EDA2514

PARTIES:

DIVISION:

SUBJECT:

Appeal of Adjudication Officer Decision No's: ADJ-00046244 (CA-00057064-004).

BACKGROUND:

The Worker appealed the decision of the WRC Adjudication Officer under Section 83 (1), Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2015 on 8 January 2024.

A Labour Court hearing took place on 6 February 2025.

The following is the Determination of the Court:

DETERMINATION:

This is an appeal by Alexandra Mia Ragauskas against a Decision of an Adjudication Officer (number ADJ-00046244, CA-00057064-004) under the Employment Equality Act, 1998 (“The Act”) in relation to a complaint by her against her former employer IBM (Ireland) Product Distribution Limited. The Adjudication Officer found that the complaint was out of time and therefore was not well founded.

A hearing of the Labour Court was held in Dublin on 6 February 2025.

For ease, the parties are referred to in this Determination as they were at first instance. Hence, Alexandra Mia Ragauskas is referred to as “the Complainant” and IBM (Ireland) Product Distribution Limited as “the Respondent”.

Preliminary Matter – Time limits

The Respondent raises a preliminary matter in relation to the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the complaint on appeal having regard to the statutory time limits set down at Section 77(5) of the Act, which states as follows:

“(a) Subject to paragraph (b), a claim for redress in respect of discrimination or victimisation may not be referred under this section after the end of the period of 6 months from the date of occurrence of the discrimination or victimisation to which the case relates or, as the case may be, the date of its most recent occurrence.

(b) On application by a complainant the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission or Circuit Court, as the case may be, may, for reasonable cause, direct that in relation to the complainant paragraph (a) shall have effect as if for the reference to a period of 6 months there were substituted a reference to such period not exceeding 12 months as is specified in the direction; and, where such a direction is given, this Part shall have effect accordingly.”

Position of the Respondent

The Complainant’s employment with the Respondent ceased on 18 July 2022, after she resigned her employment on 14 June 2022. She lodged a complaint under the Act to the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) on 9 June 2023.

The Complainant has not identified any act from which it may reasonably be inferred that she had been subjected to unfavourable treatment by reason of her possessing any protected characteristic under the Act. As the Complainant has failed to identify any acts of discrimination which allegedly occurred in the six months period prior to lodging her complaint to the WRC, the complaint in respect of discriminatory treatment is out of time.

The specific events upon which the Complainant places reliance in advancing her claims of discrimination, each fall outside of the six-month limitation period within which a claim of this kind must be instituted.

On the basis of the Complainant’s submission, she has failed to demonstrate that her failure to lodge a complaint within the first six-month period was due to reasonable cause.  In Servier Ireland Industries Limited v- Juanita Wilkinson EDA 1713 the Labour Court held as follows:

“It is clear from the authorities that the test places the onus on the applicant for an extension of time to identify the reason for the delay and to establish that the reason relied upon provides justifiable excuse for the actual delay. Secondly, the onus is on the applicant to establish a causal connection between the reason proffered for the delay and his or her failure to present the complaint in time. Thirdly, the Court must be satisfied as a matter of probability that the complaint would have been presented in time were it not for the intervention of the factors relied upon as constituting reasonable cause. It is the actual delay that must be explained and justified. Hence if the factors relied upon to explain the delay ceased to operate before the complaint was presented, that may undermine a claim that those factors were the actual cause of the delay. Finally, where the established test imposes a relatively low threshold of reasonableness on an applicant, there is some limitation on the range of issues which can be taken into account.”

The Complainant has failed to establish any reasonable cause to extend the timeframe for consideration of her complaints under the Act.   The claims under the Acts are out of time.

Position of the Complainant

The Complainant did not consider lodging a complaint under the Act initially. She thought that she had a biased and subjective view of her experience when employed with the Respondent, until she was approached by former colleagues some 11 months after her employment ended. It was only at that point that her subjective view about her employment experience with the Respondent changed. She decided at that point to lodge a complaint alleging unfair treatment by the Respondent.

The nature of the complainant, which relates to unfair treatment, constitutes reasonable ground for extending the timeframe for consideration of her complaint.

Adjournment

The Court adjourned briefly to consider the preliminary matter raised in relation to time limits. 

Rule 34 of the Labour Court Rules provides that: -

“The Court may, in its discretion, give a preliminary ruling on any aspect of the case where it is satisfied that time and expense may be saved by the giving of such a ruling and/or where it has the potential to be determinative of the case”.

