ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00050483
| Complainant | Respondent |
Anonymised Parties | Staff Nurse | Health Service Provider |
Representatives | Complainant’s husband | HR personnel |
Complaint(s):
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Sick Leave Act 2022 | CA-00061839-001 | 28/02/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Sick Leave Act 2022 | CA-00061839-002 | 28/02/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 86 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 | CA-00061839-004 | 28/02/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 | CA-00061839-005 | 28/02/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 | CA-00061839-006 | 28/02/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 | CA-00061839-007 | 28/02/2024 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Sick Leave Act 2022 | CA-00061839-008 | 28/02/2024 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 14/01/2025
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Máire Mulcahy
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 and Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 - 2015, following the referral of the complaints to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaints and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaints.
I conducted a remote hearing in accordance with the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020 and Statutory Instrument 359/2020 which designates the Workplace Relations Commission as a body empowered to hold remote hearings.
I explained the changes arising from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Zalewski v. Adjudication Officer and WRC, Ireland and the Attorney General [2021] IESC 24 on 6 April 2021. The parties proceeded in the knowledge that hearings are to be conducted in public, decisions issuing from the WRC will disclose the parties’ identities and sworn evidence may be required.
The complainant was represented by her husband.
The complainant gave evidence under affirmation.
The respondent was represented by an Employee Relations Manager, National Employee Relations, who gave evidence under affirmation.
An Assistant Director of Nursing also attended for the respondent.
Background:
The complainant has presented three complaints alleging breaches of the Sick leave Act,2022, two complaints alleging breaches of the Employment Equality Act, 1998, a complaint under the Organization of Working Time Act, 1997 and a complaint under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994. The complainant commenced employment as a registered nurse in one of the respondent’s hospitals on 02/04/2017. She has been on continuous sick leave since March 2021 due to Long Covid. Her gross fortnightly pay is €1990.00. She works an average of 19.5 hours a week. She lodged her complaint with the WRC on the 28/2/2024.
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Anonymisation of the parties.
In addition to a complaint under the Employment Equality Act,1998, the complainant has referred a dispute under the industrial relations Act, 1969.
Section 8 of the industrial relations Act, 1969I specifies that
—"(1) An investigation of a trade dispute by the Court shall be conducted in private, but the Court shall, if requested to do so by a party to the dispute, conduct the investigation in public.”
There is an extensive overlap between the elements of this dispute and the complaint under the Act of 1998 to an extent that would disclose the identities of the parties in the dispute referred to the WRC under the Act of 1969.
Section 83 of the Workplace Relations Act amended the Employment Equality Act 1998 to provide discretion as to the publication of decisions.
Section 89 of the Act of 1998 as amended provides as follows:
“89.—(1) A copy of every decision of the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission] under this Part shall be given—
(a) to each of the parties, and
(b) to the Labour Court,
and every such decision shall be published on the internet in such form and in such manner as the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission considers appropriate”.
In addition, the contents of the dispute referred under the Act of 1969 are mirrored in the details of the complaints submitted under the Sick Leave Act 2022, the Organisation of Working Time Act, 11997 and the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 191994 ton extent that would expose the identities of the parties in the dispute referred to the WRC under the 1969 Act.
Section 41(14) (a) of the Act of 2015 as amended by the Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021, provides as follows:
“Subject to paragraph (b), the Commission shall publish on the internet in such form and in such manner as it considers appropriate every decision of an adjudication officer under this section.
(b) In publishing a decision under paragraph (a), an adjudication officer may determine that, due to the existence of special circumstances, information that would identify the parties in relation to whom the decision was made should not be published by the Commission”.
I decide of my own motion that the obligation contained in Section 8 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1969 constitutes special circumstances warranting the anonymisation of the parties’ names in this decision.
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
The complainant confirmed that she was withdrawing CA-00061839-002 and CA-00061839-008 as they are duplicates of CA-00061839-001, a complaint taken under the Sick leave Act, 2022
CA-00061839-001. Complaint under Sick Leave Act 2022. Evidence of the complainant given under affirmation. The complainant suffers from Post -Covid 19 syndrome, having contracted the Covid-19 virus in March 2020 while carrying out frontline duties as a staff nurse during the peak of the pandemic in one of the respondent’s hospitals. She contends that the failure of the respondent to pay her sick leave for the period September 2021 – 28/2/2024 in accordance with the respondent’s relevant circular letters which provide for the payment of Special Leave With Pay (‘SLWP’) is a breach of the Sick Leave Act 2022.
