Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Promise  Obulor

The Aa

Representatives

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00079174-001

06/01/2026

The Complainant was employed by the Respondent from 19 August 2024 until 31 October 2024. She stated that, as the only woman and an African employee in her training group, she was subjected to heightened scrutiny, negative stereotyping, differential treatment and a lack of support, particularly following a violent assault that occurred shortly before her dismissal. She stated that these incidents, together with the Respondent’s Labour Court submissions made in respect of her dismissal as well as the Court's subsequent finding that her dismissal was procedurally unfair and effectively predetermined, form part of a cumulative pattern of race and gender discrimination that caused significant injury to her dignity, confidence and wellbeing.

The Complainant commenced employment as a Customer Service Agent on 19 August 2024 and was the only woman in a training group consisting of seven male colleagues. From an early stage, she stated that she felt she was being assessed differently from those around her and subjected to heightened scrutiny. In particular, she relied on a remark from her supervisor that she was "nowhere near where the boys are". She stated that this was significant because her performance was being measured by comparison with male colleagues rather than against objective standards. According to the Complainant, this contributed to a perception that male employees were treated as the benchmark and that she was being held to a different standard.

The Complainant further stated that she observed differences in how disciplinary and attendance issues were addressed. She alleged that when she was late due to transport issues she was formally criticised, whereas male colleagues who engaged in similar conduct were treated more informally. She stated that repeated criticism of her performance and conduct, when contrasted with what she perceived to be more favourable treatment of male colleagues, gradually undermined her confidence and reinforced a feeling that she was viewed differently in the workplace.

A further incident relied upon by the Complainant related to an abusive interaction with a customer. She stated that after being subjected to verbal abuse by a customer, she expected support from management but instead found herself criticised. When she tried to explain her position, she was interrupted and told not to become "defensive". While accepting that the comment was not explicitly discriminatory, she stated that it formed part of a broader pattern whereby her attempts to explain herself were interpreted negatively. As an African woman, she asserted that this reflected stereotypes that African women are aggressive, confrontational or overly emotional, and that her legitimate self-advocacy was reframed as problematic behaviour.

The Complainant stated that these concerns became more significant after she suffered a violent assault in Dublin in October 2024. She stated that she was physically injured, attended hospital, required medical treatment and medical certification, and had her mobile phone stolen during the incident. According to her submission, the Respondent was aware of these circumstances, including the fact that she had been assaulted, had attended hospital and was medically unfit for work. Despite this, she stated that there was no meaningful welfare intervention, enquiry into her wellbeing, discussion about support measures, or consideration of the physical and psychological effects of the assault. She asserted that this absence of empathy and support was particularly striking given the traumatic nature of the event.

The Complainant further stated that this lack of concern is consistent with stereotypes often applied to African women, including assumptions that they are inherently resilient, less vulnerable to trauma, and capable of enduring hardship without support. She did not suggest that the Respondent consciously adopted such views, but stated that unconscious bias can manifest through failures to recognise vulnerability and provide appropriate support.

Shortly after the assault, the Complainant was dismissed. She highlighted the subsequent Labour Court Recommendation LCR23193, which found that the decision to dismiss had effectively already been made before the dismissal meeting took place. The Labour Court also found that she was not informed of the purpose of the meeting, was not afforded representation rights and was not provided with a meaningful opportunity to explain herself before the decision was taken. The Labour Court ultimately concluded that the dismissal was unfair and recommended compensation equivalent to one month's salary. The Complainant stated that these findings independently supported her belief that management had formed a negative view of her and that her dismissal had effectively been predetermined.

The Complainant also relied on what she described as repeated misspellings of her surname. While accepting that occasional mistakes happen, she stated that repeated inaccuracies, despite the correct spelling being readily available, demonstrated a lack of care and respect for her identity. She stated that names are closely linked to heritage, culture and dignity, and that the repeated misspelling of her surname contributed to her feeling that her identity was not afforded the same respect that would ordinarily be expected.

Throughout her written submissions, the Complainant placed particular emphasis on the concept of intersectionality. She stated that her experience cannot be separated into race discrimination on one hand and gender discrimination on the other. Instead, she stated that she experienced the workplace as an African woman who was the only female trainee in a predominantly male environment. She asserted that the combination of race and gender shaped the manner in which she was perceived and treated, resulting in greater scrutiny, negative assumptions, repeated criticism and reduced support.

