Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Brian  Gartland

Dundalk Town FC Limited

Representatives

Ger Connolly, Mason Hayes and Curran LLP

 John Temple B.L. (Respondent)

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00064174-001

19/06/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00064174-002

19/06/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991

CA-00064174-003

19/06/2024

This matter was heard by way of remote hearing pursuant to the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2020 and S.I. No. 359/2020 which designates the WRC as a body empowered to hold remote hearings.

The initial hearing took place on 18 October 2024 where the new owner of the respondent club indicated that he had just taken over the club recently and was not aware that there were any proceedings in train.  The respondent was on notice of the complaints since 20 July 2024 when the WRC wrote to the respondent regarding these matters.  On 17 October 2024 the WRC copied the complainant’s submissions in relation to this matter and to the complaint of penalisation heard under ADJ 54469 to the respondent.  The hearing was adjourned to allow the respondent to make written submissions. The hearing notification for the second day issued to the parties on 5 November 2024. No submissions were made by the respondent regarding the substantive issues to be heard by the WRC.  However, the respondent indicated in advance of the hearing that they would not be in attendance as the hearing was taking place outside the legal term.  As the WRC does not operate in accordance with the legal term, and since the respondent had received adequate notice of the hearing, the hearing proceeded as scheduled in the absence of the respondent.

The complainant undertook to give his evidence under affirmation.

The respondent submitted that there are four claims to these cases - the first is a payment of wages claim which is straightforward and he was owed €8076.92 in unpaid wages. The second is that he was never given his terms and conditions of employment in writing. The third is an unfair dismissal which is both substantially and procedurally unfair and gave rise to a loss of four weeks wages. The fourth complaint concerns penalisation for raising health and safety concerns for the players in his charge arising from the medical condition of the manager. This complaint falls squarely within the Protected Disclosures Act.  The complainant was initially threatened with dismissal, was then awaiting dismissal and ultimately was dismissed from his position.

The complainant submitted that he was employed as Head of Football Operations with the respondent from 1 January 2023. He was initially employed on a one-year contract. It was noted that the contract was poorly drafted and was not signed. However, the contract was reused for the following year when the complainant’s employment rolled over. In November/December 2023 the club was bought by new management and a new deal was struck with the complainant for a further two years employment.  Under a verbal agreement, his salary was due to increase for the first year with an additional increase for the second year. It was noted that there was also a fee schedule regarding transfer fees and prize money.

The complainant submitted that he never received the terms and conditions of his employment in writing. He did not receive the promised pay increase and accordingly is owed €8076.92, a shortfall in his wages for the period 1 January 2024 to 11 May 2024 when he was summarily dismissed.

The complainant submitted that there was a series of managers but after one manager was sacked the complainant became acting Co-manager of the team for a short period.  A new manager was appointed and shortly afterwards, the complainant made a protected disclosure regarding a health condition of the new manager that impacted upon player safety. The first protected disclosure was made on 19 April and the second was made on 22 April.

The complainant submitted that on the first day under the new manager he expressed serious concerns to the team's owner about the managers ability to undertake the responsibilities of the role. He noted that he had heard some rumours but that they were only that, however he told the club’s owner that but that he had witnessed one or two incidents with his own eyes.

The complainant submitted that he was summarily dismissed and that this amounts to an unfair dismissal. He submitted that his dismissal was announced in the paper within 15 minutes of him being told that he was dismissed.  He submitted that he was aware of his duty to mitigate his loss and found another position within four weeks. It was confirmed that there is no ongoing loss.

The complainant acknowledged that redress under the Unfair Dismissals Act is, by and large, limited to loss of earnings but noted that the penalisation in this case was severe, there was reputationally impact on foot of the penalisation, and that his summary dismissal was a very public matter on a national level but also on a local level where he lived.

The complainant submitted that it is very clear that the penalisation that he suffered as a direct result of his having raised a protected disclosure included: dismissal; unfair treatment; coercion, intimidation, harassment and ostracisation; discrimination, disadvantage or unfair treatment, harm, including to his reputation, particularly in social media, and financial loss, including loss of business and loss of income.

