Employee.
Section 1(1)(b) of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977, defines “constructive dismissal” as
“the termination by the employee of his contract of employment with his employer, whether prior notice of the termination was or was not given to employer, in circumstances in which, because of the conduct of the employer, the employee was or would have been entitled, or it was or would have been reasonable for the employee, to terminate the contract of employment without giving prior notice of the termination to the employer”.
The first is the Contract Test where an employee will argue an entitlement to terminate the Contract of Employment because of a fundamental breach of the Employment Contract on the part of the Employer. The breach must be a significant breach going to the root of the Contract. This has not been argued.
Secondly, the employee may allege that she satisfies the 1977 Act’s “reasonableness” test. That is that the conduct of the Employer was such that it was reasonable for her to resign. That is to say that the employer has conducted its affairs so unreasonably that the employee cannot be expected to put up with it any longer and is justified in leaving. The test is objective. The test requires that the conduct of both employer and employee be considered. The conduct of the parties as a whole and the cumulative effect must be looked at. The conduct of the employer that is being complained of, must be unreasonable and without proper cause and its effect on the employee must be judged objectively, reasonably and sensibly in order to determine if it is such that the employee cannot be expected to put up with it.
In the case of Curtin -v- Primark UD 234/2003 the Labour Court clearly sets a high bar on those that resign and claim it as not voluntary. In that case the Labour Court found against a store Manager of a large store who should have been “…able to handle the kind of pressure that he alleges he was put under”.
In this particular instance, and in circumstances where the Complainant herein has referred a complaint of having been unfairly dismissed from her place of employment (by reason of Constructive Dismissal) wherein she had worked for in excess of one year and where the Workplace Relations Complaint Form (dated the 19th of February 2024) issued within six months of her Constructive dismissal, I am satisfied that I (an Adjudication Officer so appointed) have jurisdiction to hear the within matter
In a case of Constructive Dismissal, there is a generally accepted proposition that the Employee should engage and exhaust internal mechanisms which might be available in a given workplace before tendering a resignation. I would therefore have regard for the seminal Employment Appeals Tribunal case of UD 474/1981 Margot Conway -v- Ulster Bank Limited wherein the Tribunal stated:
“The Tribunal considers that the Appellant did not act reasonably in resigning without first having substantially utilized the grievance procedure to attempt to remedy her complaints. An elaborate grievance procedure existed but the Appellant did not use it. It is not for the Tribunal to say whether using this procedure would have produced a decision more favourable to her, but it is possible.”
Also, in Constructive Dismissal type cases the period directly after termination might reasonably be taken into consideration as very often a “cooling off” period might bring a different perspective. In the case of Curtin -v- Primark UD 234/2003 the Labour Court was “…impressed by the lengths the Respondent went to in trying to get the Claimant to return to work. We feel that these were genuine offers to an employee who was held in high esteem by the Respondents”
Lastly, where an employee has been dismissed and the dismissal is found to be unfair the employee shall be entitled to redress pursuant to Section 7 of the 1977 Act. Such redress might include re-instatement, re-engagement, or compensation for any financial loss attributable to the dismissal where compensation for such loss does not exceed 104 weeks remuneration. The acts, omissions and conduct of both parties will be taken into account when considering the extent of the financial loss and there is an onus on a Complainant to adopt measures to mitigate the loss.
7.1 (b) (ii) states that
“if the employee incurred no such financial loss, payment to the employee by the employer of such compensation (if any, but not exceeding in amount 4 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated as aforesaid) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances”
Background:
This matter was heard by way of remote hearing pursuant to the Civil Law and Criminal Law (miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020 and SI 359/2020 which said instrument designates the Workplace Relations Commission as a body empowered to hold remote hearings pursuant to Section 31 of the Principal Act. The said remote hearing was set up and hosted by an appointed member of the WRC administrative staff. I am satisfied that no party was prejudiced by having this hearing conducted remotely. The matter was heard over two days. I am also satisfied that I was in a position to fully exercise my functions and I made all relevant inquiries in the usual way. There were two hearing days assigned to this matter In response to the Supreme Court decision in the constitutional case of Zalewski -v- An Adjudication Officer and the Workplace Relations Commission and Ireland and the Attorney General [2021] IESC 24 (delivered on the 6th of April 2021) I can confirm that the within hearing was open to the public so as to better demonstrate transparency in the administration of Justice. I additionally informed the parties that pursuant to the Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2021 coming into effecton the 29th of July 2021 and in the event that there was to be a serious and direct conflict in evidence between the parties to a complaint then an oath or affirmation may be required to be administered to any person giving evidence before me. I confirm that I have administered the said Affirmation as appropriate. It is noted that the giving of false statement or evidence is an offence. The Specific Details of the Dispute are outlined in the Workplace Relations Complaint Form which was received by the WRC on the 19th of February 2024.