The Complainant further stated that the impact on her did not end with her dismissal. Following the Labour Court recommendation, the Respondent wrote to her confirming payment of the recommended amount but described the payment as a "goodwill gesture". The Complainant stated that she found this deeply upsetting because, in her view, the Labour Court had already identified significant procedural failings. She stated that by characterising the payment as an act of goodwill rather than acknowledging wrongdoing, the Respondent minimised her experience and refused to accept responsibility for the harm caused.

According to the Complainant, no acknowledgement was ever given regarding the emotional and psychological impact of the assault, the dismissal, the financial insecurity she experienced, or the effect of prolonged litigation. She stated that this continuing refusal to accept responsibility became a source of distress in its own right and reinforced the same feelings that she experienced during her employment: that she was not being listened to, believed, respected or valued.

The Complainant stated that because of the cumulative effect of these events she suffered significant injury to her dignity, loss of confidence, anxiety, emotional distress, diminished self-esteem and financial hardship. She stated that the pattern of treatment, viewed as a whole, establishes a prima facie case of race discrimination, gender discrimination, intersectional discrimination and less favourable treatment within the meaning of the Employment Equality Acts. She further stated that the Respondent failed in its duty to protect her welfare following the assault, and that the Labour Court's findings provide independent support for concerns about how she was treated.

The Respondent denied all allegations of discrimination, victimisation, harassment, and less favourable treatment. Their primary position was that the complaint falls outside the statutory time limits under the Employment Equality Acts and that the WRC therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear it. The Respondent stated that the Complainant's employment ended in October 2024, yet her Equality complaint was not lodged until January 2026, more than 14 months later. They stated that neither the Complainant's involvement in Labour Court proceedings nor her claimed psychological difficulties can extend the statutory time limit beyond the maximum 12-month period permitted by the legislation. The Respondent further stated that the Complainant's attempts to rely on later events, such as the misspelling of her name in legal submissions or correspondence following the Labour Court recommendation, cannot amount to continuing acts of discrimination and therefore cannot revive an otherwise time-barred claim.

Without prejudice to its jurisdictional objection, the Respondent stated that the Complainant was lawfully dismissed during her probationary period because of ongoing performance and conduct concerns. They stated that she received three verbal warnings for repeated lateness in August 2024 and a final written warning in October 2024 relating to further lateness, poor attitude on calls and alleged call manipulation.

The Respondent also stated that the Complainant failed to comply with its absence reporting procedures following her assault and did not return to work when expected. They stated that she was fully aware that her employment was subject to a six-month probationary period during which her suitability for the role could be assessed and her employment terminated if standards were not met.

According to the Respondent, they acted reasonably, followed a progressive disciplinary process, provided reasons for dismissal, and applied its policies consistently to all employees regardless of gender or race. Accordingly, they rejected any suggestion that the Complainant was treated differently because of a protected characteristic.

The Law:

6.—(1) For the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to its provisions relating to discrimination occurring in particular circumstances discrimination shall be taken to occur where—

(a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified insubsection (2)(in this Act referred to as the ‘discriminatory grounds’) which—

(i) exists,

(ii) existed but no longer exists,

(iii) may exist in the future, or

(iv) is imputed to the person concerned,

(b) a person who is associated with another person—

(i) is treated, by virtue of that association, less favourably than a person who is not so associated is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and

(ii) similar treatment of that other person on any of the discriminatory grounds would, by virtue ofparagraph (a), constitute discrimination.

(2) As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are—

(a) that one is a woman and the other is a man (in this Act referred to as “the gender ground”),..

(h) that they are of different race, colour, nationality or ethnic or national origins (“the ground of race”),

Findings:

As well as stating that she was discriminated during her employment with the Respondent, the Complainant stated that there was a continuum of discriminatory treatment of which various post-employment acts formed part. Those acts included the alleged repeated misspelling of her surname in the Respondent's Labour Court submissions, the Respondent's description of compensation paid following the Labour Court Recommendation as a "goodwill gesture", the Respondent's alleged refusal to acknowledge harm caused to her, and its alleged failure to engage meaningfully with her concerns following her dismissal.