The complainant submitted that when he was dismissed by the respondent, its ambiguous and minimal statement created a lot of distress. Four lines were published by the club, and the statement clearly indicates that the decision to terminate his employment was not his own.   This was the complainant’s first professional role in football where he was not going to be a player. The respondent’s statement was damming in terms of its brevity and has a clear implication that the complainant was dismissed from his role as Head of Football Operations due to his performance. The use of the phrase “the decision to part ways” is very clear in this respect. In circumstances where this was the complainant’s first job in a professional football context where he was not a player, the impact of this statement could not be overstated. This was in circumstances where he has been employed for over ten years, firstly as a player, and then as Head of Football Operations. The general consensus among fans, and also within the wider professional football community in Ireland, was that he was dismissed due to poor job performance and poor signings at the club. By publicising this narrative, that it was “not easy” to decide to part ways, his new career ambitions within professional football took a heavy blow. The respondent gave the complainant no opportunity to input into the statement and control the narrative in relation to the termination of his employment. This was after over eleven years with the club, with the complainant having moved to Dundalk and setting up his whole life there for the good of the club.

The complainant submitted that other people with whom he had worked for years in the club thought that he had walked away from the club in a tough time. A club that he had been at for 11 years and to which he stayed loyal. The complainant submitted that he had turned down offers from other clubs on better contracts over many years but remained loyal to respondent. The complainant submitted that for many within League of Ireland circles, to think that the complainant had turned his back and abandoned the club is damning to his reputation. It is also damning to his reputation in the town of Dundalk where he lives with his young family. The complainant submitted that he has been abused by fans in Dundalk as a direct result of the statement of the respondent, and the manner in which he was dismissed after over 11 years with the club.

The complainant submitted that he is owed approximately €8,000 in expenses from the respondent that the ongoing failure to pay him monies owed, months after his employment has terminated, is a further form of penalisation as a result of his having raised a protected disclosure.

The complainant noted some recent decisions of relevance to the case. The recent decision of the WRC in A Worker v A Massage Therapy Business ADJ 00043225 illustrated the factors that should be taken into consideration when assessing non-remuneration damages for penalisation in the context of protected disclosures. “The Protected Disclosures Act 2014 is in the nature of protective legislation. Schedule 2 of the Act makes provision for maximum awards of compensation of up to five year’s remuneration in the event of a breach, which is substantially higher than the award jurisdiction conferred on an adjudicator by any other employment statute in the state

In addition, the Act introduced, for the first time in Employment legislation, unique statutory provisions in relation to interlocutory applications to the Circuit Court. It is clear that the legislative intention behind the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 was to afford a very high degree of protection to persons making protected disclosures, which protection was in part expressed by the conferral on an adjudication officer of an extended compensation-award jurisdiction. Schedule 2 of the Act empowers an adjudicator to require an employer to pay such compensation as he/she “considers just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances”. That term is not defined in the Act.

The complainant submitted that some guidance is available from the jurisprudence of the CJEU (formerly the ECJ) which has held that where a fundamental social right has been breached, national law must provide an effective, proportionate or dissuasive remedy. In Cementation Skanska (formerly Kvaerner Cementation) Ltd v Carroll, DWT0338, the Labour Court, considering the right to annual leave stated:

“The obligation to provide annual leave is imposed for health and safety reasons and the right to leave has been characterised as a fundamental social right in European Law…In Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891 the ECJ has made it clear that where such a right is infringed the judicial redress provided should not only compensate for economic loss sustained but must provide a real deterrent against future infractions.”

In Financial Services Union v. Hanna PDD201, where the quantum of the adjudicator’s award of compensation under the Protected Disclosures Act was the sole issue, the Labour Court further considered Von Colson and made the following finding:

“In making its submission on the redress to be awarded under the Act, Counsel for the Complainant referred to the Von Colson case, where the CJEU made it clear that where a right which is derived from the law of the Community is infringed the sanction for breaches must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and must provide a real deterrent against future infractions. The doctrine of conforming interpretation was first formulated in Von Colson, this requires a national Court to interpret and apply its domestic law in light of the wording and purpose of a Directive so as to achieve the result envisaged by the Directive. This obligation arises by virtue of the transposition of Page 20 of 89 Community Law, however, protected disclosure legislation is national legislation which has not emanated from the EU.

Schedule Two of the Act “Redress for Contravention of Section 12(1)”, provides for an award of compensation which is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances.” In that decision that Labour Court did not apply the Von Colson doctrine on the basis that the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 was purely domestic as distinct from Community driven legislation. However, EU Directive 2019/1937 was already in force from October of 2019 when that decision issued (in January 2020), albeit that it had yet to be implemented into Irish Law at that time, or for that matter by the time the circumstances of the present case arose, i.e., between 2020 and 2022. The Directive was implemented by the Protected Disclosures Amendment Act 2022 which came into force on the 1st of January 2023. Thus, strictly speaking the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 in its pre-amended format was purely domestic legislation at the material times giving rise to the present claim but it is also the case that rights arising from the making of protected disclosures have been recognised at EU level since 2019. No further guidance was given by the Labour Court except to cite the wording of the provision – “just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances”.

