ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00051337
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Cassio Ramos | The Food Point Limited |
Representatives | Self-represented | Kevin Sherry, Dermot G. O’Donovan Solicitors |
Complaint:
Act | Complaint Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 24 of the National Minimum Wage Act, 2000 | CA-00062410-001 | 20/03/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 | CA-00062410-002 | 20/03/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 | CA-00062410-003 | 20/03/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 | CA-00062410-004 | 20/03/2024 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 16/10/2024 and 19/11/2024
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Ewa Sobanska
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 following the referral of the complaints to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaints and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaints.
This matter was heard by way of remote hearing pursuant to the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2020 and S.I. 359 of 2020, which designates the WRC as a body empowered to hold remote hearings.
At the adjudication hearing, the parties were advised that, in accordance with the Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021, hearings before the Workplace Relations Commission are now held in public and, in most cases, decisions are no longer anonymised.
The parties were also advised that the Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021 grants Adjudication Officers the power to administer an oath or affirmation. The Complainant was sworn in and gave evidence. The Respondent’s representative was offered, but did not avail of, the opportunity to cross-examine the evidence.
I have taken the time to carefully review all the evidence both written and oral. I have noted the respective position of the parties. I am not required to provide a line for line rebuttal of the evidence and submissions that I have rejected or deemed superfluous to the main findings. I am guided by the reasoning in Faulkner v. The Minister for Industry and Commerce [1997] E.L.R. 107 where it was held “…minute analysis or reasons are not required to be given by administrative tribunals...the duty on administrative tribunals to give reasons in their decisions is not a particularly onerous one. Only broad reasons need be given…”.
I am required to set out ‘such evidential material which is fundamentally relevant to the decision’ per MacMenamin J. in Nano Nagle School v Daly [2019] IESC 63.
Where I deemed it necessary, I made my own inquiries to better understand the facts of the case and in fulfilment of my duties under statute.
In reaching my decisions I have taken into consideration all written and verbal submissions of the parties, and I have had full regard to the evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
An adjudication hearing for the purpose of investigation of the Complainant’s claims was scheduled for 16 October 2024. On 14 October 2024, Mr Sherry of Dermot G. O’Donovan Solicitors came on record for another case concerning the Respondent scheduled for the same day. He informed the WRC that he would not be able to attend the hearing of that case. Mr Sherry was informed by the WRC that, given the late application, he should attend the hearing and seek an adjournment. Mr Sherry was also requested to inform the WRC if he was on record for the remaining cases against the Respondent. On 15 October 2024, after normal office hours, Mr Sherry provided documentary evidence regarding his unavailability to attend the hearing on 16 October 2024.
Having carefully considered the Respondent’s representative’s application, I was satisfied that exceptional circumstances and substantial reasons existed to grant the adjournment.
A second hearing for the purpose of investigation of the Complainant’s claim was scheduled on 19 November 2024.
The Complainant was self-represented.
The Respondent did not attend the hearing. The Respondent was represented by Mr Sherry of Dermot G. O’Donovan Solicitors. Mr Sherry asserted that Mr Igor Roese de Conto, Director of the Respondent company was unable to attend due to stress. No medical evidence was furnished in that regard and no postponement was sought. Mr Sherry wished to proceed in the absence of the Respondent.
The Complainant is one of ten former employees of the Respondent who referred their complaints against the Respondent to the Director General of the WRC. The Complainant’s work colleague with good command of English communicated with the WRC on behalf of all the complainants.
The hearing was conducted with the assistance of a Portuguese interpreter sourced by the WRC. The interpreter was sworn in.
