Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Derek  Lynch

Alliance Automotive Group Ireland Limited

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 18 of the Parental Leave Act 1998

CA-00068666-001

16/01/2025

On January 4th, 2025 the complainant’s wife had a severe fall, and on January 6th, he was told by the hospital that she required emergency surgery. As a result, she became unable to care for herself, drive, or perform basic daily activities, and was in urgent need of continuous care.

As her sole caregiver, his presence was absolutely necessary from January 6th to 8th, at the very least. With no alternative support available, he remained at the hospital to attend to her while the medical team at the Mater Hospital evaluated treatment options. Due to the unpredictable nature of her recovery, the course of care remained uncertain during this critical period.

Despite the gravity of the situation, his employer refused to grant him Force Majeure leave, which he believed he was entitled to under such circumstances. He was informed that this leave was typically reserved for extreme situations and that he would only be granted one day’s pay (not Force Majeure) as a gesture of goodwill. Given the seriousness of his wife’s condition, this response was wholly insufficient, and he continued to experience significant stress as a result.

He received no response from the HR Director when he requested Force Majeure leave. At no point was any consideration given to his personal situation, and he was treated in an insensitive manner.

Further compounding his distress, he received his pay slip, which included a deduction for the time he had taken off to care for his wife. A colleague told him of having been been granted three days of Force Majeure leave under similar circumstances. It is difficult for him to understand why he was treated less favorably than another employee in such an extreme situation.

His wife continues to require full-time care, as she is unable to perform basic self-care tasks. While some family members have been able to assist on a limited basis, he remain the sole earner in his household and the primary caregiver.

The lack of support from his employer has caused him significant stress and anxiety. he was not offered any assistance through an employee support programme, nor was he compensated for the time he took off to care for his wife. This, coupled with the pay deduction after he appealed the HR Manager’s decision, has caused considerable emotional distress.

Having been with the company since 2015, he am disheartened and shocked by the lack of compassion and understanding shown to him during such a challenging time. he am currently on sick leave due to the impact this situation has had on his mental health, and he am seeking compensation for the treatment he have received from his employer.

The respondent, Alliance Automotive Group Ireland Limited is an automotive aftermarket parts supplier with 13 locations in Ireland and approximately 230 employees. The complainant was employed as a night delivery driver. His employment carried over via the TUPE process with a start date of 11th June 2015. His duties included loading deliveries to his van, completing manifests creating a record of all deliveries to ensure items were trackable, delivering overnight orders, and completing van checks.

He resigned from his position as a nighttime delivery driver on January 31st, 2025, after a period of absence. Upon resigning, he told his line manager, that he was experiencing issues with his eyes and that he felt this resignation the ‘safest thing to do’ given his role as a night driver. His employment with Alliance Automotive Group Ireland Ltd ended on the 14th of February 2025. The complainant's resignation is submitted. The respondent disputes the complainant’s complaints in their entirety.

On the morning January 6th,  2025 at 10.10am, the complainant sent a message via WhatsApp to his manager Mr Fitzpatrick explaining that his wife had a fall the previous day, Sunday January  5th, 2025, had broken both of her wrists and was hospitalised. Hestatedthathebelievedtherewasthreedaysforcemajeureleavehecouldapplyfor and asked Mr Fitzpatrick to grant this. After this initial message, the complainant sent a picture of a person sitting upright in a hospital bed with bandaged wrists. No other supporting documents were provided by the complainant.

Mr Fitzpatrick does not have the authority to grant such requests. Ordinarily requests of this nature are made to the Human Resources department or escalated by Mr Fitzpatrick to the relevant department. Accordingly, Mr Fitzpatrick queried this request with the Human Resources Team and was informed that such requests would need approval from a member of the HR Team before being paid.

Mr Fitzpatrick & Maria O’Callaghan, HR Advisor discussed the requested via telephone. It was agreed that because the accident had occurred on the weekend, and due to the fact that the complainant’s wife was already in the care of the doctors, nurses and care staff of the Mater Hospital that the ‘urgency of the initial incident and the immediate and indispensable presence of the complainant and the place where the person is had passed.

