UDD256

PARTIES:

DIVISION:

SUBJECT:

Appeal of Adjudication Officer Decision No's: ADJ-00038059 (CA-00049430-001)

BACKGROUND:

The Employer appealed the Decision of the Adjudication Officer to the Labour Court on 15 September 2023 in accordance with Section 8A of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 to 2015. Labour Court hearings took place on 26 June 2024 and 23 January 2025.

The following is the Decision of the Court.

DECISION:

This is an appeal by Ricoh Ireland Limited (hereafter the Respondent) against an Adjudication Officer’s Decision ADJ-00038059 CA-00049430-001 given under the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 to 2015 (the Act’s) in a claim by Paul Kealy (hereafter the Complainant) that he was unfairly dismissed by way of unfair selection for redundancy.  The Adjudication Officer upheld his complaint of unfair dismissal and ordered re-engagement with effect from 1st October 2023.

1 Background

The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent as a Production Print Sales Specialist in the commercial and industrial print sector.  The Complainant earned a basic gross salary of €44,535 and had the potential to earn up to €33,750 commission.

 The complaint was submitted on 30th March 2022 and therefore the cognisable period for the purpose of the Act is 1st October 2021 to 30th March 2022. 

 2Preliminary issue

 On Tuesday 25th June 2024 the day before the scheduled hearing, IBEC on behalf of the Respondent sent in a further submission raising a preliminary issue which they wanted to raise at the commencement of the hearing.  It was their submission that the complaint was in fact out of time.  It was not in dispute between the parties that this issue was not raised at first instance.

At the Court hearing on the 26th June 2024 the parties agreed that the Court should in the first instance hear the parties on the preliminary issue.

 The Court then posed three questions to the parties in respect of the preliminary issue

1) With reference to Clark J’s judgment in Mary Stokes v Christian Brothers High school Clonmel [2015] IESC 13 has the Labour Court got jurisdiction to hear an issue in respect of time limits where this issue was not dealt with at first instance and no decision of an Adjudication Officer exists in respect of same.

2) By not raising this issue at first instance with the Adjudication officer has the Respondent deprived the Complainant of the right to seek an extension of the time limits for reasonable cause.

3) If the Complainant’s contract provides for payment in lieu of notice and he accepted the payment that was tendered for same, can he still rely on the notice period to bring his complaint in time.

It was agreed with the parties that the Court would adjourn to allow the parties make written responses to the questions posed to assist the Court in its deliberations in respect of the preliminary issue raised by the Respondent. On receipt of the responses, the Court would consider the preliminary issue.

3 Summary of Respondents submission on preliminary issue

 The Respondent in their submission noted that the Supreme Court in the ‘Stokes’  case had held that “the respondent was precluded from raising a preliminary issue as to whether it had been notified of the complaint in time in circumstances where this issue had not been raised before the Equality Tribunal such that the appellant had been deprived of an opportunity to seek an extension of time from the Director of Equality investigations.” They submitted that the facts, the statutes and jurisprudence applicable to the complaint currently being considered by the Labour Court, distinguish it from the ‘Stokes’ case as this case turns on what the statute provides for in relation to matters before the Labour Court. The Respondents submission then considered the Mary Stokes case and concluded as it was an appeal to the Supreme Court on a point of law it was distinguishable to the facts of this case.

The IBEC representative on behalf of the Respondent submitted that both the statute and the Labour Court rules provide for appeals to be heard ‘de novo’ and went on to cite McKechnie J in Brannigan v the Equality Tribunal and County Louth VEC [2016] IESC 40 stating “a creature of statute must live by the statute” and Clarke J in Fitzgibbon v the Law Society [2014] IESC 48 where he sets out the critical characteristics of a de novo appeal in support of their submission.  They opened the case of More Hampton Foods—v Dean Gibbons DWT1720, a Labour Court decision which they submitted supported their contention that de novo hearing could include a time limits issue not previously raised.

 In respect of the second question the Respondent submitted that “It is trite that a Labour Court appeal is a full rehearing of a claim, Therefore, it remains within the scope and powers of the labour court to deal with and determine any preliminary points raised by the parties in the course of the hearing”. The submission then went on to address the test for ‘reasonable cause’ in terms of considering an extension of the time limits.

In addressing the third question posed by the Court the Respondent relied on the decision of the Labour Court in Fyffes Tropical Ireland Ltd v Loui Osman UDD2413 where because the Complainant was paid in lieu of his contractual notice his date of dismissal was considered to be the date he was issued notice and or the date he received payment if different.