The award made was much higher than the losses of the complainant in that case. The Labour Court affirmed that award and stated that it was not in the nature of remuneration. The award thus affirmed was clearly not restricted to financial losses.

In circumstances where EU Directive 2019/1937 has now been fully implemented in Irish law with the Protected Disclosures Act 2022, it is clear that it is open to the WRC to make an award “just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances”

The complainant submitted that in the massage parlour case, whilst this case was similarly in relation to the pre-2022 legislation only, the WRC made the following statement: “Accordingly, I take the view and I so find that the basis of assessment of compensation under Section 12 (1) and Schedule 2 is not limited solely to financial loss and consideration may be given to other factors which may include an assessment of whether an award is effective, proportionate or dissuasive.”

The complainant submitted that the implications of the penalisation suffered by him (such penalisation including the conduct of the owner in the aftermath of his having raised a protected disclosure, the fact and manner of his dismissal, the statement publicised by the club immediately after his employment was terminated) have had a devastating impact on him, both professionally and personally. Mentally, this saga has been very hard to take, and it has taken a serious toll on his confidence. The complainant lives right in the middle of Dundalk town and all neighbours are fans of the respondent team.  He cannot go anywhere without questions on the disintegration of his career at Dundalk and finds it very hard to reply to people when matters relating to his time at the club are brought up.  Some people wrongfully blame him as there was a narrative that he was responsible for a lot of issues which arose. All these interactions are extremely uncomfortable and seriously distressing for the complainant.

The complainant submitted that football in Ireland is a small industry, there are only nine teams in the premier League of Ireland division. As such, the repercussions professionally for him are serious, particularly in circumstances where this was his very first non-playing role in football. The complainant submitted that he wanted to leave football as a result of the penalisation.

Given the impact on the complainant’s life has been so devastating, extremely damaging to his reputation and the effects of penalisation will hamper his career in Irish professional football for the rest of his life, it is submitted that the WRC should exercise its discretion under the Protected Disclosures Acts to make the full award available.

The complainant noted Section (6) (2) of the UD Act states that “Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal if it results wholly or mainly from one or more of the following: the employee having made a protected disclosure”

The complainant submitted that whilst some previous unfair dismissal cases which involved a protected disclosure limited the award to the employee’s financial loss, it is submitted that the position must now be viewed in light of EU Directive 2019/1937. The following excerpts from the Directive were noted:

Beyond an explicit prohibition of retaliation provided in law, it is crucial that reporting persons who do suffer retaliation have access to legal remedies and compensation. The appropriate remedy in each case should be determined by the kind of retaliation suffered, and the damage caused in such cases should be compensated in full in accordance with national law. The appropriate remedy could take the form of actions for reinstatement, for instance, in the event of dismissal, transfer or demotion, or of withholding of training or promotion, or for restoration of a cancelled permit, licence or contract; compensation for actual and future financial losses, for example for lost past wages, but also for future loss of income, costs linked to a change of occupation; and compensation for other economic damage, such as legal expenses and costs of medical treatment, and for intangible damage such as pain and suffering. While the types of legal action may vary between legal systems, they should ensure that compensation or reparation is real and effective, in a way which is proportionate to the detriment suffered and is dissuasive.

Of relevance in this context are the Principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights, in particular Principle 7 according to which ‘Prior to any dismissal, workers have the right to be informed of the reasons and be granted a reasonable period of notice. They have the right to access to effective and impartial dispute resolution and, in case of unjustified dismissal, a right to redress, including adequate compensation.’. The remedies established at national level should not discourage potential future whistleblowers. For instance, providing for compensation as an alternative to reinstatement in the event of dismissal might give rise to a systematic practice, in particular by larger organisations, thus having a dissuasive effect on future whistleblowers.

Article 21 of the Directive specifically notes as follows: “Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that remedies and full compensation are provided for damage suffered by persons referred to in Article 4 in accordance with national law.”

The complainant submitted that to limit him to the immediate financial loss which is related to his dismissal would be contrary to EU law and EU Directive 2019/1937. It was submitted that the only correct interpretation of the reference to 260 weeks under the UD Act, post EU Directive 2019/1937, is that it is not limited to the employee’s immediate financial loss.

