ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00045373
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Rajesh Hamal | Musgrave Retail Partners |
Representatives |
| Mark Comerford IBEC |
Complaint(s):
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000 | CA-00056215-001 | 21/03/2023 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 | CA-00056215-002 | 21/03/2023 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 86 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 | CA-00056215-003 | 21/03/2023 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 30/08/2024
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Breiffni O'Neill
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 - 2015, and Section 25 of the Equal Status Act, 2000,following the referral of the complaints to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaints and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaints.
The Respondent’s representative highlighted as a preliminary matter that they were advised in correspondence from the Complainant’s representative received on 10 May 2023 that the Complainant was pursuing an application against them with the Injuries Resolution Board in respect of discrimination, victimisation, bullying and harassment.
It was highlighted by the Respondent however that, in Henderson v Henderson (1843), the rule developed which prevented duplication of proceedings and which provided there should be finality to litigation (subject to appeal) and that a party should not be twice vexed in the same manner. The Respondent stated that this was further developed in Cunningham v Intel Ireland Limited [2013] IEHC 207 where the claimant returned from a combination of sick leave and maternity leave in 2008 and instituted a claim for gender discrimination against her employer on the grounds that Intel had failed to allow her return to her original job as a workforce mobility manager and failed to provide her with a job to match her grade level. In her claim before the Equality Tribunal the claimant alleged the discrimination affected her health and well - being. Intel brought a motion to strike out the claimant’s Personal Injury proceedings for abuse of process and/or duplication of proceedings in the High Court. Hedigan J noted that the claimant had “attempted to draw an artificial distinction between her Equality Tribunal complaint and her Personal Injury proceedings” and ruled in favour of Intel again observing that “Thus all matters and issues arising from the same set of circumstances must be litigated in the one set of proceedings save for special circumstances“.
The Respondent requested that I address the preliminary matter first and foremost and reach a conclusion on same before deciding whether the substantive complaints should be heard. They supported this request by highlighting the case of Bus Eireann v SIPTU PTD048/2004, where the Labour Court indicated that a preliminary point should be determined separately from other issues arising in a case ‘where it could lead to considerable savings in both time and expense’ and where the point was ‘a question of pure law where no evidence was needed and where no further information was required’ referencing the judgement of O’Higans CJ in Tara Exploration & Development Company Limited v Minister for Industry & Commerce [1975] IR 242. In the case of Employee v Employer UD969/2009, the Employment Appeals Tribunal was asked to decide on a preliminary matter first before moving to hearing the substantive case. Given the significance of the preliminary points raised, the Tribunal moved to hear the preliminary matter first and reach a decision on same.
In respect of this case, I accept the Respondent’s suggestion that it makes sense to make a decision on the preliminary matter, given the time and expense it would take to conclude the hearing, and also because the point is ‘a question of pure law’ as set out by the Labour Court in Bus Eireann v SIPTU, referred to above.
Having therefore considered the preliminary matter and while recognising that that there are some differences between the Cunningham case and the instant case, I am satisfied the High Court has clearly outlined that where matters are arising from the same set of circumstances, they must be litigated in the one set of proceedings. Given that the Complainant accepted he was indeed pursuing such an application in respect of these complaints to the Injuries Resolution Board, I find that I have no jurisdiction in respect of the matters.
Background:
See the preamble above |
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
See the preamble above |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
See the preamble above |
Findings and Conclusions:
See the preamble above |
Decision:
Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 82 of the Act.
Section 25 of the Equal Status Acts, 2000 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 27 of that Act.
For the reasons outlined in the preamble above, I have no jurisdiction to hear these complaints. |
Dated: 25-02-25
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Breiffni O'Neill
Key Words:
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