Background:
The Complainant commenced his employment with the Respondent on 12 September 2023. On 20 March 2024, he referred his complaints to the Director General of the WRC. |
CA-00062410-001- section 24 of the National Minimum Wage Act, 2000
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
The Complainant alleges that he did not receive the national minimum rate of pay. Summary of direct evidence of the Complainant At the adjudication hearing, the Complainant confirmed that he was paid €11.30 per hour. He agreed that it was the national minimum wage at the relevant time. The Complainant had not requested awritten statement of his average hourly rate of pay. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
Mr Sherry, on behalf of the Respondent submitted that the Respondent rejects the claim and asserts that the Complainant was paid the national minimum wage. |
Findings and Conclusions:
Section 23 of the National Minimum Wage Act, 2000 provides: ‘23. Employee entitled to statement of average hourly rate of pay for pay reference period (1) Subject to subsection (2), an employee may request from his or her employer a written statement of the employee's average hourly rate of pay for any pay reference period (other than the employee's current pay reference period) falling within the 12 month period immediately preceding the request. (2) An employee shall not make a request under subsection (1) in respect of any pay reference period during which the hourly rate of pay of the employee was on average not less than 150% calculated in accordance with section 20, or such other percentage as may be prescribed, of the national minimum hourly rate of pay or where the request would be frivolous or vexatious. (3) A request under subsection (1) shall be in writing and identify the pay reference period or periods to which it relates. (4) The employer shall, within 4 weeks after receiving the employee's request, give to the employee a statement in writing setting out in relation to the pay reference period or periods— (a) details of reckonable pay components (including the value of all forms of remuneration) paid or allowed to the employee in accordance with Part 1 of [Schedule 1], (b) the working hours of the employee calculated in accordance with section 8, (c) the average hourly pay (including the value of forms of remuneration other than cash payments) actually paid or allowed to the employee, as determined in accordance with section 20, and (d) the minimum hourly rate of pay to which the employee is entitled in accordance with this Act. (5) A statement under subsection (4) shall be signed and dated by or on behalf of the employer and a copy shall be kept by the employer for a period of 15 months beginning on the date on which the statement was given by the employee.’ Section 24 of the Act - Disputes about entitlement to minimum hourly rate of pay stipulates: ‘(1) For the purposes of this section, a dispute between an employee and his or her employer as to the employee's entitlements under this Act exists where the employee and his or her employer cannot agree on the appropriate entitlement of the employee to pay in accordance with this Act resulting in an alleged underpayment to the employee. (2) The Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission shall not entertain a dispute in relation to an employee's entitlements under this Act and, accordingly, shall not refer the dispute to an adjudication officer under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015— (a) unless the employee— (i) has obtained under section 23 a statement of his or her average hourly rate of pay in respect of the relevant pay reference period, or (ii) having requested the statement, has not been provided with it within the time limited by that section for the employer to supply the information, and a period of 6 months (or such longer period, not exceeding 12 months, as the adjudication officer may allow) has not elapsed since that statement was obtained or time elapsed, as the case may be,’ Section 24(2)(a) of the Act provides that a dispute cannot be referred to an Adjudication Officer under the Act unless an employee has received a statement pursuant to Section 23, or having requested such a statement, the employer has failed to provide the statement within the period of four weeks. The Complainant had not requested a statement of average hourly rate of pay from his employer. Therefore, I find that I have no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. In Mansion House Ltd v Izquierdo MWD 3/2004, the Labour Court held that, where a claimant had failed to request a statement in accordance with section 23(1) of the Act, the “appropriate course of action” was for the rights commissioner to decline jurisdiction without prejudice to the claimant's right to re-enter the same complaint having complied with the said subsection. It was the Labour Court's view that a decision dismissing the claim on its merits on the basis of non-compliance with section 23(1) was neither “appropriate nor is it warranted by any provision of the Act”. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
For the reasons set out above, I declare that I do not have jurisdiction to hear this complaint without prejudice to the Complainant's right to re-enter the same complaint having complied with Section 23 of the Act, subject to applicable time limits. I declare this complaint to be not well founded. |
CA-00062410-002 - section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
The Complainant alleges that he was not compensated for working on a Sunday. Summary of direct evidence of the Complainant At the adjudication hearing, the Complainant stated that the Respondent had a clock in system in place (finger and face recognition). The Complainant had his own record of hours he worked. He said that he worked on one Sunday, on 22 October 2023 from 1.04pm to 10.35pm, with a 30-minute break. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