I have considered section 77(5) of the Acts and the Labour Court's decision in County Cork VEC v Hurley EDA1124. The Labour Court made clear that a complainant seeking to rely on a continuing act must first establish an act of discrimination, harassment or victimisation within the cognisable period. Only where such an act is established may earlier incidents be considered as forming part of a continuum.

Accordingly, before considering whether any alleged continuum exists, it is necessary to determine whether any of the post-employment acts relied upon by the Complainant constitute acts prohibited by the Employment Equality Acts.

The act principally relied upon by the Complainant is the Respondent's Labour Court submission dated 22 October 2025, in which her surname was incorrectly recorded as "Obular" rather than "Obulor". As the complaint was presented to the Workplace Relations Commission on 6 January 2026, I am satisfied that this allegation falls within the cognisable period and may therefore be considered.

The Complainant also relied upon the Respondent's subsequent correspondence following the Labour Court Recommendation, including its description of the payment made pursuant to that Recommendation as a "goodwill gesture", together with what she characterised as a continuing refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing, accept responsibility or engage meaningfully with her concerns.

However, even accepting the Complainant's account of these events at its height, I am not satisfied that they constitute acts of discrimination within the meaning of the Employment Equality Acts. The characterisation of a payment as a "goodwill gesture", the maintenance of a legal position in litigation, the failure to admit wrongdoing, or a refusal to provide the acknowledgement sought by a former employee may be matters that a complainant finds upsetting or objectionable. However, without evidence linking such conduct to a protected ground, they do not of themselves establish less favourable treatment on the race or gender ground.

I am therefore satisfied that none of the post-dismissal events relied upon by the Complainant, apart from the alleged misspelling of her surname, are capable of constituting acts of discrimination for the purposes of section 77(5) of the Acts.

It is well established that a complainant must, in the first instance, present facts from which it can be inferred that they were treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated on the relevant discriminatory ground. The principles established in Southern Health Board v Mitchell, Melbury Developments Ltd v Valpeters and Margetts v Graham Anthony & Company Ltd require a complainant to establish primary facts of sufficient significance from which discrimination may reasonably be inferred before the burden shifts to the respondent. Mere assertion or speculation is insufficient.

In the instant case, the Complainant stated that the misspelling of her surname amounted to race discrimination. While I accept that a person's name is closely connected to their identity and that repeated inaccuracies may understandably cause offence or frustration, the question before me is whether the facts presented support an inference that the conduct complained of occurred because of the Complainant's race.

The Complainant adduced no evidence that the misspelling was accompanied by any racist remark, racial reference, derogatory comment or other conduct indicative of bias. Nor was any evidence presented of a pattern of racially motivated behaviour associated with the preparation of the Labour Court submissions themselves. While comparator evidence is not essential in every discrimination case, there must nevertheless be facts capable of supporting an inference that the treatment complained of was connected to a protected ground.

I am not satisfied that an administrative or typographical error in the spelling of a surname, without more, is capable on the facts of this case of supporting an inference of race discrimination. There was no evidence presented to me to suggest that the error occurred because of her race, colour, ethnic origin or nationality, or that a person outside her protected group would have been or was treated differently in comparable circumstances.

Accordingly, I find that the Complainant has failed to establish primary facts from which discrimination on the race ground may be inferred in relation to the misspelling of her name in the Respondent’s Labour Court submission of 22 October 2025. The burden of proof under section 85A therefore does not shift to the Respondent.

As I have found that none of the post-employment matters relied upon by the Complainant constitute acts of discrimination within the cognisable period, there is no act capable of grounding a continuing act analysis under section 77(5) of the Acts. The earlier matters complained of, all of which occurred during the Complainant's employment and more than twelve months before the presentation of the complaint, are therefore outside the cognisable period and cannot be investigated.

Although the Complainant also applied to extend the cognisable period from six months to twelve months under section 77(5) of the Acts, on grounds of reasonable cause, I do not need to decide whether reasonable cause has been shown. The extension would only help her if it gave her a discriminatory act to build a continuum on, and it does not: as set out above, none of the acts relied upon within either the six-month or the twelve-month period amount to discrimination. It is the absence of any established act within the cognisable period, not the length of that period, that is fatal to the continuum argument. Extending time to twelve months would not change that, and could not bring the earlier, substantive matters relied upon by the Complainant within my jurisdiction. I therefore do not need to determine whether reasonable cause has been established.

As the Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, I find that she was not discriminated against.