RPD253

PARTIES:

DIVISION:

SUBJECT:

Appeal of Adjudication Officer Decision No's: ADJ-00049926 (CA-00061305-001)

BACKGROUND:

The Employer appealed the Decision of the Adjudication Officer to the Labour Court on 13 August 2024in accordance with the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967 to 2014. A Labour Court hearing took place on 31st January 2025.

The following is the Decision of the Court:

DECISION:

This is an appeal by Coras Mini Market Limited against the decision of an Adjudicator Officer (ADJ-00049926, CA-00061305-01, dated 2 July 2024) made in relation to a complaint by Rachel Flynn under the Redundancy Payments Acts, 1967.

The Adjudication Officer found that the complaint under that Act was well founded, and that Rachel Flynn was entitled to a statutory redundancy payment.

A hearing of the Labour Court was held on 31 January 2025 in Dublin. The Court heard submissions from both parties on the preliminary matter of time limits and the substantive matter under appeal.

John Crennan on behalf of Coras Mini Market Limited (the Appellant) and Rachel Flynn (the Respondent) gave sworn testimony under oath.

Preliminary Matters – time limits

A preliminary matter arose regarding whether a valid appeal was lodged to the Court within the statutory time limits and, if not, whether exceptional circumstances arose preventing the lodging of the appeal such that the statutory time limits may be extended.

Position of the Appellant

The Applicant’s representative informed the Court that he was not acting on behalf of the Appellant when the initial incomplete appeal form was lodged. The Appellant’s representative at the time lodged an appeal to the Court on 12 August 2024. A completed appeal form was subsequently lodged by email on 13 August 2024. In and around that time, circumstances arose that were outside the Appellant’s control.  There was a breakdown in communications with his sister who lodged the appeal on his behalf.  He did not understand the nuances of the legislation, due to a lack of knowledge a completed form was not lodged within the 42-day time limit.

Position of the Respondent

The Respondent did not accept that any “exceptional circumstances” arose to prevent the lodging of the appeal on time. She submitted that her understanding of the term “exceptional circumstances” referred to such events as a war or a death in the family, which did not apply in this case.

Relevant Law and Rules – Preliminary Matter

The making of appeals to the Labour Court is governed by s.44 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. Sections 44 (2) (3) and (4) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 Act provide as follows:

(2) An appeal under this section shall be initiated by the party concerned giving a notice in writing to the Labour Court containing such particulars as are determined by the Labour Court in accordance with rules under subsection (5) of section 20 of the Act of 1946 and stating that the party concerned is appealing the decision to which it relates.

(3) Subject to subsection (4), a notice under subsection (2) shall be given to the Labour Court not later than 42 days from the date of the decision concerned.

(4) The Labour Court may direct that a notice under subsection (2) may be given to it after the expiration of the period specified in subsection (3) if it is satisfied that the notice was not so given before such expiration due to the existence of exceptional circumstances.

The relevant rules are contained in the Labour Court Rules 2024, which the Court is authorised to make under s.20(5) of the Industrial Relations Act 1946, and which state as follows: -

 23. The appeal shall be initiated by notice in writing, including by email, or via the Labour Court portal delivered to the Court within 42 days from the date of the decision being appealed. In accordance with the provisions of the Interpretation Act 2005 the date of the decision is day 1 of the 42-day period. Appeals sent by post can be given to the Court in the ordinary course of the Court’s business and the date of receipt by the Court will be recorded using a date stamp manually applied on the day the appeal is received. Appeals submitted by email or via the Labour Court portal can be made up to 12 midnight on the 42nd day and the date of receipt will be the date and time automatically recorded on the email/Labour Court portal.

 24. If the appeal is not made within the requisite 42 days, then application should be made to the Court in accordance with Section 44(4) of the 2015 Act, to extend time for bringing an appeal and giving the grounds upon which, the extension is sought. The grounds for any such extension of time should form part of the written submission of the Appellant. Such an extension of time will only be granted in exceptional circumstances.

 25. The notice of appeal shall be completed in full and accompanied by a copy of the decision of the Adjudication Officer to which the appeal relates.

26. The notice referred to at Rule 23 & 25 above shall be given on a form provided by the Court for that purpose.

27. Where the appeal is made via the Labour Court portal the Appellant is required to provide the same information as requested in the appeal form.

Deliberations

Was a valid appeal lodged in time?

The deadline to submit the within appeal to the Labour Court was 12 February 2024, having regard to the statutory timeframe set out at s.44(2) of the Workplace Relations Act.

An appeal form was emailed to the Labour Court on 12 August 2024 at 17:02 and again at 17:18 on behalf of Appellant, which falls within the 42-day period. While the Respondent’s name was included on the appeal form, no address, email or telephone contact details for the Respondent were provided.

The Labour Court informed the Appellant’s representative by email on 13 August 2024 that the document submitted to the Court could not be processed as it was lacking in the information required. That email correspondence pointed set out that the document had not been accepted as an appeal and that the appeal could not be processed without a copy of the completed form and a copy of the Adjudication Officer’s decision.

Section 44(2) of the Act, together with the relevant provisions of the Labour Court Rules, prescribe what is needed to validly initiate an appeal to the Court. Conversely, a notice sent to the Court that does not comply with these requirements cannot constitute a valid initiation of an appeal.