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Summary of Complainant’s Case:
Over the course of the two days, the Complainant was not represented and made her own case. The Complainant provided me with a comprehensive submission dated the 24th of April 2024. The Complainant was also given an opportunity to give oral evidence. The Evidence adduced by the complainant was challenged as appropriate by the Respondent’s Representative. No objection was raised to any of the materials/documents relied upon by the Complainant in the making of her case. The Complainant raises a number of issues in her workplace relations complaint form which issued on the 19th of February 2022 some two and a half weeks after the termination of the employment. The Complainant alleges she was discriminated against in the workplace and the Complainant says that she was constructively dismisses. The Complainant has additionally asserted three specific contraventions of the Terms of Employment (information) Act 1994 by her previous Employer. Where it also became necessary, I explained how the Adjudication process operated with particular emphasis on the burden of proof which had to be attained by the Complainant in the first instance. Where I deemed it necessary, I made my own inquiries so as to better understand the facts of the case and in fulfilment of my duties as prescribed by Statute. On the first day of hearing the Complainant and the Respondent confirmed that the Complainant had issued a second ADJ File (ADJ 51399). This contained a Payment of Wages claim and the parties agreed to have this matter addressed through this hearing. I understand that between the first and second dates of hearing that the Complainant issued a separate complaint form ADJ File 52526. This ADJ File 52526 was not before me and has yet to be assigned a Case Officer and a date for hearing. It is noted that the Complainant prepared a further submission as of the 3rd of July 2024 which was just before the resumed hearing date of July 10th. This submission ought properly be read alongside the newly issued ADJ File 52526. The Respondent objected to any part of this submission being put into the Adjudication process before me in circumstances where the Complainant had already given and completed her evidence on the first day of hearing in April 2024. It is submitted that an entirely fresh submission introduced at this late stage would be unfair. I agree that I cannot re-run the complainant’s evidence as she has already been cross examined on foot of the oral evidence given by her. I accepted the Respondent position in this regard. It was not possible to read this most recent submission into evidence where it might contradict or enhance the Complainant’s oral evidence already given and completed. The second day of hearing was given over to the Respondent’s evidence with both parties invited to give a final oral submission in the afternoon. I confirm that the Complainant was not satisfied to have this submission set aside and stated that this decision interfered with her right to have her case fully heard. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
The Respondent had full legal representation at this hearing. The Company Director (Mr. E) gave evidence on behalf of the Company. The Respondent provided me with two written submissions. The first was dated the 18th of April 2024 and was received in advance of the first hearing date. The second written submission was received on the 21st of June 2024 and was received in response to a second ADJ file (ADJ 51399) which issued in April of 2024 and concerned a Payment of Wages claim. The parties agreed on the first day of hearing that both of these ADJ files 50260 and 51399 could be heard together. All oral evidence was heard following an Affirmation. The Respondent witness was challenged by the Complainant. The Respondent rejects that there has been a Constructive Dismissal or Discrimination and rejects any contravention of Employment Statutes. Where I deemed it necessary, I made my own inquiries so as to better understand the facts of the case and in fulfilment of my duties as prescribed by Statute. |
Findings and Conclusions:
The Complainant gave extensive evidence over the course of the first day of hearing. The Complainant commenced her employment as an Accountant with Icon Accounting on 26th July 2021. The Complainant was placed in the Kalc Department. The Complainant worked on a part time basis of 25 hours per week. The Complainant told me that an ongoing issue with her back and chronic back pain has meant that she cannot work longer hours. The complainant had been in a car accident which had resulted in these injuries. The Complainant it is noted had a comprehensive Contract of employment with Icon. At the beginning of May 2022 all staff of Kalc Accounting were notified that a merger was planned between Kalc Dept of Icon Accounting and AEON Accountants. The Complainant was due to be part of this merger. I have had sight of a letter of the 29th of June 2022 addressed to the Complainant which purports to initiate the 30-day consultation period required to effect a lawful transfer of business. The letter confirms: “Your contract of employment transfers to the new entity and there is no change in your terms and conditions of employment. There is continuity of service and you retain all entitlements under your contract of employment that you had in Icon Accountancy ..” The date of transfer was the 31st of July 2022. Ultimately the newly created accountancy company was named Borgo Accounting Limited. Mr AE came on board as the Managing Director as a direct result of this merger. The Complainant has understood that this merger and transfer has meant that she should receive a new and updated Contract of Employment. In particular, the Complainant was anxious to confirm that the terms and conditions enjoyed under the previous employment had been transferred and would be fully recognised moving forward. It was put to the complainant in cross examination that she perhaps had misunderstood the legal implications. The 2021 Contract of employment together with the terms and conditions (contained therein) continued to validly cover her ongoing employment in the aftermath of the August 2022 transfer. The Complainant it was suggested was mixing up the idea of a “new employer” with “new employment”. I think in this regard the Respondent is correct. However, I do note that the complainant did subsequently have a changed term or condition concerning paid sick leave foisted on her without consultation. This only became an issue after the complainant had resigned (or been constructively dismissed) and therefore could not be challenged under the tenure of the employment. After the merger the Complainant described a very intense and busy time in the aftermath of the merger. She was reporting into the overall Managing Director AE up to the end of 2022. The Complainant was happy to play her part, but she was working well in excess of the 25 hours a week that she was obliged to work under her Contractual arrangement. The Complainant described having to stay back until 8pm on the 25th of November 2022 by reason of some errors made with the outsourcing arrangements. When the Complainant attended her G.P. around this time with ongoing back issues, she was certified out of the workplace for two weeks. It was while she was out of the workplace that the complainant was notified of some internal changes including some non-competitive promotion and the introduction of a new line Manager GN. The Document “Borgo, accounting redefined” was opened to me and on foot of its contents I note that the Complainant wrote to AE expressing her disappointment. In particular she felt that “ without any annual appraisal reviews taking place the former AEON staff were promoted whilst the former Kalc staff were demoted.” I accept the Complainant genuinely felt this is exactly what happened, and it is an unavoidable fact that objectively looked at the complainant appears to be correct. The Complainant has given evidence that she believes that the decision to bypass the Complainant for the purpose of promotion had something to do with her nationality and/or her disability and/or her family status. The Complainant has asserted that she was more senior and had more experience than either of the two Aeon Employees that were promoted. The Complainant noted that all three newly created Management positions went to Irish people. The Complainant believes that the Complainant’s ongoing health issues with her back must have mitigated against her being considered for any promotion. The Complainant believes that AE was not happy to have his decisions challenged. Mr. AE gave evidence that as part of the merger, a consultancy company came on board to help put best practices in place and to develop an ideal team structure. The restructuring which was actually implemented was born of the advice given. He says that at board level they were discussing how and where to fit all members of staff into the new structure. AE believed that there was no change in the complainant’s role – she remained an Accountant. I can accept that on the face of it the Complainant has identified a restructuring process that seemed to exclude her. Whether this was ineptitude on the part of Management or grounded in racial discrimination or a bias against an individual with a disability is unclear. I have to note, one way or another, that no complaint was raised within six months of these events. In his defence AE says that he had met Ms. Nolan and had identified her as having the potential to be a huge asset to the burgeoning company. He felt that the complainant was more introverted and methodical. He made these deductions, he says, observing her and all staff in the six months up to the re-structuring. He had in fact not advertised for a role and had met her Ms. Nolan quite by chance. Internally, AE accepts that he had promoted two of his own employees both Irish males with no discernible disability. On reflection AE accepts that he should have given the complainant the opportunity to apply for roles instead of assigning roles in the way that he had. Moving forward he intended to be more transparent, he said. He did note that the complainant never applied for a later production Manager role that came up in April of 2023 and was an open competition. It is noted that the Complainant had also put forward an inverted family status argument whereby her colleagues were given more accommodation by reason of having children then she had been given by reason of having no children. I found this argument to be without merit. The Complainant sought to make the best of this situation by expressing her clear dissatisfaction and then requesting a workplace scenario which she believed would be better suited to her hours. The Complainant requested that AE remove her from the client accounts and instead put her exclusively into making Income Tax returns. The Complainant brokered this bespoke arrangement which allowed her to move from 5 days to four days a week. Working 6 hours per day. This was a reduction in one hour of work per week at the same rate of pay. This formula was approved by AE and GN. I do not get the impression that AE accepted that his re-structuring formula was hugely upsetting for the Complainant, nor have I formed the impression that AE recognised the Complainant’s ability one way or another. He says that she appeared happy from January 2023 onwards. In any event, the Complainant believed she worked much better concentrating on one area rather than working across a broad range of disciplines which meant having to collaborate with others but also meant being constantly interrupted by others. The Complainant accepted that from time to time she was called upon to help others in the workplace. With her level of experience and understanding of the client base she was happy to help. The Complainant gave evidence that she believed her part time status (four days at six hours a day) was better suited to doing the Income Tax returns. Towards the end of 2023 tax deadlines started to loom. The Complainant gave evidence that she was called upon to assist with Corporation Tax deadlines for former corporate clients who had now been assigned elsewhere. This