CA-00061839-004. Complaint under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998. The complainant submits that the respondent discriminated against her on the grounds of disability in refusing to pay her SWLP, a payment specifically implemented to support frontline staff, who contracted the Covid -19 virus while carrying out frontline duties during the peak of the pandemic in March 2020 and who, at a later date, succumbed to SARS-CoV-2/Long Covid illness. The complainant was diagnosed in March 2021 with SARS-CoV-2/Long Covid illness. The complainant submits that the respondent discriminated against her on the grounds of disability by requiring her to undergo an in -person occupational health assessment in order to establish her entitlement to receive SWLP, despite the fact that there were ample diagnoses that she was suffering from Long Covid. The respondent refused her request for an on – line assessment in March 2023. She had been assessed by occupational health physicians and declared medically unfit for work in December 2022. Her complaint of discrimination is also based on the altered requirement put to her by the respondent on 10 March 2022 to submit weekly certificates, as opposed to the previously acceptable submission of medical certificates at three-monthly intervals. In relation to the statutory time limits, which confines consideration of acts of discrimination falling between 29/9/2023 to 28/2/2024,the complainant submits that the acts of discrimination are part of a continuum, permitting consideration of acts which fell within the statutory time limits and those which fell outside of the statutory time limits. Evidence of the complainant given under affirmation. The complainant states that she was diagnosed with Post Covid Syndrome (Long Covid ) in March 2021. The complainant states that the act of discrimination was the requirement put to her by an Assistant Director of Nursing on 11/12/2023 to submit to an in person Occupational Health assessment, notwithstanding the fact that she had been assessed as suffering from Long Covid, contracted while working in one of the respondent’s hospitals during the period when Covid 19 was rampant. She had ongoing medical reports declaring her unfit to work due to Long Covid. Up until that point, the respondent had accepted medical certificates at three monthly intervals but now required them to be submitted at weekly intervals. The complainant had received a report from a leading Consultant in infectious disease that her symptoms aligned with Long Covid in March 2024. The complainant did not put forward a comparator. In terms of the advice of the adjudicator concerning the requirement to submit a comparator, the complainant refers to the statistical data provided by the respondent showing how they had extended discretion to fellow sufferers of Long Covid in their employment, in contrast to herself, and who received this payment up until 2024.
CA-00061839-005. Complaint under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998. Evidence of the complainant given under affirmation. The complainant states that she was diagnosed with Post Covid- 19 Syndrome ( Long Covid ) in March 2021. The complainant states that she was discriminated against on the grounds of disability on 11/12/2023 when the respondent refused to offer her reasonable accommodation by way of an online occupational health assessment while she was residing in Spain, notwithstanding the fact that she had been assessed as suffering from Long Covid, contracted while working in one of the respondent’s hospitals during the period when Covid 19 was rampant. She had ongoing medical reports declaring her unfit to work due to Long Covid. This assessment was a preliminary to examining her claim for SLWP and a return to work. She sought this as it was extremely difficult and painful for her to fly at that point as she had back problems due to Long Covid. Up until 2022 she had done the occupational health assessments online. On 3/8/3023 she notified the respondent of her availability to attend an online assessment. She got no response to that request for accommodation. There was an assessment scheduled for her for 9/3/2023, but the respondent sent the notification to the wrong address, so she did not receive it. She requested an online assessment due to long covid on 16/10/2023 and 28/10/2023. In response to a question from the adjudicator, she advised that she had not been declared medically unfit to fly but that it would cause her great pain and hardship. This act of discrimination also meant she would remain off salary. The complainant argues that the failure of the respondent to pay her during her absence from work due to Long Covid is in breach of the Employment Equality Act, 1998. The complainant mounted an extensive trawl of the respondent circular letters governing sickness leave, sick pay guidelines and procedures, arguing that they had been misapplied and that misapplication, in itself, amounted to discrimination. The complainant had received a report from a leading Consultant in infectious disease in March 2024 that her symptoms aligned with Long Covid.
CA-00061839-006. Complaint under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997. The complainant stated that she received no annual leave payments during the period of her absence on sick leave, a period which extended from 30/3/2021 up until February 2024. She is entitled to 27 days annual leave a year on a pro rata basis. She works 19.5 hours a week. The full time equivalent works 37.5 hours CA-00061839-007. Complaint under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 The complainant states that she was not notified of a change in her terms and conditions of employment contrary to section 5 of the Act of 1994. The breach was the failure of the respondent to notify her one month in advance of their refusal to pay her special leave without pay in accordance with the terms of CL 022/2022. The breach occurred on 16 December 2022 and in 2023 and again in 2024. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
CA-00061839-001. Complaint under Sick Leave Act 2022. This complaint, seeking the payment of Special Leave With Pay due to Post -Covid 19 illness from September 2021 forward, is inadmissible. Section 9 of the Act of 2022 states: “(1) The obligations under this Act shall not apply to an employer who provides his or her employees a sick leave scheme where the terms of the scheme confer, over the course of a reference period set out in the scheme, benefits that are, as a whole, more favourable to the employee than statutory sick leave.” The respondent’s sick leave scheme is more favourable that what is contained in section 5 of the Act of 2022 and renders the complaint inadmissible.