An appeal must set out in unambiguous terms an intention to appeal a specific decision of an Adjudication Officer within the prescribed 42-day period. It must contain sufficient information so that the Respondent can be notified about the appeal. A respondent’s contact details are necessary to inform the other party that an appeal is in being. The requirement to identify the respondent to an appeal and provide an address for service of documents is an essential aspect of any appeal and a failure to include such information when lodging an appeal renders a notice of appeal invalid.

Having regard to the above, the Court finds that the omission of an address, email and telephone details for the Respondent to the appeal renders the appeal made on 12 August 2024 invalid and therefore, out of time.

Application for an extension of time.

The Appellant’s representative applied to extend the time limit for lodging the appeal form. In considering an application for an extension of time, the matter for the Court to decide is whether “exceptional circumstances” existed during the period for the giving of notice of an appeal that prevented the lodging of that appeal within the 42-day statutory period.

The meaning of the expression "exceptional circumstances" has been considered extensively by this Court and other fora. In Joyce Fitzsimons-Markey v Gaelscoil Thulach na nOg [2004] ELR 110, the Labour Court held as follows:

“The question for determination in this case is whether the applicant was prevented by exceptional circumstances from bringing her claim within the time limit prescribed by Section 77(6) of the Act.  That is pre-eminently a question of fact and degree. Each case must be decided on its own circumstances and the improbability of any two cases falling under the same set of circumstances makes it unlikely that the decision in any one case can be more than a rough guide to the decision in another.”

The Court went on to state:

“The Court must first consider if the circumstances relied upon by the applicant can be regarded as exceptional. If it answers that question in the affirmative the Court must then go on to consider if those circumstances operated so as to prevent the applicant from lodging her claim in time.”

In Byrne v PJ Quigley Limited [1995] ELR 205 the Employment Appeals Tribunal held that exceptional circumstances were “strong words” and meant “out of the ordinary, unusual, probably quite unusual but not necessarily highly unusual”. The Tribunal further stated that to extend time it must be satisfied that the exceptional circumstances “prevented” lodging the claim within the statutory time limit, and not merely that the exceptional circumstance caused or triggered the claim. More recently, in McLoughlin v Murray Senior [2022] IEHC 537 Heslin J considered the term “exceptional circumstances” and note that:

“70. The view expressed in the EAT's decision in Byrne v. PJ Quigley Ltd is that exceptional circumstances in the present context must be circumstances which are, at the very least, “quite unusual”. In my view, what is required goes somewhat further and I take this view for the following reasons.

71. The Oireachtas chose not to use, for example, the words good reason in s.44 (4). The bar was set higher. Nor did the Oireachtas employ the term special circumstances in that section. In my view, the bar was set higher still, by the use of the term exceptional.

…whereas the EAT used the term “quite unusual” in Byrne v PJ Quigley Ltd, I believe s. 44 (4) requires even more of the circumstances. In other words, exceptional seems to connote something even greater as regards the circumstances being well out of the ordinary – in short, not merely quite unusual, but highly unusual.”

The burden of proof in establishing the existence of “exceptional circumstances” rests with the Applicant. To discharge that burden the Applicant must explain what “highly unusual” circumstances arose, within the meaning of s. 44(4) of the Act and having regard to the established case law, to prevent the lodging of his appeal within time.

In this case, the Applicant’s submitted that exceptional circumstances arose as there was a breakdown in communications with the person lodging the appeal on his behalf and that due to a lack of knowledge a completed appeal form was not lodged within time. A completed form was subsequently lodged to the Court on 13 August 2024.

While the Appellant relies on a lack of knowledge as the basis for his contention that exceptional circumstances arose to prevent the lodging of an appeal within time, this Court has consistently held that ignorance of one’s legal rights, as opposed to the facts giving rise to those rights, cannot be accepted as an excuse for not observing the statutory time limit.

The Court recognises that a lay litigant may be unfamiliar with the law, however, the information provided to parties when they receive decisions from the Workplace Relations Commission make clear to them, in a manner that requires no legal training, that there is a limit of 42 days within which to appeal. In reply to question from the Court, the Appellant accepted that he had read the WRC correspondence when he received the Adjudication Officer’s decision which set out the 42-day time limit for appealing that decision.  The Labour Court appeal form is not a complicated form and is structured in a way to facilitate all appellants lodge an appeal, without the need for legal advice. In any event should an appellant need legal advice before submitting an appeal, the period of 42 days provides adequate time to do so.

Based on the facts of the case as presented, the Court cannot establish any facts to support the assertion that “exceptional circumstances” arose to prevent the lodging of an appeal within the statutory timeframe.

Determination

Rule 54 of the Labour Court Rules 20224 states as follows:

“The Court may, in its discretion, give a preliminary ruling on any aspect of the case where it is satisfied that time and expense may be saved by the giving of such a ruling and/or where it has the potential to be determinative of the case.”

In this case, the Court finds that the existence of “exceptional circumstances” has not been established by the Applicant. Therefore, the Court finds that the within claim was out of time when it was given to the Labour Court and is accordingly statute barred. 

In these circumstances, the Court cannot proceed to hear the substantive matter.

The appeal is rejected, and the Decision of the Adjudication Officer is upheld accordingly.

The Court so Determines.

	Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
	Katie Connolly
AL	______________________
10th February 2025	Deputy Chairman

NOTE

Enquiries concerning this Decision should be addressed to Amy Leonard, Court Secretary.