4 Summary of Complainants submission on preliminary issue

The representative for the Complainant submitted that the ‘Stokes’ case was on all fours with the facts of this case. In both cases, the time limits were not raised at first instance and the power to extend the time limit for reasonable cause lay with the first instance body. In ‘Stokes’ the Supreme Court noted “it seems to me that a party cannot be deprived of the opportunity to seek an extension of time by reason of the fact that its opponent does not raise the time issue at all before the body, in this case the Director, on whom the power to extend time is conferred”. The same issue arises in this case.  In the case of St James Hospital v Love EDA1612, the Labour Court considered the implications of the principles in ‘Stokes’ and held that “where an issue is not raised at first instance a party cannot seek to rely on that issue on appeal to defeat the claim”. Mr Kirwan on behalf of the Complainant submitted that, the Respondent’s application that the Court declare the complaint submitted out of time, should be dismissed.

 In respect of the second question Mr Kirwan submitted that if the Court has the jurisdiction to allow the Respondent to raise the time limits, de facto it should have the jurisdiction to allow an extension of time limits for reasonable cause. It was his submission that relying on the Morehampton case that a de novo appeal can allow for an issue such as time limits to be addressed. The Complainant submitted that should the Labour Court notwithstanding the principle in ‘Stokes’ consider it necessary to address the issue of compliance with time limits, then the Complainant should be allowed adduce evidence to support an extension of time.

 On the third issue the Complainant acknowledges the principals det out in the ‘Fyffes’ case. However, they submit that it is the particular terms in the Complainant’s contract that the Court is required to consider. In this case the relevant clause provides that during the notice period the person will continue as an employee of the Respondent.

5 The applicable Law

Section 8. Determination of claims for unfair dismissal

[(1)

(a) A claim by an employee against an employer for redress under this Act for unfair dismissal may be referred by the employee to the Director General and, where such a claim is so referred, the Director General shall, subject to section 39 of the Act of 2015, refer the claim to an adjudication officer for adjudication by that officer.

(b) Section 39 of the Act of 2015 shall apply to a claim for redress referred to the Director General under paragraph (a) as it applies to a complaint presented or dispute referred to the Director General under section 41 of that Act, subject to the modification that references in the said section 39, to a complaint or dispute shall be construed as references to a claim for redress so referred.

(c) An adjudication officer to whom a claim for redress is referred under this section shall—

(i) inquire into the claim,

(ii) give the parties to the claim an opportunity to be heard by the adjudication officer and to present to the adjudication officer any evidence relevant to the claim,

(iii) make a decision in relation to the claim consisting of an award of redress in accordance with section 7 or the dismissal of the claim, and

(iv) give the parties to the claim a copy of that decision in writing.]

[(1A) A decision of an adjudication officer under subsection (1) consisting of an award of redress in accordance with section 7 shall include a statement of the reasons for the award of such redress and the reasons for the adjudication officer's deciding not to award other redress under that section.]

[(1B) Subsection (14) of section 41 of the Act of 2015 applies to a decision of an adjudication officer under subsection (1) as it applies to a decision of an adjudication officer under that section subject to the modification that the words “subsection (1) of section 8 of the Act of 1977” shall be substituted for the words “this section”.]

(2) A claim for redress under this Act shall be initiated by giving a notice in writing (containing such particulars (if any) as may be specified in [regulations under subsection (17) of section 41 of the Act of 2015]) to [the Director General]—

(a) within the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the relevant dismissal, or

[(b) within such period not exceeding 12 months from the date of the relevant dismissal as the adjudication officer considers appropriate, in circumstances where the adjudication officer is satisfied that the giving of the notice within the period referred to in paragraph (a) was prevented due to reasonable cause,]

and a copy of the notice shall be given by the [Director General] […] to the employer concerned as soon as may be after the receipt of the notice by the [Director General].

Section 8 A   Application of provisions of Act of 2015 to claim for redress

(1) Sections 42 and 43 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 shall apply to a claim referred to an adjudication officer under section 8 as they apply to a complaint or dispute referred to an adjudication officer under section 41 of that Act, subject to the following modifications:

(a) references to a complaint or dispute shall be construed as references to a claim referred to an adjudication officer under section 8 of this Act;

(b) the reference to section 41 shall be construed as a reference to section 8 of this Act; and

(c) any other necessary modifications.]