The Court reconvened and advised the parties that it proposed to adjourn the hearing and decide on the preliminary matter regarding its jurisdiction to hear the appeal. It advised the parties that no decision had yet been made on that matter and it would need to consider the arguments of both parties. If it decided that the appeal was lodged within time, a further hearing would be scheduled, and the Court would proceed to consider the substantive appeal. If the Court decided that the complaint was lodged outside the time limits set down in the Act, the appeal would found to be out of time and statute barred. The parties were agreeable to proceed on that basis.

Deliberation and Findings

The preliminary matter for determination by the Court is an application for an extension of time.

The Complainant lodged a complaint under the Act to the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) on 9 June 2023. Therefore, the relevant period for consideration by the Court in assessing a contravention under the Act, having regard to the six-month statutory time frame set down at Section 77(5) of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 is the period from 10 December 2022 to 9 June 2023.

Should the Court find a reasonable cause for the delay in lodging the claim, the timeframe for considering when a contravention occurred can be extended from six months to twelve months.

In this case an application for extending the timeframe for consideration of the complaint under the Act is made on the basis that her failure to present a complaint within time was due to reasonable cause.

The established test for deciding if an extension of time can be granted for reasonable cause is that formulated by this Court in Labour Court Determination DWT0338, Cementation Skanska (Formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v Carroll.  The test was set out as follows:

“It is the Court's view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.”

The test formulated in Cementation Skanska (Formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v Carroll draws heavily on the decision of the High Court in Donal O’Donnell and Catherine O’Donnell v Dun Laoghaire Corporation [1991] ILRM 30. Here Costello J. (as he then was) stated as follows:

“The phrase ‘good reasons’ is one of wide import which it would be futile to attempt to define precisely. However, in considering whether or not there are good reasons for extending the time I think it is clear that the test must be an objective one and the court should not extend the time merely because an aggrieved plaintiff believed that he or she was justified in delaying the institution of proceedings. What the plaintiff has to show (and I think the onus under O. 84 r. 21 is on the plaintiff) is that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford a justifiable excuse for the delay.”

The burden of proof in establishing the existence of reasonable cause rests with the Complainant.

To discharge that burden, and for this Court to grant an extension of time, the Complainant must both explain the delay and offer a justifiable excuse for the delay.  The Complainant must establish a causal connection between the reason for the delay and the failure to present the complaint in time. Finally, the Court must satisfy itself that the complaint would have been presented in time if not for the factors relied upon as reasonable cause. It is the actual delay that must be explained and justified.

The Complainant in this case submits that she did not consider lodging a complaint under the Act until she was approached by former colleagues some 11 months after her employment ended when she learned about their employment experiences with the Respondent. Having engaged with those colleagues her subjective view about her own employment experience changed and she decided to lodge a complaint alleging unfair treatment by the Respondent. She did not delay in lodging her complaint at that point.

While the reason submitted by the Complainant in this case may explain the delay, the Court finds that it does not provide a justifiable excuse for the delay. 

The operative reason for the delay was because the Complainant became aware of some information 11 months after her employment ended that, in her view, validated her subjective view of her employment experience. It was only after engaging with those former colleagues about their experiences that she considered lodging a complaint under the Act.

Having regard to the submissions made, the Court finds that the Complainant has failed to establish any facts that prevented her from lodging a complaint under the Act within the six-month timeframe set down in the Act. The Court is further of the view that the Complainant’s engagement with former colleagues, which may have validated her own subjective view of her employment experience, does not provide an adequate explanation to explain why she delayed for 11 months to lodge a complaint under the Act.

In all the circumstances, the Court finds that a justifiable basis upon which an extension of time could be granted has not been put forward in this case. The Complainant does not meet the threshold outlined in Cementation Skanksa whereby the statutory timeframe within which he is permitted to refer his complaint under the Act can be enlarged for reasonable cause.

The Court cannot assume a jurisdiction which is not conferred to it. A failure on the part of a Complainant to present a complaint in time deprives the Adjudication Officer, and this Court on appeal, of jurisdiction to hear the claim. As a result, the Court finds that it has no jurisdiction to hear the complaint.

Decision

The Court finds that the reasons provided by the Complainant are not sufficient to demonstrate reasonable cause for the delay in filing his complaint with the WRC.  Therefore, the Court finds that the within claim was out of time when it was presented to the Workplace Relations Commission and is accordingly statute barred. 

In these circumstances, the Court cannot proceed to hear the substantive matter.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the complaint is not well founded and that the Decision of the Adjudication Officer is upheld.

The Court so Determines.

	Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
	Katie Connolly
TH	______________________
14 February 2025	Deputy Chairman

NOTE

Enquiries concerning this Determination should be addressed to Therese Hickey, Court Secretary.