CA-00061839-004. Complaint under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998. The respondent stated that cognisable period is the 29/8/2023 – 28/2/2024, yet the complainant raised the matter of SLWP in 2021.This complaint is out to time and should be dismissed. The respondent denies that they discriminated against the complainant on grounds of disability. They applied the rules regarding SWlP on the same basis as applied to all other employees. The occupational health assessment was a requirement to detect the continuing presence of her disability and unfitness/fitness for work. The complainant received special leave with pay from 29/12/2020-28/3/2021 in accordance with the employer’s rules, (C/l 12/2020). She then transitioned to the non- Covid sick leave scheme/ payments. These expired in September 2021, and payment of the complainant’s salary ceased. She has remained on sick leave since March 2021. Special leave with pay beyond the 28 days provided for in the respondent’s circulars will be offered when 4 criteria are met as per C/L/073 /2020. One of the four criteria requires confirmation by the occupational health team that the employee is unfit to work due to ongoing Covid 19 illness - a requirement which rolled over into all relevant subsequent circular letters. This detail concerning the complainant’s fitness was not available to the employer in 2023. Evidence of Regional Employee Relations Manager given affirmation. The respondent accepts that according to the department of Social Protection, the complainant had a disability and was unfit to work as evidenced by their payment to her of a disability benefit in June 2023. The respondent regrets that the complainant contracted the virus. The respondent applied the short- term and long-term sick leave arrangements as per their circular letters. The respondent’s policies permit the requirement for weekly certificates. The complainant has not provided any named comparator. In response to a question from the adjudicator, the witness stated that online occupational health assessments might be facilitated and probably occurred when Covid 19 was at its height, but that that is a matter entirely at the discretion of the occupational health officer. What was applied to the complainant was applied throughout the respondent’s services. She did not meet the criterial laid out in the relevant circular letters (HR 015/2121) for the payment of special leave with pay beyond 28 days when suffering from a Covid 19 illness. The Act has no function in examining this complaint.
CA-00061839-005. Complaint under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998. The respondent denies that they discriminated against the complainant by failing to provide her with reasonable accommodation in the form of an online occupational health assessment so as to obviate the need for her to return to Ireland and undergo a face-to-face occupational health assessment. She did not provide medical evidence as to why this was necessary. So, they were unaware of the disability which the complainant states prevented her flying from Spain to Ireland from August 2023 onwards. Had they known, they would have considered the matter and the validity of the request. CA-00061839-006. Complaint under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997. The respondent stated that they would calculate the leave owed to the complainant within a three-week period and submit their calculations to her and the WRC. They will explore ways of seeing how she can be paid her entitlements promptly.
CA-00061839-007. Complaint under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 The respondent denies that that any breach of the Act of 1994 occurred. The complainant’s complaint concerns the implementation of the respondent circular letters, a product of a joint management staff agreement on the implementation of SWLP. Their terms were notified to staff. That is the longstanding and agreed process by which changes to terms and conditions are introduced/ altered / improved for staff.
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Findings and Conclusions:
CA-00061839-001. Complaint under Sick Leave Act, 2022. I am obliged to determine if the respondent has breached the complainant’s entitlements under section 5 of the Sick Leave Act, 2022, when they failed to pay her SWLP for the period 25/9/2021 to 28/2/2024, based on the complainant’s interpretation of the entitlements available to her under the employers’ sick leave regulations. The complainant contracted work-related SARS-CoV-2 in March 2020, which progressed to a diagnosis of SARS-CoV-2/ Long-COVID illness /Post-COVID Syndrome in March 2021. The complainant has been on sick leave due to this work-related illness since 30/3/2021. Her (non -Covid) sick leave entitlements and annual leave entitlements ended in September 2021.All salary payments then ceased. The complainant has undertaken an extensive trawl though the relevant circular letters governing payment for sick leave without considering the statutory time limits as set out in section of Section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act,2015, nor the effect of section 9 of the Act of 2022 on the validity of her complaint. Preliminary issue: The complainant’s written evidence shows that the contravention occurred on 25/9/2022 in that the complainant was refused special leave with pay at that point. The complainant lodged her complaint with the WRC on 28/2/2024 The Act came into force on 1/1/2023. There is no authority for an employee to retrieve entitlements under an Act which was not in being at the time of the beginning of the alleged contravention. This is aside altogether from the fact that the complaint is outside of statutory time limits, and that section 9 of the Act vitiates the complaint. While it is very regrettable that the complainant contracted this illness, this complaint is misconceived. I find that I do not have jurisdiction to hear this complaint.