[(2) Section 44 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 shall apply to a decision of an adjudication officer given in respect of a claim for redress under this Act by an employee as it applies to a decision of an adjudication officer given in proceedings under section 41 of that Act, subject to the following modifications:

(a) the substitution of the following subsection for subsection (1);

“(1)

(a) A party to a claim for redress under the Act of 1977 may appeal a decision of an adjudication officer given in relation to that claim to the Labour Court and, where the party does so, the Labour Court shall—

(i) give the parties to the appeal an opportunity to be heard by it and to present to it any evidence relevant to the appeal,

(ii) make a decision in relation to the appeal affirming, varying or setting aside the decision of the adjudication officer to which the appeal relates, and

(iii) give the parties to the appeal a copy of that decision in writing.

(b) A decision of the Labour Court under paragraph (a) may include an award of redress under section 7 of the Act of 1977.”

6 Discussion

The Court has set out above the relevant sections of the Act. What is clear from the Act is that section 8 (2) (b) gives an Adjudication Officer the power to extend time where they are satisfied that reasonable cause exists. That section clearly requires that the Adjudication Officers have to satisfy themselves that the giving of notice was prevented due to reasonable cause. No similar clause exists in section 8A (2) which sets out the role of the Labour Court in respect of an appeal.  The Respondent has sought to rely on the Labour Court case of Morehampton Foods v Dean Gibbons DWT1720 which can be distinguished from this case. In that case the parties to that hearing agreed that in the proceedings before the Adjudication Officer the Complainant had made an application for an extension of time, and the Adjudication Officer without giving a ruling on the time limit point, proceeded to consider the substantive issue. In the case to hand both parties accept that the time limit issue was not raised at first instance.

The Court then looked at the Stokes decision and in particular paras 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 which state.

7.3 However, there is a second, and perhaps logically anterior, issue as to whether it is now open to Clonmel High school to rely on the time issue. In that context, it is important to note that s 21(3) of the 2000 Act provides an express authority to the Director to extend time in an appropriate case. It sems to me that, in the light of the fact that additional procedures, in the form of a s.29 appeal to the Department of Education were being pursued, a cogent case could have been made on behalf of John Stokes to seek to persuade the Director to extend time if the point had been taken by Clonmel High school at that stage.

7.4 It seems to me that a party cannot be deprived of the opportunity to seek an extension of time by reason of the fact that its opponent does not raise the time issue at all before the body, in this case the Director, on whom the power to extend time is conferred. It is clear that time bar in this case is not an absolute one, because it is capable of being extended by the Director. It is not, therefore, a barrier which goes to jurisdiction as such. Rather, it is a measure which may, in the absence of a successful application to extend time, lead to acclaim not being able to proceed on the merits.

7.5 However, it seems to me to follow that it is incumbent on a Respondent to a claim before the Director to make any point concerning time which may be open to them so as to put the claimant on notice that there is a time issue, and to afford the claimant an opportunity to seek to persuade the Director to extend time. Against that background, it seems to me that a failure to raise the time question before the Director may lead to a legitimate conclusion that a respondent is, thereby, precluded from raising the point thereafter. It must be acknowledged, however, that there may be a case where a failure to raise a time point might not be decisive. For example, there might be cases where a respondent would be able to argue that it was, through no fault of its own, unaware of aspects of the factual matrix against which the question of possible reliance on a time bar would have to be considered. However, no such circumstances appear to have arisen on the facts of this case. To now rule that Clonmel High School is entitled to rely on a time bar, and thus to deprive John Stokes of the opportunity to persuade the Director to extend time would, in my view, be to countenance a manifest injustice. In those circumstances, it sems to me that Clonmel High school is precluded from raising the time bar issue. It follows that it is unnecessary therefore to consider any other aspect of that issue, or to determine when time began to run on the facts of this case.”

The statutory provisions in the case to hand are similar to that in the ‘Stokes’ case in that in this case the power to extend time is granted to an Adjudication Officers at first instance.  There is no such expressed power granted to the Labour Court under the statute.  In ‘Stokes’ the Court found that to allow the Respondent to rely on a time bar when no provision existed to extend the time bar would be a manifest injustice. However, it did acknowledge that there could be circumstances where a failure to raise the time bar might not be decisive and set out the circumstances where that might apply.