task needed to be completed for in and around the 20th of September 2023. The Complainant also needed to help with the sole trader accounts and VAT returns. The deadline for Income Tax is set for Mid November. The Complainant assumed that others in the company would be assigned to help her ensure the deadline would be met. The Complainant had had some assistance assigned to her in the person of C. There were about 250 Income Tax returns to prepare for clients. She had already largely completed 170 of these she says. The Complainant said it was clear that they were extremely short staffed as a lot of experienced people had moved on or were out on parental leave. The Complainant was looking for a team effort to get this class of returns (Income Tax) over the line. She particularly sought this help at a staff meeting on the 9th of October 2023. She was denied this by Mr. AE who asked the Complainant to hold back after the meeting for the express purpose of telling her that this was her problem and she needed to get the job done. The Complainant makes the case that it was unrealistic of AE to expect that she would ever be able to complete this mammoth task working for only 24 hours a week. AE knew or should have known that (as with other deadlines) a team effort would be needed in the final weeks. I accept that Complainant felt belittled and perhaps intimidated by AEs hard line. AE accepted that there was not a great atmosphere generally in the workplace in late 2023. Everyone was under pressure. The Complainant has asserted that this interaction amounted to a discrimination and that the Manager AE only treated her that way because she was from another country. The Complainant said this directly to AEs face. I am not inclined to accept this allegation. AE was certainly presenting as being short tempered and as having poor management skills (as previously evidenced by his January restructuring), but I cannot find there was any racial motivation in his words or actions. I understand that the complainant made the allegation of racial discrimination then and there on the 9th of October. I think that AE did the right thing in this instance when he abruptly finished the interaction and asked the Complainant to put her concerns in writing so that the issues raised could be handled through the Company policy and procedures. An email of the 9th of October confirms this is what was to happen. I note AE gave evidence that he was very upset and indeed blindsided by this allegation. He vehemently rejects any suggestion that he would discriminate on the grounds of race and he points to the diverse staff working with him. AE also confirmed that all HR issues are outsourced, and he started taking advice at this time on the best way froward if a grievance was triggered. The Complainant did submit a lengthy Grievance document on the 15th of October 2023. An initial meeting was held on the 1st of November 2023 between the Complainant and AE together with a note taker. It seems to me the purpose of this meeting was to confirm the Grievances and to ask the Complainant to elaborate on same as might be needed. This meeting seems to have finished on an even note with the promise by the notetaker that she would write up the notes for sign off before proceeding to the next step. For reasons unknown, the notes were not signed off on by any of the attendees until well into December 2023. I understand that despite the initial chastisement of the Complainant, AE did in fact assign staff to assist with the final work required to get the balance of the Income Tax work over the line. The Complainant asserts that she had always done the bulk of the work in advance but simply did not have enough hours in the days to tie up the loose ends. AE noted that other staff were annoyed that the complainant was so far behind given she was only dealing with this singular aspect of the business. The Complainant also asserts that she had done a lot of overtime during this period of time. I have seen the Complainant’s calculations in this regard which show that the complainant worked up to 15 hours extra in the run up to Income tax deadline. The Complainant says that there was still a tremendous amount of pressure in the workplace through November 2023. As many experienced staff were gone or had unaccountably been given leave during the busiest time of the year. She says her knowledge and know how was being sought after by all staff. She says she was the only qualified Accountant with no team to support her. She had to beg for assistance and yet was expected to freely give assistance. She was always the go to person. By the end of November, the complainant was exhausted, and her back problems had flared up. The Complainant went out on sick leave for two weeks to the 11th of December 2023. On her return to the workplace in mid-December 2023 the complainant noted a definite shift in what was being expected of her. She was no longer expected to just deal with just the Income Tax issues and was now being assigned clients. Clients she now had to handle in full. Clients she was unfamiliar with. This was not what she had agreed with AE in January of 2023. This was a stealth return, she felt, to how she had previously worked, and which required a 9 to 5, five days a week, input. This was not consistent with her working hours as agreed with AE. The Complainant knew from previous experience that working in this way would exacerbate her back problems. The Complainant references the fact that she had at this point in time been looking for Contractual certainty from management. This had been a conversation she had had with her line Manager as far back as July of 2023. In particular, the complainant had been looking for an up-to-date job description to reflect the fact that the complainant was intended to work exclusively on Income tax returns. This is what she had been doing from January to September 2023. However, her work type was noticeably changing over November and December 2023. The Complainant perceived that the Income tax work was being handled by someone else. The Complainant says it felt like the ground was constantly moving beneath