It was submitted by the complainant that it would be a directly discouraging for other whistleblowers if it is the case that the complainant is limited to his direct and immediate financial loss. The ultimate form of penalisation for any employee is dismissal. The complainant now has to drive for many hours each week in order to carry out his new role. He has no choice but to take this role up, and it would be deeply wrong, and contrary to EU law for the WRC to now limit his award to his immediate financial losses.

Complainant evidence:

The complainant stated that he was appointed as co-manager on a temporary basis in early April 2024. About two weeks later while a match was being played, he got a message to his phone indicating that a new manager had been appointed. This was leaked to the press about 15 minutes later while the team was still on the bus travelling home from the match. He was surprised, as he had understood that the decision was still some days away. He stated that the owner had gone and done it by himself, which was his right. The new manager was awarded an 18-month contract. He raised an issue with the owner regarding a health condition that the new manager had which may impact on the team. However, he did mention that he was not quite sure how accurate his information was but he suggested that the owner follow up on this. However, the complainant also followed up and clarified matters with some of his former teammates.

The complainant stated that the following Monday the new manager arrived on site. He noted that it became apparent fairly early on that there were some difficulties, and he called the owner again that afternoon to raise those issues with him. He stated that a number of issues were raised over the following two weeks and that he had to raise the matter with the owner as issues had arisen from a health and safety perspective regarding the safety of players.

The complainant stated that the owner said to leave matters with him until he got home (due to be a week later) but also stated that he didn't think that this particular club was the place for the complainant. The complainant stated that it was his understanding that the co-managers would step away from the management role when the new manager was appointed but that they couldn't. The new manager told them to cover the training schedules. The complainant stated that he started raising health and safety issues regarding players and injury prevention noting that players can't play three days a week straight after coming back from injury. He indicated that there had to be a safety plan in relation to players such as that. The complainant stated that team selection was left to him and to the other former co-manager but that during games he was overruled regarding changes to safeguard players.  This resulted in players being out for weeks and months. He stated that it was becoming a real risk to the players health.

The complainant stated that he brought his concerns to the then CEO who noted that he was well aware of all the circumstances. However, he was instructed not to take players off irrespective of health concerns. He was however asked to perhaps consider potential new managers. In a call on the 10 May 2024, the owner stated that “if the CEO wants to replace the manager, then that's his call”.

The complainant recalled one occasion when the manager wanted to put a player in a position he hadn't played before and noted that the manager simply couldn't remember what position the player usually played. When it was brought to his attention the complainant was then told to “just do anything”.

The complainant stated that at the time there were a number of approaches to the club from potential sponsors who would put up funding for an alternative manager and the complainant was asked by the CEO to open discussions with an alternative candidate. He noted that there was also an issue around the time of potential sponsors seeking naming rights for the club and grounds.

The complainant stated that he got a call from the owner asking him who gave him permission to negotiate with a potential new manager. The complainant stated that he responded that he wasn't asked to negotiate but simply to see if a candidate was potentially open to discussions. He said it was put to him that he was undermining the coach/manager and he responded that the person who is the manager hadn't coached once at that stage. The complainant stated that the owner then fired him on that call, and he asked the owner for that in writing.  The complainant stated that statement was made to the press very shortly afterwards and he received an e-mail the next day (12 May) indicating that he was fired.  The complainant stated that he was removed from his position due to having raised issues regarding player safety.

The complainant stated that a few days later he received a phone call from the owner apologising and asking him if he would come back but he sent a message declining the role as he did not believe it was a workable situation given that the papers had been notified, that the news was very public and that it was all over his hometown where he lived.

The complainant stated that he sought an alternative role almost immediately and within four weeks was offered an alternative role. He stated that it wasn't his ideal role at the time but as he had family to support, he couldn't afford to be choosy as to where his future lay. He stated that he enjoyed the role and that it paid slightly more than his former position.

The respondent did not attend the hearing of these matters.

The complainant gave his evidence in a cogent and clear manner, and I am satisfied that he is a credible witness.

CA-0064174-001 Unfair Dismissal

Section 6(2)(ba)of the unfair Dismissal Act, 1977, as amended, states as follows:

6.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal unless, having regard to all the circumstances, there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal if it results wholly or mainly from one or more of the following:

(ba) the employee having made a protected disclosure

As regards what amounts to a Protected Disclosure, Section 5(3)(d) of the Protected Disclosures Act, 2014, states that:

(3) The following matters are relevant wrongdoings for the purposes of this Act—

(d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered,

Section 6(1) of that Act provides for the manner in which a Protected Disclosure is made and states as follows:

6. (1) A disclosure is made in the manner specified in this section if the worker makes it—

(a) to the worker’s employer, or

(b) where the worker reasonably believes that the relevant wrongdoing which the disclosure tends to show relates solely or mainly—

(i) to the conduct of a person other than the worker’s employer, or

(ii) to something for which a person other than the worker’s employer has legal responsibility,

to that other person.