Mr Sherry, on behalf of the Respondent submitted that the Respondent rejects the claim and that the Complainant was paid a Sunday premium. Mr Sherry had no further instructions as to the details of the alleged premium paid to the Complainant. There were no available records of hours worked by the Complainant. |
Findings and Conclusions:
Section 14. Sunday work: supplemental provisions of the Organisation of Working Time Act stipulates as follows;- (1) An employee who is required to work on a Sunday (and the fact of his or her having to work on that day has not otherwise been taken account of in the determination of his or her pay) shall be compensated by his or her employer for being required so to work by the following means, namely— (a) by the payment to the employee of an allowance of such an amount as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or (b) by otherwise increasing the employee's rate of pay by such an amount as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or (c) by granting the employee such paid time off from work as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or (d) by a combination of two or more of the means referred to in the preceding paragraphs. This complaint was referred to the Workplace Relations Commission on 20 March 2024. Therefore, the cognisable period for this complaint in accordance with the provisions of Section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 is the six-month period prior to the referral of the claim i.e., from 21 September 2023 to 20 March 2024. In Park House Hotel Ltd v. Wlodarczyk DWT 24/2016, the Labour Court said that what was intended by section 14 of the Act was that an employee who is obliged to work on a Sunday is entitled to compensation for that obligation in the form of a benefit which he or she would not receive if they were not so obliged. In Viking Security Ltd v. Valent DWT 89/2014, the Labour Court held that it could only be satisfied that an employee had obtained his or her entitlements under this section “where the element of compensation for the obligation to work on Sunday is clearly discernible from the contract of employment or from the circumstances surrounding its conclusion”. There was no dispute that the Complainant was paid €11.30 per hour which was the national minimum wage during the period of the Complainant’s employment with the Respondent. The Complainant’s rate of pay did not exceed the national minimum rate of pay and, therefore, it did not include an element of compensation for Sunday working. There was no evidence put forward by the Respondent that would show that any additional compensation was given to the Complainant with respect to the requirement to work on Sundays. The Complainant’s contract is silent on the matter. I take account of the Labour Court decision in Chicken & Chips ltd t/a Chicken Hut v. Dawid Malinowski DWT159 regarding Sunday premium where it stated; “The Court considers a premium of 33% of the hourly rate is reasonable.” In Viking Security Limited v. Valent DWT1489, the Labour Court provided guidance on calculating Sunday premium. The Labour Court measured compensation at approximately time plus one third for each hour worked on a Sunday. This is the basis on which I will calculate the Sunday premium. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
I declare this complaint to be well founded. I require the Respondent to pay the Complainant €33.90 gross ((9 hours worked) *€11.30/3) for the financial loss which the Complainant suffered. I further require the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation in the amount of €500 for the breach of the Complainant’s statutory rights which I deem just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances. |
CA-00062410-003 - section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
The Complainant alleges that the Respondent did not pay him his salary and accrued annual leave. Summary of direct evidence of the Complainant The Complainant alleges that he should receive €706.25 in outstanding salary for the month of November 2023 and €256.51 for annual leave accrued to be paid on cessation of his employment, totalling €962.76. The Complainant submits that he received a payslip showing the above amounts but no monies were paid to him on the pay day on 10 December 2023 or after. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
The Respondent did not contest the claim. Mr Sherry confirmed that the Respondent accepted the amounts due to the Complainant as exhibited on his payslip i.e. €706.25 in outstanding salary for the month of November 2023 and €256.51 for annual leave accrued. Mr Sherry noted that the Respondent was willing to enter into a payment plan with the Complainant and an offer of monthly payments of approximately €90 was made to the Complainant but not accepted by the Complainant. |
Findings and Conclusions:
There was no dispute between the parties that the Respondent did not pay the Complainant €706.25 in outstanding salary for the month of November 2023 and €256.51 for annual leave accrued to be paid on cessation of his employment, totalling €962.76. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
I declare this complaint to be well founded. I direct the Respondent to pay the Complainant the sum of €962.76. |
CA-00062410-004 - section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