 It was agreed that one day force majeure leave would be paid to the complainant to allow him to be present on Monday the 6th of January 2025 for the surgery on his wife that was due to take place that day and not have to worry about attending his scheduled shift at 12am on Tuesday the 7th of January 2025.

It was felt that due to a lack of information on situation it was more correct to grant one day force majeure leave rather than decline the request outright. This was communicatedtothecomplainantviaWhatsAppmessagefromGarethFitzpatrick laterthesameday,MondayJanuary 6th,2025.

Following this communication from Mr Gareth Fitzpatrick to the complainant, an email was received from a representative of the complainant. The attachment stated it was to ‘formally address my recent request for force majeure leave, which was regrettably declined’. Furthermore, this email stated the incident led to the complainant's wife breaking both her wrists occurred on Saturday January 4th,  2025 and not on the day previous, Sunday January 5th, 2025, as the complainant had first reported. Further compounding that the urgency and immediacy of the initial incident had passed.

This email stated the complainant needed force majeure leave from his night shifts from January 6th to the 8th as his spouse was unable to feed herself or drive and no other support was available. The message continued to suggest that his spouse remained in the care of the doctors, nurses and care assistances of the Mater Hospital and would remain in the care of the medical care teams of the Mater Hospital ‘while they determined the next course of treatment’.

It was therefore contradictory to say that there are no other support available whilst his spouse remained in hospital. The complainant stated he may require further time off to support his wife during her recovery also.

In an effort to explain the reasoning for only granting one of the three days leave requested, the company responded stating that the immediate and urgency factor required to satisfy force majeure leave were for example ‘acts of God, extreme weather, war and the sudden and immediate turn in health of a loved one’.

The respondent was happy to provide force majeure leave to the complainant for one day in relation to the required surgery on Monday the 6th of January 2025. The complainant was not scheduled to work on the 6th of January 2025, and this was applied to the next shift scheduled to work which was midnight, 12am on the morning of Tuesday the 7th of January 2025.

It was suggested to the complainant that medical care leave and/or carers leave were more accurate leave applications to make for assisting his wife post-surgery, when she left the care of the hospital and if she could not drive or feed herself.

On Thursday January 9th, 2025, the complainant contacted his line manager Mr Fitzpatrick asking why he had not been paid for a period of illness relating to his eyes from the 25th of November 2024 until the 2nd of December 2025. Mr Fitzpatrick asked if the complainant had provided a medical certificate. The complainant stated he had given his medical certificate to another driver, Mr Michael Ward and was going to ring the driver and see what he had done with it. Mr Fitzpatrick asked him not to ring the driver as he was in hospital and unwell and reaffirmed, he would investigate the situation himself.

Mr Fitzpatrick told the complainant this is not the correct way to submit a medical certificate and that it should have been given directly to him and or an assistant manager. A short time later, the complainant rang back and stated that, he had spoken to the other driver, who stated he had put the medical certificate on an assistant manager's desk but had not told anyone what he had done. Mr Fitzpatrick searched this location and found the certificate amongst other paperwork and reassured the complainant it would be submitted to payroll for the Statutory Sick Payment (SSP).

The complainant did not attend work on the morning of Tuesday January 7th, 2025. This was authorised as force majeure. The complainant did not attend work on the morning of Wednesday 8th of January 2025, nor did he attend work on the evening of Thursday the 9th of January 2025 for his night shift that would run into the morning of Friday the 10th of January 2025.

The complainant attended work for his scheduled shift on the evening of Friday the 10th of January 2025, which would have run into the morning of Saturday the 11th of January 2025. Owing to the weekend and the fact that the HR department work Monday to Friday between the hours of 8am and 5pm. The HR team where not made aware of his return until Monday the 13th of January 2025.