The complainant made a complaint to the Club owner, his employer, relating to a disclosure that related to the likelihood that the health and safety of an individual, in this case the players, being or likely to be endangered.  The complainant suggested that this resulted directly in his dismissal.  Although this was not the subject of his initial complaint to the owner, I am satisfied that during their subsequent conversations the issue of the health and safety of the players was brought up with the owner.  I find that this amounts to a protected disclosure under Section 5(3)(d) of the 2014 Act.  He was dismissed shortly thereafter without reason.  In the absence of any evidence indicating otherwise, I am satisfied that this dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from the employee having made a protected disclosure.  Accordingly, I find that the complainant was unfairly dismissed from his position with the respondent under Section 6(2)(ba) of the 1977 Act as amended.

Section 7(1) of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 states:

Redress for unfair dismissal.

7.—(1) Where an employee is dismissed and the dismissal is an unfair dismissal, the employee shall be entitled to redress consisting of whichever of the following the adjudication officer or the Labour Court, as the case may be, considers appropriate having regard to all the circumstances:

(a) re-instatement by the employer of the employee in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal on the terms and conditions on which he was employed immediately before his dismissal together with a term that the re-instatement shall be deemed to have commenced on the day of the dismissal, or

(b) re-engagement by the employer of the employee either in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal or in a different position which would be reasonably suitable for him on such terms and conditions as are reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or

(c) (i) if the employee incurred any financial loss attributable to the dismissal, payment to him by the employer of such compensation in respect of the loss (not exceeding in amount 104 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of this Act) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances, or

(ii) if the employee incurred no such financial loss, payment to the employee by the employer of such compensation (if any, but not exceeding in amount 4 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated as aforesaid) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances,

and the references in the foregoing paragraphs to an employer shall be construed, in a case where the ownership of the business of the employer changes after the dismissal, as references to the person who, by virtue of the change, becomes entitled to such ownership.]

(1A) In relation to a case falling within section 6(2)(ba) the reference in subsection (1)(c)(i) to 104 weeks has effect as if it were a reference to 260 weeks.

The complainant sought compensation.  The complainant was out of work for a month after the unfair dismissal.  His salary amounted to €50,000 per year.  Therefore, his loss amounted to €4166.66.  However, his loss also appears to encompass expenses which do not fall to be considered under the Payment of Wages Act but to which he was contractually entitled.  The expenses amounted to €8337.96.  The complainant was also entitled to 2.5% of any transfer fees.  In this case that amounted to €2625. 

The complainant also advanced an argument regarding his reputational loss, not only from the peremptory manner in which he was dismissed but also from the almost instantaneous publication in print and social media sites of the enforced parting of ways.  In a country as small as Ireland, the football scene is understandably small and any slight may well follow a player or for that matter, a member of the management team, throughout the League of Ireland.  The use of social media for the rushed-out announcement ensured that the respondent’s account of events will go beyond these shores.  It is difficult to assess the level of financial loss vis-à-vis his reputational loss but in the circumstances, a conservative estimate would be equivalent to nine months’ salary, i.e., €37,500.

Section 44 of the Directive states as follows:

There should be a close link between reporting and the adverse treatment suffered, directly or indirectly, by the reporting person, for that adverse treatment to be considered to be retaliation and consequently for the reporting person to be able to enjoy legal protection in that respect. Effective protection of reporting persons as a means of enhancing the enforcement of Union law requires a broad definition of retaliation, encompassing any act or omission occurring in a work-related context and which causes them detriment. This Directive should not, however, prevent employers from taking employment-related decisions which are not prompted by the reporting or public disclosure.

There is no evidence whatsoever that the employer was taking an employment-related decision.  No reason for the dismissal was ever provided, no procedures were followed.  Therefore, I find that the only logical conclusion is that the complainant was dismissed for having made a protected disclosure.

The complainant’s loss amounted to €52,629.62.  He made immediate efforts to mitigate his loss and succeeded in securing alternative employment after a short time period. Having regard to his efforts to mitigate his loss, I find that compensation of 100% of his loss is just and equitable in all the circumstances. 