The Complainant alleges that the Respondent has not pay him the appropriate payment in lieu of notice of termination of his employment. Summary of direct evidence of the Complainant The Complainant said that given the lack of engagement on the part of the Respondent, all employees wrote a letter to the Respondent on 25 November 2023 stating that as a dedicated and committed team they wished to express their concern regarding the delay in the payment of salaries and their insecurity regarding the payment. The employees stated in the letter that the failure to pay their salaries has left them in an uncomfortable financial situation and has significantly impacted their personal, financial, and psychological lives. They expressed their understanding that unexpected situations may arise, but that it was essential to ensure that employees received due compensation for the work they have done. The employees informed the Respondent that they would withdraw work if all outstanding payments were not settled. The employees went on to emphasise that their goal was to continue contributing to the success and growth of the Respondent. However, it was essential that salary issues were resolved to maintain team motivation and stability. They stated that they were open to dialogue and seeking solutions that were mutually beneficial to the parties. They looked forward to resolving the situation in the best possible way and resuming their activities. There was some confusion on part of the Complainant regarding the termination of employment. It appears that the Complainant believed that the letter that was sent to the Respondent could be his resignation. He said that the employees decided to close the restaurant and walk out. He seemed unsure as to when the dismissal actually took place. He received a payslips showing the final pay and accrued annual leave. The Complainant gave evidence that he did not receive any notice of the termination of his employment, and that he was not compensated in respect of the same. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
Mr Sherry, on behalf of the Respondent submitted that the Respondent rejects the claim. However, Mr Sherry had no further instructions. |
Findings and Conclusions:
Relevant Law: Payment of Wages Act 1991 The Payment of Wages Act 1991 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1991 Act”) provides the following definition of “wages” at section 1: "wages", in relation to an employee, means any sums payable to the employee by the employer in connection with his employment, including— (a) any fee, bonus or commission, or any holiday, sick or maternity pay, or any other emolument, referable to his employment, whether payable under his contract of employment or otherwise, and (b) any sum payable to the employee upon the termination by the employer of his contract of employment without his having given to the employee the appropriate prior notice of the termination, being a sum paid in lieu of the giving of such notice: Provided however that the following payments shall not be regarded as wages for the purposes of this definition: (i) any payment in respect of expenses incurred by the employee in carrying out his employment, (ii) (ii) any payment by way of a pension, allowance or gratuity in connection with the death, or the retirement or resignation from his employment, of the employee or as compensation for loss of office, (iii) any payment referable to the employee's redundancy, (iv) any payment to the employee otherwise than in his capacity as an employee, (v) any payment in kind or benefit in kind, (vi) any payment by way of tips or gratuities.
Sections 5(1) and 5(6) of the 1991 Act provide: 5(1) An employer shall not make a deduction from the wages of an employee (or receive any payment from an employee) unless— (a) the deduction (or payment) is required or authorised to be made by virtue of any statute or any instrument made under statute, (b) the deduction (or payment) is required or authorised to be made by virtue of a term of the employee's contract of employment included in the contract before, and in force at the time of, the deduction or payment, or (c) in the case of a deduction, the employee has given his prior consent in writing to it. (2) … (3) … (4) … (5) … (6) Where— (a) the total amount of any wages that are paid on any occasion by an employer to an employee is less than the total amount of wages that is properly payable by him to the employee on that occasion (after making any deductions therefrom that fall to be made and are in accordance with this Act), or (b) none of the wages that are properly payable to an employee by an employer on any occasion (after making any such deductions as aforesaid) are paid to the employee, then, except in so far as the deficiency or non-payment is attributable to an error of computation, the amount of the deficiency or non-payment shall be treated as a deduction made by the employer from the wages of the employee on the occasion. The non-payment of wages that are properly payable to an employee is an unlawful deduction by the employer. This definition also makes it clear that payments in lieu of notice i.e. such moneys which the employee would have earned as wages had he worked out his notice are “wages”. The question to be decided is whether the wages claimed were properly payable. The Complainant gave evidence that he commenced employment with the Respondent on 12 September 2023. The Complainant alleges that he was dismissed and did not receive the appropriate payment in lieu of notice of termination of his employment. The Respondent rejects the claim, albeit no further clarification of the Respondent’s position or submission was offered to the hearing. It is regrettable that the Respondent chose not to attend the hearing. There was some confusion regarding the termination of the Complainant’s employment. Anemployee who has resigned from their employment in circumstances of a constructive dismissal cannot succeed in a claim for minimum notice. However, even if it was accepted that the Complainant was dismissed by the Respondent, to be entitled to the statutory minimum notice, an employee must have been working for an employer continuously for at least 13 weeks. The Complainant commenced his employment on 12 September 2023. On his own evidence, his employment terminated on 19 November 2023 (as per his complaint form), on 25 November 2025 (when the letter was signed). The Complainant had not worked for the Respondent for the required period and, therefore, had he been dismissed by the Respondent he would have no entitlement to a statutory notice in any event. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
I declare this complaint to be not well founded. |
Dated: 07/02/2025
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Ewa Sobanska
Key Words:
National minimum wage- Sunday premium – wages – minimum notice- |