There was no submission before this Court to suggest that the failure to raise the time bar in this case was through no fault of the Respondent and /or in any way linked to aspects of a factual matrix that the Respondent was unaware of.  On that basis and relying on the decision in Stokes the Court finds that to allow the Respondent to rely on the time bar in the circumstances of this case would be an injustice and the Court does not uphold the preliminary issue in respect of same.

The Court determines that the Respondent cannot now rely on a time limit bar in circumstances where it was not raised at first instance. On that basis there is no need for the Court to consider the final issue in respect of the notice period.

 Substantive issue

7 Summary of Respondents submission

The Complainant was employed by the Respondent from 15 October 2021 until his role was made redundant on 30 July 2021. He was employed as a Production Print Sales Specialist on a basic salary with the potential to earn commission. He worked in a specialised area selling large machines to corporate clients. The Respondent’s business was affected by Covid, and staff were laid off in April 2020 particularly on the sales side. The direct Sales team reduced down to 4 members of staff. The Respondent’s IBEC representative took the Court through the business model that operated at that time.  A review of the Irish Strategy for Financial Year 2021 was carried out and identified a need for restructuring of the Sales Department. Following on from that review it was felt the way forward was to diversify away from Sales Specialists and have Business Development Managers who could sell all the stock that the Respondent carried including software and cyber security packages.  The Respondent already had some staff doing this type of sales and at the time the Complainant was the only Production Print Sales Specialist as other staff in similar roles had retired or left.

During the Covid layoff the Complainant had been offered a part-time role as a Business Development Manager but had not accepted same.

 Arising from the 2021 review the Complainant’s post was identified as being at risk. A meeting was held on the 28 June 2021 where he was told that his role was at risk of being made redundant An invite to a first consultation meeting on 12 July 2021 was sent to the Complainant on 30 June 2021. The letter set out that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the proposed restructure of the Sales Division and the effect that might have on his role.   A second consultation meeting was scheduled for Friday 16 July 2021. The Complainant advised the Respondent that he could not attend. The Respondent attempted to the reschedule the meeting for Monday 19, or Tuesday 20 July 2021, but the Complainant never responded to those proposed dates. A further invitation was sent to the Respondent for a meeting on Friday 23 July, he did not respond, nor did he attend the meeting.

 A letter was issued on 23 July 2021 noting that that he had not responded to their attempts to reschedule a further consultation meeting and offering a final opportunity for him to engage with them and submit any suggestions that he might have on or before close of business on 26 July 2021. As no response was received to that correspondence, by letter of 30 July 2021, the Complainant was advised that his role was now redundant and as there were no suitable alternative vacancies at that time, he was being made redundant. The details of payments due to him were set out in the letter. The Complainant was also advised of his right to appeal the decision but did not do so.

 Section 6 (4) (c ) of the Unfair Dismissals  Act 1977 provides that a dismissal shall not be unfair if it results wholly or mainly from the redundancy of the employee.  The Respondent sought to engage with the Complainant on numerous occasions, but he declined to engage.

8 Summary of Complainant’s submission

Mr Kirwan representative for the Complainant submitted that he had 35 years’ experience as Sales Manager and was very successful in his role. He grew the Respondents market share, and it was the No 1 digital press provider in 2016, 2017 and 2018. While it is not disputed that he was a specialist his role had changed over the years .  Prior to becoming a specialist, he had previously undertaken Business Development Manager roles so had the relevant skillset.

Mr Kirwan on behalf of the Complainant referenced an incident dating back to pre-Covid between the Managing Director and the Complaint and indicated that the Complainant believed that this fed into the decision to make him redundant. The Complainant also referenced a payment of wages case that he had taken relating to a bonus payment.  The Complainant was ultimately awarded 50% of the payment he had sought. It was further suggested that in March 2020 when the Covid layoff occurred at least five members of staff were on probation and were not laid off.

 It was the Complainants belief that at the time of his redundancy there were six staff with less service that he had.  Mr Kirwan submitted that the Complainants Covid lay off was extended a number of times when other staff were brought back.  The Complainant had concerns that the people assigned to manage the redundancy procedure had been involved in a previous grievance he had, and their outcome had been overturned by a more senior person in the UK.   It is the Complainant’s submission that the Redundancy was just an excuse to get rid of him and that the offer of an appeal to that decision was a smokescreen as he did not believe the decision would be overturned.