CA-00064174-002 Terms of Employment (Information)

Section 3 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act states as follows:

Written statement of terms of employment.

3.—(1) An employer shall, not later than one month after the commencement of an employee’s employment with the employer, give or cause to be given to the employee a statement in writing containing the following particulars of the terms of the employee’s employment, that is to say—

(a) …

(b) …

(c) …

(d) …

(e) …

(f) …

(fa) a reference to any registered employment agreement or employment regulation order which applies to the employee and confirmation of where the employee may obtain a copy of such agreement or order,

(g) …

(ga) that the employee may, under section 23 of the National Minimum Wage Act, 2000, request from the employer a written statement of the employee’s average hourly rate of pay for any pay reference period as provided in that section,]

(h) the length of the intervals between the times at which remuneration is paid, whether a week, a month or any other interval,

(i) …

(j) any terms or conditions relating to paid leave (other than paid sick leave),

(k) any terms or conditions relating to—

(i) incapacity for work due to sickness or injury and paid sick leave, and

(ii) pensions and pension schemes,

(l) the period of notice which the employee is required to give and entitled to receive (whether by or under statute or under the terms of the employee’s contract of employment) to determine the employee’s contract of employment or, where this cannot be indicated when the information is given, the method for determining such periods of notice,

(m) a reference to any collective agreements which directly affect the terms and conditions of the employee’s employment including, where the employer is not a party to such agreements, particulars of the bodies or institutions by whom they were made,

(n) the training entitlement, if any, provided by the employer,

(o) in the case of a temporary contract of employment, the identity of the user undertakings (within the meaning of Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 20085 on temporary agency work), when and as soon as known, and

(p) if the work pattern of an employee is entirely or mostly unpredictable, the statement shall inform the employee of —

(i) the principle that the work schedule is variable, the number of guaranteed paid hours and the remuneration for work performed in addition to those guaranteed hours,

(ii) the reference hours and days within which the employee may be required to work, and

(iii) the minimum notice period to which the employee is entitled to before the start of a work assignment and, where applicable, the deadline for notification in accordance with section 17 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997, and

(q) where it is the responsibility of the employer, the identity of the social security institutions receiving the social insurance contributions attached to the contract of employment and any protection relating to social security provided by the employer.

Section 3A states as follows:

Form of statement to be provided

3A. A statement furnished by an employer under section 3, 4, 5, 6, 6E or 6F shall be —

(a) signed and dated by or on behalf of the employer,

(b) in writing, and

(c) transmitted on paper or, provided that the information is accessible to the employee, that it can be stored and printed, and that the employer retains proof of transmission or receipt, in electronic form.

The complainant stated that he was not provided with a statement of the terms and conditions of his employment by his employer, signed and dated by or on behalf of the employer in writing.  Although he provided an unsigned copy of a draft contract, no evidence contrary to the complainant’s contention was provided.  Accordingly, I am satisfied that the complaint is well founded and that the Act was contravened.  I consider that compensation equivalent to four weeks salary is just and equitable in respect of the contravention, that is €3727.36.

CA-00064174-003 Payment of Wages

The complainant stated that he was not paid the amount of €8076.92 which was the increase to his salary from 1 January to the date of his dismissal.  He stated that this was an oral agreement but was supported by a draft contract of employment that he submitted.  In the absence of a signed contract of employment or a signed written note of the principal terms and conditions of his employment and given that I have found the complainant to be credible, I am satisfied that the complaint is well founded and that the Act was contravened.  Accordingly, I direct the respondent to pay the complainant compensation of €8076.92 which is just and equitable in respect of the contravention.

CA-0064174-001 Unfair Dismissal

Having regard to all the written and oral evidence presented in relation to this matter, my decision is that the complainant was unfairly dismissed for having made a protected disclosure.  I award the complainant redress of €52,629.62.

CA-00064174-002 Terms of Employment (Information)

Having regard to all the written and oral evidence presented in relation to this matter, my decision is that the complaint is well founded and that the Act was contravened.  I award the complainant compensation of four weeks salary, that is €3727.36, which is just and equitable in the circumstances.

CA-00064174-003 Payment of Wages

Having regard to all the written and oral evidence presented in relation to this matter, my decision is that the complaint is well founded and that the Act was contravened.  I award the complainant compensation of €8076.92, which is just and equitable in the circumstances.

Unfair Dismissal – Protected Disclosure – Award of Redress – Terms of Employment – not given in signed and in writing – act contravened – compensation awarded – Payment of Wages – act contravened – compensation awarded.