her feet. The Complainant asserts that the quid pro quo for being overlooked for promotion the year previously, was to get herself assigned to concentrate on a job that was within her remit and would provide workplace stability and job assurance. In December 2023 the Complainant felt that this was slipping away from her. It was in these circumstances that the complainant tendered her resignation on the 14th of December 2023. The letter of resignation reads: “I am resigning my position due to work-related pressure and stress, which are issues for my health. Thank you for the opportunities afforded to me in the last year and a half at Borgo. I wish everyone on the team much success in the coming years. I would be happy to meet with you at your convenience to discuss the transition of my duties.” By way of reply AE writes: “I acknowledge the receipt of your resignation from the position of Senior Accountant at Borgo. Thank you for the hard work and effort that you have shown during your time. I will come back to you regarding the other points below next week. I won't say anything to the team until you have a chance to speak to them.” Despite the seemingly cordial nature of this correspondence, the complainant said in evidence that she was being squeezed out. It is noted that at about the same time as she was resigning the complainant also signed the notes for the first grievance process meeting. In effect this left this process hanging in mid-air and unable to go forward. The Contract of employment sets out its Notice requirements and these are in line with the Minimum Notice and Terms of employment Acts which meant that the complainant was expected to give two weeks’ Notice up to her final date. In fact, the complainant offered to work up to the end of January 2024. In her follow up correspondence, the Complainant notes that she was owed 29.5 hours overtime for 2023. It is noted that the Complainant’s 2021 contract of employment (which had not been replaced in the course of the employment) does not allow for overtime – unless the overtime is at the weekend. The Complainant had a formal meeting with AE on the 20th of December. In an unusual step, AE provided the complainant with an updated Contract of employment – something she had been agitating for in the last five months. AE also provided the Complainant with the finished notes from the grievance meeting which had been conducted back on November 1st. it seems that it took all three signatories some time to sign off on these notes. As I understand it, the Complainant’s last day of actual work was December 20th. Thereafter the complainant went on a combination of annual leave, and paid leave including payment in lieu of working the notice period. This was a generous notice period provided by AE. The complainant was employed up to the 31st of January 2024. The workplace relations complaint form issued on the 19th of February 2024. My sense, having considered all the evidence, is that the Complainant herein may well have had a claim of discrimination against her employer when two of her Irish male colleagues got promoted over her in circumstances that appeared to be underhand and exclusionary. This may also have played into a claim of discrimination on the grounds of her part time status and of her having a recognised disability. However, the complainant did not trigger a statutory complaint in the aftermath. Instead, the complainant leveraged that situation to bring her own demands to the table. The Complainant sought, and was given the right, to work exclusively on Income tax returns for all the clients in the company who needed them. This was work which suited her hours, her days, her capabilities and her temperament. This operated well for most of the year. However, when it came time to finalize and file the returns, the work was overwhelming. The complainant perceived that AE was instrumental in preventing anyone assisting her get this work over the line. A Grievance procedure was triggered arising out of the interaction and disagreement between the Complainant and AE. As there was no HR Manager the Grievance process appeared to my mind to be getting a light touch so that whilst a meeting took place no further steps were generated. The notes of the first meeting were pretty perfunctory and hardly required the big sign-off which was repeatedly raised in evidence to justify an inordinate delay. As key members of staff were leaving, AE seemingly was directing that the complainant fall back into her old role, and it seemed to the complainant that she was in mid-December 2023 being asked to manage accounts and do work that she had not been deemed worthy of or being capable of performing in December 2022. It was in these circumstances that the Complainant resigned. As I have noted, the communications around the resignation were perfectly cordial, but I have to note that AE did not allow for a cooling off period and did not ask the complainant to reflect on the decision to resign. I must wonder if this inaction on his part is consistent with her belief that he wanted her out? On the other hand, I also have to recognise that AE maybe did not anticipate this resignation would happen when it did. After all, there was a live Grievance process which might have been expanded to allow for a discussion of the workload which the complainant perceived was being foisted on her. Having listened to the complainant over the course of two days I am satisfied that she was an Employee who was well able to advocate on her own behalf. This incomplete utilisation of the grievance procedure is important when it comes to assessing loss. Having reflected on the above, I am turning my attention to the individual claims brought before me as follows: CA-00061655-003 Complaint of a contravention of Section 3 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 - 3.—(1) An employer shall, not later than one monthafter the commencement of an employee’s employment with the employer, give or cause to be given to the employee a statement in writing containing the following particulars of the terms of the employee’s employment, I accept that the Respondent is entitled to presume that the 2021 Contract of employment was still validly operable after the Transfer of Undertaking. CA-00061655-004 Complaint of a contravention of section 5 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 - 5.