 9 Witness evidence

The first witness for the Respondent was Mr Brosnan Senior Finance Manager for Ireland. Mr Brosnan informed the Court that he joined the company 1 June 2021. At the time he joined the Respondent was making losses month on month. He looked at the trends from the previous year and how the different parts of the business were performing. He did year on year comparisons in respect of the different business areas.  In the financial year 20/21 the Respondent received government support. When he extrapolated out the government support, the Respondent made a significant loss that year. Business only really started to turn around in first quarter of 2022 which was after the Sales re-structuring had been put in place.  It was his evidence  that the change of focus in terms of the services they were delivering were key to the recovery of the Respondent’s business. Mr Brosnan explained how the Company worked and their relations with other companies worldwide. It was his evidence that the Respondent now provides a much broader array of services.

Under cross examination Mr Brosnan was asked if he would have retained employees on probation during Covid. He responded stating that it would depend on the area they worked in and their skill set. Not all areas of the print industry were closed during Covid.

 The next witness for the Respondent was Mr Hopwood Managing Director.  He outlined his background in the industry. He confirmed that he first met the Complainant in 2013 when he moved to Ireland. The impact of Covid on the industry was sudden and dramatic. Their income sources at the time were mainly from the sale of machines and an annuity charge.  Both were significantly impacted during Covid, as staff were not in office using photocopying machines, and companies were reluctant to invest in new machinery during that period.  Mr Hopwood stated that at the time of Covid there were nine BDM’s and one Production Salesperson, the Complainant. They laid off five BDM’s and the Complainant, and introduced other measures such as salary sacrifice on a sliding scale starting at 15% for highest earners. They also reduced working hours for staff not on lay off.

  A meeting was scheduled for 8th March 2021 with the Complainant to discuss the future of his role amongst other things. The Complainant was unavailable to attend as he was on certified sick leave. By letter of 12 March 2021, the Complainant was informed of a part-time vacancy in a BDM role. The letter went on to say that if he did not accept that offer of work his lay off would be extended for a further period.  It also stated that the Company were trying to reduce their cost base would no longer be in a position to continue providing him with a company car and fuel card while on layoff or continue the employer contribution to his pension in circumstances where no employee contribution was being made. The Witness informed the Court that at that time the Complainant was the only one on lay-off receiving these benefits.  The Complainant was offered the opportunity in that letter to have an input and make suggestions in respect of the issues raised. No response was received to that letter. Separately, around the same time, the Complainant lodged a grievance about other issues which was processed through the normal procedure.

 It was Mr Hopwood’s evidence that the Respondent had tried a lot of things before looking at redundancies.  He confirmed that the Complainant’s role was never backfilled. Going forward the Respondent only employed multiskilled people and the first recruitment after the redundancy was January 2023.   He went on to confirm that at the time of the Complainant’s redundancy three other people had left. One resigned, one retired, and one failed his probation. The Complainant was the only person made redundant. His role was the only standalone sales role, and they were moving away from that model. The positions of the people who retire, or otherwise left were not back filled.  The Respondent sought to engage with the Complainant, but he would not engage.

 Under cross examination by Mr Kirwan the witness confirmed that he was aware that the Complainant had raised a grievance and that the procedure provided for it to be dealt with informally. It was his understanding that there was an attempt to deal with it informally but that did not work out. He agreed that the outcome of the process was that the Complainant received part of a bonus that had initially been refused. He confirmed that it was his understanding that the Complainant would have had to apply for the part-time Business Development Manager job in March as he was not the only person on lay off at the time. The Witness confirmed that he was not involved in the consultation process that led to the redundancy, but he signed off on the decision to commence the process. He also confirmed that by the end of 2022 the sales team consisted of three people.

 Complainant’s evidence

  The Complainant stated that he worked as a Production Sales Specialist for 25 years and believed he was selected for redundancy because he challenged the business and his grievance was upheld. It was his evidence that he was never offered a BDM role.  He could have performed the role as had attended training sessions with the other BDM’s. He was told in March 2021 that there was a part-time position that he could apply for. It was his evidence that he was the only person left on layoff after other staff were brought back. He accepted that he did not appeal the decision to make him redundant but did not accept that he did not engage with the redundancy process. He confirmed that he had only attended the first meeting. The Complainant then went through the jobs he had applied for and his attempts at mitigating his loss.

