AWD264

PARTIES:

DIVISION:

SUBJECT:

Appeal of Adjudication Officer Decision No's: ADJ-00050080 (CA-00061219-001).

BACKGROUND:

The Worker appealed the decision of the WRC Adjudication Officer under Section 25 (2), Protection of Employees (Temporary Agency Work) Act, 2012 on 23 February 2025.

A Labour Court hearing took place on 15 January 2026.

The following is the Decision of the Court:

DECISION:

Background to the Appeal

This is an appeal by Mr Patrick Martin (‘the Complainant’) from a decision of an Adjudication Officer (ADJ-00050080/CA-00061219-001, 10 January 2025) under the Protection of Employees (Temporary Agency Work) Act 2012 (‘the Act’). The Complainant’s Notice of Appeal was received in the Court on 23 February 2025. The Court heard the appeal in Dublin on 15 January 2026.

Preliminary Issue

At the outset of the within hearing the IBEC representative acting for FRS (‘the Respondent’) raised a jurisdictional issue arising from the date on which the Complainant submitted his appeal to the Court. As noted above, the Adjudication Officer’s decision issued on 10 January 2025. The time limit for submitting an appeal under the Act from a decision of first instance is forty-two days. That period expired, in respect of the instant case, on 20 February 2025.

However, the Complainant did not submit his appeal until 23 February 2025 i.e. three days outside of the permitted timeframe for doing so.

The Complainant was afforded the opportunity to make an application to extend time. The test to be met for a party seeking such an extension of time to refer an appeal to the Court is to establish that their delay in doing so was “due to the existence of exceptional circumstances” (Section 44(4) Workplace Relations Act 2015 refers). The Complainant told the Court that the delay in this case was due to issues with his home broadband. He also cited a lack of certainty on his part as to whether the forty-two-day period stated in section 44(4) comprised working days only or also included weekend days.

Meaning of ‘Exceptional Circumstances’

The meaning to be given to the words ‘exceptional circumstances’ was considered by this Court when construing identical words in the Employment Equality Act 1998 (prior to its amendment in 2004) in Fitzsimons-Markey v Gaelscoil Thulach na nÓg [2004] E.L.R. 110. The Court, in its Determination in that case, said that to be exceptional, “a circumstance need not be unique or unprecedented or very rare; but it cannot be one which is regular or routinely or normally encountered”.

The Court in Fitzsimons-Markey outlined the correct approach that should be taken to determine, whether in any particular case, the circumstances relied on by an appellant to extend time constitute ‘exceptional circumstances’:

“The Court must first consider if the circumstances relied upon by the applicant can be regarded as exceptional. If it answers that question in the affirmative the Court must then go on to consider if those circumstances operated so as to prevent the applicant from lodging her claim in time.

The term exceptional is an ordinary familiar English adjective and not a term of art. It describes a circumstance which is such as to form an exception, which is out of the ordinary course or unusual or special or uncommon. To be exceptional a circumstance need not be unique or unprecedented or very rare; but it cannot be one which is regular or routinely or normally encountered (see R v Kelly [1999] 2 All ER 13 at 20 per Lord Bingham CJ.)”

The Court has applied the same approach when construing the words ‘exceptional circumstances’ as they are used in section 44(4) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. See, for example, Luiz v Zoric (TED1712), Yeria Limited v Adebbite (MND176) and Gumaraes Hanlon v Cavtat Taverns 3 T/A Urban Eats (EDA20/2023)

Discussion and Decision

The Complainant told the Court that his home broadband was working only intermittently in the immediate period before he submitted his completed appeal form and this was the reason for the delay. In reply to questions from the Court, he said that he did have a smart phone, and he accepted that there was nothing prohibiting him from sending a hardcopy appeal form in the post. It seems reasonable to the Court, therefore, to infer from the Complainant’s answers that the intermittent broadband issues he was experiencing in February 2025 do not explain his tardiness in submitting his appeal in circumstances where there were several other options open to him to ensure that it reached the Court within the statutory timeframe.

The Complainant also informed the Court that he was unsure as to how the forty-two-day period was to be computed. It is well established that a lack of understanding as to how a statutory time limit is to be applied cannot justify non-compliance with it.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Complainant has not established the existence of exceptional circumstances that explain and justify his delay in submitting his appeal under the Act to the Court. The appeal is, accordingly dismissed.

The Court so decides.

	Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
	Alan Haugh
TH	______________________
28 January 2026	Deputy Chairman

NOTE

Enquiries concerning this Decision should be addressed to Ms Therese Hickey, Court Secretary.