—(1) Subject to subsection (2), whenever a change is made or occurs in any of the particulars of the statement furnished by an employer under section 3, 4 or 6, the employer shall notify the employee in writing of the nature and date of the change as soon as may be thereafter, but not later than— (a) the day on which the change takes effect, or (b) where the change is consequent on the employee being required to work outside the State for a period of more than 1 month, the time of the employee’s departure. I accept that the employer agreed certain fundamental changes to the particulars of the Contract of Employment which existed between the parties. This was in January of 2023. This included a change in hours, a subsequent change in the hourly rate of pay and a change in job description. The Complainant was anxious to have these details recorded and consolidated. This did not happen. It did not happen on each and every day that the Respondent failed to provide the complainant with the written particulars starting on the day on which the changes took effect. CA-00061655-005 - Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 In circumstances where the complaint form issued in February of 2024, I do not have jurisdiction to hear any allegations of discrimination which may or may have occurred in and around December of 2022. This falls well outside the cognisable period. In addition, the Complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the six-month period immediately preceding the date on which the Workable Relations complaint form issued – the 19th of February 2024. CA-00061655-006 -Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 On balance I accept that the Complainant was constructively dismissed in December of 2023. The Complainant had not felt supported by the Managing director of the newly merged company. This lack of support started as far back as the re-structuring in December of 2022. The Complainant felt that AE did not place any great value in her contribution and even though he agreed to allow her deal exclusively with the Income Tax work he allowed her to be called upon to do the work of others whilst resenting that she should make the same request of colleagues. In assessing compensation, I have to be mindful of two things. Firstly, that the complainant should have pursued the Grievance process to its end point as this might have provided a forum for thrashing out all issues. Secondly, I have to be mindful of the fact that the complainant was not been in a position to work or look for work since December of 2023. The complainant cannot therefore make the case that she has incurred financial loss as a result of not being in a workplace. The complainant’s ongoing financial loss arises because of a disability. 7.1 (b) (ii) of the UD Act states that “if the employee incurred no such financial loss, payment to the employee by the employer of such compensation (if any, but not exceeding in amount 4 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated as aforesaid) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances”
CA-00061655-007 Complaint of a contravention of section 6G of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 – Mandatory training 6G.— Where an employer is required by law or by a collective agreement to provide training to an employee to carry out the work for which he or she is employed, such training shall — (a) be provided to the employee free of cost, (b) count as working time, and (c) where possible, take place during working hours. The Complainant argued that she was entitled to have any and all training, including Compulsory professional Development Training be paid for by the employer. I do not agree that this type of training is included in the mandatory training envisaged in the Section 6G of the Act.
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Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaints in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 82 of the Act.
Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the unfair dismissal claim consisting of a grant of redress in accordance with section 7 of the 1977 Act.
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 – The complaint herein is not well founded and fails. Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 – The complaint herein is well founded and I order the employer to pay to the employee compensation in the amount of €1,282.00 which I consider just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances and which I know does not exceed 4 weeks’ remuneration in respect of the employee’s employment. Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 – The complainant has not established a prima facie case of discrimination having occurred within the six-month period immediately preceding the 19th of February 2024. I cannot look beyond that period. Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 – I am satisfied that the complainant was constructively dismissed. In awarding compensation, I have as previously noted taken into account a failure to exhaust the internal grievance process as well as the Complainant’s inability to establish a remunerative type financial loss. 7.1 (b) (ii) states that “if the employee incurred no such financial loss, payment to the employee by the employer of such compensation (if any, but not exceeding in amount 4 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated as aforesaid) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances” I am satisfied that it is just and equitable to award the sum of €1,923.00 having regard to all the circumstances. Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 – The complaint herein is not well founded and fails.
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Dated: 5th September 2024
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Penelope McGrath
Key Words:
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