Under cross examination the Complainant stated that he had two weeks certified sick leave in March 2021 but that he was anxious to get back to work and would have considered any role. In respect of the letter dated 12th March 2021, that was sent to him when he was on sick leave, and he felt it was victimising him. He didn’t open the email until the 18 March 2021, which meant he only had 48 hours to respond which he felt was unfair. He accepted that the Respondent had never stated that he only had 38 hours to respond.

 It was his belief that because of his ongoing grievance he had no co-operation from the Respondent on any front and that was why he did not co-operate with the redundancy process. He felt he was being victimised by being on layoff. He stated that he did not want to sit down with Ms Farrelly who was involved in the redundancy process until his grievance was resolved. He accepted that only of the two people handling the redundancy process were involved with his grievance and that there was a successful outcome to his grievance.

 10 Relevant Law

6.Unfair dismissal

(1)

Subject to the provisions of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal unless, having regard to all the circumstances, there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.

(2)…….

3)

Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, if an employee was dismissed due to redundancy but the circumstances constituting the redundancy applied equally to one or more other employees in similar employment with the same employer who have not been dismissed, and either—

(a)

the selection of that employee for dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from one or more of the matters specified in subsection (2) of this section or another matter that would not be a ground justifying dismissal, or

(b)

he was selected for dismissal in contravention of a procedure (being a procedure that has been agreed upon by or on behalf of the employer and by the employee or a trade union, or an excepted body under the Trade Union Acts 1941 and 1971 [as amended by the Industrial Relations Act 1990], representing him or has been established by the custom and practice of the employment concerned) relating to redundancy and there were no special reasons justifying a departure from that procedure,

then the dismissal shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal.

(4)

Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, not to be an unfair dismissal, if it results wholly or mainly from one or more of the following:

(a)

the capability, competence or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do,

(b)

the conduct of the employee,

(c)

the redundancy of the employee, and

(d)

the employee being unable to work or continue to work in the position which he held without contravention (by him or by his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under any statute or instrument made under statute.

11 Discussion and Decision

In order for a dismissal by way of redundancy to be deemed an unfair dismissal the Complainant must have been unfairly selected for redundancy. To establish if that is the case the Court would normally look to establish if there was a business case or other supporting materials that supported a need for restructuring. The Court found the uncontested evidence of the Senior Finance Manager in terms of the financial standing of the company when he joined on 1 June 2021 whereby, they were making losses month on month, and the review which highlighted the Sales Department as the area most impacted by Covid, lends support to the argument that there was a good business case for restructuring.

 The Court would normally also examine the consultation process followed by the Respondent in deciding what post was redundant and in coming to the decision that the particular Worker should be made redundant. In this case it is not disputed that the Complainant was informed that his post was at risk of redundancy and that he only attended the first consultation meeting on 12 July 2021. He was invited to attend a further meeting on 16, 19, 20 23 July but did not attend or confirm that he would attend. A further letter was issued on 23 July noting that he had not responded to attempts to schedule a further consultation meeting and offering him a final opportunity to engage and submit any suggestions that he may wish to make. No response was received. By letter of 30 July 2021 the Complainant was advised that he had been made redundant as there was no suitable alternative vacancy available. The letter set out the details of his redundancy entitlements, any monies due to him and informed him he could appeal the decision. The Complainant did not appeal same.

 The Complainant in his evidence to the Court confirmed that he did not co-operate with the consultation process relating to the potential redundancy. He stated that he did not want to attend the meeting with one of the people tasked with carrying out the consultations until his grievance was completed.  He did not dispute that his grievance was being processed in line with the in-house procedures. He confirmed that ultimately his grievance was partly upheld, and he was awarded 50% of a bonus payment he felt he was due. No explanation was given as to why he felt that the redundancy procedure should be put on hold pending the outcome of his grievance and no case law was opened to the Court supporting his position.  The Complainant’s position that the appeal was a smokescreen  is not credible in circumstances where he was successful in his appeal in respect of his grievance.

In circumstances where the Complainant chose not to engage or in his words co-operate with the consultation process, the Court has been unable to identify any shortcomings in the process such that it could deem the termination of his employment by reason of redundancy to be unfair. 

 The appeal is upheld. The decision of the Adjudication Officer is set aside.

 The Court so decides.

	Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
	Louise O'Donnell
AR	______________________
20th February 2025	Deputy Chairman

NOTE

Enquiries concerning this Decision should be addressed to Aidan Ralph, Court Secretary.