On Monday the 13th, the complainant reporting to his line manager that he was sick, suffering issues with his eyes again and would not be able to attend his scheduled shift of the morning of Tuesday the 14th of January 2025. The complainant submitted via a medical certificate via a WhatsApp message stating he was unfit to attend work due to illness from 13th of January 2025 until the 20th of January 2025 and that he would be fit to work from the 21st of January 2025. The complainant attended his scheduled shift on the morning of the 22nd of January 2025.

There were no communications between the complainant and the company during this time of illness. It would not be standard practice for the company to contact an employee who is on short term certified sickness leave. The company short term illness policy outlines that communication should be made each week of illness with updates.

On the complainants return to work, Ms O’Callaghan emailed the complainant on Wednesday the 22nd of January 2025, to the email address held on file for him.

This email explained that theHR Department had been made aware of his return to work by his line manager, Mr Fitzpatrick and that the company held the belief that prior to his period of illness he was aggrieved by the company’s interpretation of force majeure leave. This email had attached to it, the company grievance policy and standard fillable form, as well as instructions on the email to return it to if he wished to engage with the process. The complainant has submitted the same email as part of the bundle submitted but the date on which this was sent seems to be edited by complainant to January 6th  2025.

A response was received to this email on the same date the 22nd of January 2025 his representative stating it was for and on behalf of the complainant. This email declined the grievance process, stating it was of limited relevance given the companies decision had already resulted in a loss of pay. This email accused Ms O’Callaghan of only retrospectively offering the complainant the grievance procedure after being informed by the workplace relations commission of the complainant’s intention to take a claim under the Parental Leave Act.

This is incorrect, the grievance process was issued to thecomplainant at the first opportunity when the complainant returned to his normal duties and was deemed fit to work and/ or engage in company proceduresand policies. Ms O’Callaghan was not aware, nor hadshereceivednotificationfromtheWorkplaceRelationsCommissionowingtothe fact that she works remotely.MsO’Callaghan’sfirstnotificationwasviatheemailsfrom the complainant. Ms O'Callaghan received the notification letter from the Workplace Relationscommissiononthe23rdofJanuary2025,whenthepostaddressedtoherwas senttoCorkviaaninter-companydeliverytruck.

On January 31st, 2025, the complainant tendered his resignation to his line manager Mr Fitzpatrick. The complainant does not detail the reason for his resignation, however during a conversation with Mr Fitzpatrick following his period of illness from the 25th until the 2nd of December 2025, the complainant expressed that he felt he would need to resign if his issues with his eyes worsened as driving at night was becoming more challenging.

The respondent has interpreted the law correctly in this case. Each request for Force Majeure is taken on its own merits. The complainant asserts that he has been treated differently and less favourably to his colleague Mr Brian Carmody, who was granted three days force majeure leave on the 27th of September 2024. Mr Carmody’s circumstances where wholly different.

Mr Carmody was granted annual leave to travel to Spain with his spouse, who was to have surgery under the cross-border directive. Owing to risks such as blood clots, Mr Carmody’s spouse was not allowed to fly post-surgery during a prescribed recovery period. Mr Carmody factored this is to his annual leave time. Mr Carmody was her soul next of kin and companion in a foreign country with a different language. After Mr. Carmody’s spouses’ initial surgery and during the period she remained in Spain for recovery and monitoring, Mr Carmody’s spouse suffered complications with her first surgery and upon her arrival at hospital was told that further emergency surgery was necessary as soon as possible. This resulted in the Carmody’s not being able to make their initial flight and having to rebook passage home to Ireland once she was permitted to travel. It also extended his spouses recovery and monitoring period where she was to remain in Spain and was instructed not to fly due to the risks it would cause. If Mr. Carmody had left, it would have left his wife alone in a foreign country, where there was a language barrier, post-surgery while she adhered to medical advice to not fly for a prescribed period of time after her 2nd surgery. Mr Carmody also submitted with his application for force majeure a letter from the surgery facilitators confirming this.

The complainant was paid both force majeure leaves as well as back dated statutory sick pay on weekends the 18th of January 2025. There was a slight delay in making this payment owing to a pay frequency change which the complainant was made aware of on the 27th of November 2024, the correspondence of which is submitted.

In respect to the complaint under The Parental Leave Act 1998, it is the Respondent’s contention that it has interpreted and applied the law correctly.

Relevant Case Law:

The respondent relies on Labour Court decision of Thermo King v Nolan, PLD171 which affirms that force majeure leave must be assessed day by day under Section 13(1) of the Parental Leave Act stated the entitlement to force majeure leave only applies when all Section 13(1) conditions are met. Those being Urgent, Unforeseeable, Indispensable reasoning that force majeure leave should be assessed on a day-by-day basis rather than approving or denying leave on a blanket basis.

The respondent further relies upon case ADJ 00027631, Caroline Giles v Outhaus Group Country Manor Bricks, ADJ00027631 which relied on the test laid out in MJER v Skibal [2018] IESC68, stating that force majeure leave covers “abnormal and unforeseeable circumstance and outside the control of the party and the consequences could not have been avoided in spite of the exercise of all due care” critical issue was whether only the first day of the child’s hospitalisation which occurred of a Sunday qualified as sudden and urgent, or whether the three-day absence did so. Court ruled only the first day would have qualified as Force Majeure.

The respondent respectfully argues that recent WRC case law, ADJ00051923 involving Komfort Kare, where the complainant’s wife remained in hospital due to haemorrhaging after a miscarriage differs in that there are no dependent children relying on the complainant’s care while one carer remains in hospital. Similarly in Nowak v Securitas, ADJ 00052345 there were also dependent relying on the complainant’s care while the other carer/parent remained in hospital.

This complaint relates to Force Majeure leave, as is set out in both submissions.

The complainant’s wife sustained an unfortunate injury on Saturday, January 4th, and the complainant was at home on that day. He was due back at work the following Monday. He says that his presence was ‘absolutely necessary’ from January 6th to 8th, and while this comes close to the standard required it does not quite reach it.

In particular, his wife was by this time in the Mater Hospital and while the complainant undoubtedly added to her comfort by being there to support her, this is not what the measure is intended to cover. 

As the respondent notes above the criteria are that the worker’s attendance is ‘urgent, unforeseeable, indispensable’, with the corollary that no other person was available to provide the support of an applicant.

The respondent relies on Labour Court decision of Thermo King V Nolan, PLD171 which underlines the ‘urgent, unforeseeable, indispensable’ criteria and also that force majeure leave must be assessed day by day under Section 13(1) of the Parental Leave Act to evaluate the continuing applicability of the criteria.

In that case the Court stated that the entitlement to force majeure leave only applies when all three Section 13(1) conditions are met.

The respondent further relies upon case ADJ 00027631, Caroline Giles v Outhaus Group Country Manor Bricks, ADJ00027631 which relied on the test laid out in MJER v Skibal [2018] IESC68, stating that force majeure leave covers

 “Abnormal and unforeseeable circumstance and outside the control of the party and the consequences could not have been avoided in spite of the exercise of all due care”

The critical issue was whether only the first day of the child’s hospitalisation (in that case) which occurred on a Sunday qualified as sudden and urgent, or whether the three-day absence did so. The Court ruled only the first day would have qualified as Force Majeure.

This well illustrates the standard required. It is not simply, as the complainant mistakenly believed, related to ‘the gravity of the situation’. The test is much more rigorous and specific as set out above.

The complainant’s reaction is understandable.

He obviously felt that the seriousness of the injury to his wife brought him within the general principles of the force majeure provisions. He clearly hoped that some more flexibility might have been shown by the respondent, but he rather robbed them of the opportunity to do so by taking immediate sick leave and also placing all his eggs in the force majeure basket.

That flexibility may have been no more that facilitation with annual leave, but the question to be determined in respect of this complaint is whether the respondent interpreted the specific provisions of force majeure regulations correctly and fairly and I find that they did.

For those reasons the complaint is not well founded.

For the reasons set out above Complaint CA-00068666-001 is not well founded.

‘Force Majeure’ Leave