CA-00061839-004. Complaint under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 I am required to establish if the complainant was discriminated against on grounds of disability, contrary to section 6 (2)(g) of the Acts on 11/12/2023 when the respondent insisted on an online occupational health assessment as a prerequisite to paying her the SLWP. She had been assessed by occupational health physicians and declared unfit for work in January 2022. She was paid up to September 2021. The circular letters governing sick leave entitlements were improperly applied and she was denied paid sick leave for the period September 2021 to 28/2/2024. Her complaint of discrimination is also based on the altered requirement for her to submit weekly certificates. Preliminary point: Statutory Time Limits. Section 77(5)(a) of the Acts dictates that the only admissible incidents grounding the complaint of discrimination are those that occurred in the six months prior to the submission of the complaint, that period being the 29/8/2023- 28/2/2024.The evidence discloses that the respondent advised the complainant in March 2023 that she was required to undergo an on-site occupational health assessment. She declined this on 31 March 2023. However, in Hurley v County Cork VEC (EDA 1124), the Labour Court noted that Subsection (5) and subsection (6A) of s.77 deal with different forms of continuing discrimination or victimisation and held that “Subsection (5) of s.77 deals with a situation in which there are a series of separate acts or omissions which, while not forming part of regime, rule, practice or principle, are sufficiently connected so as to constitute a continuum.” I find that the approaches to the complainant concerning the requirement to undergo a face-to-face assessment which extended from 2022 – October 2023 all concerned the respondent’s requirement to establish her level of fitness to either merit the SWLP or to return to work. But while the respondent’s engagements with the complainant which she found to be discriminatory are connected, the complainant, must, in addition satisfy a further requirement , set out in Cork County VEC v. Hurley EDA 24/2011 and County Dublin VEC v. Dodo EDA1327/2013) which held that a discriminatory act must have occurred within the limitation period in order to consider those acts occurring outside of the statutory period. Therefore, I must decide if the acts of alleged discrimination occurring between 29/8/2023- 28/2/2024 constitute discrimination on the grounds of disability and permit consideration of acts occurring outside of the statutory period. Relevant Law. Section 6(1) of the Employment Equality Acts provides that discrimination shall be taken to occur where “a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) ...” which— (i) exists, (ii) existed but no longer exists, (iii) may exist in the future, or (iv) is imputed to the person concerned.” Section 6(2)(g) provides that discrimination on the grounds of disability will be taken to occur where “That one is person with a disability and the other either is not or is a person with a different disability” Section 8(1)(b) of the Act as amended prohibits discrimination in terms of condition of employment. The first obligation which the complainant must meet is compliance with section 85A of the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015 which lays the onus of proof with the complainant to establish a prima face case of discriminatory treatment contrary to the Acts. Section 85A (1) of the Acts states that “In any proceedings where facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant from which it may be presumed that discrimination has occurred in relation to him/her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary”. In the case of Teresa Mitchell v Southern Health Board (Cork University Hospital) AEE/99/8, [2001] 12 E.L.R. 201, the Labour Court in amplifying what section 85A(1) concluded that: “a complainant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination. It is only if these primary facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, and they are regarded by the Court as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the onus shifts to the respondent to prove that there was no infringement of the principle of equal treatment”. The complainant must discharge this evidential burden. If she does, the respondent must prove that she was not discriminated against on grounds of her disability. If she does not, her case cannot succeed. In order to achieve compliance with section 85(A)- the first step- she must satisfy three elements of a test laid out in Minaguchi v Mr. Ray Byrne, T/A Wine port Lakeshore Restaurant DEC-E/2002/20. The three requirements necessary to establish that a prima facie case exists are: - That s/he is covered by the relevant discriminatory ground(s), - That s/he has been subjected to specific treatments; and - That this treatment is less favourable than the way someone who is not covered by the relevant discriminatory ground is, has been or would be treated.” Application of the above preconditions to the circumstances of this complaint. I accept that the complainant’s illness meets the definition of a disability as set out in section 2 (1) of the Act of 1998. The special treatment is declaring the complainant ineligible for a particular payment, the SPWL, having failed to meet the criteria for payment of same. There is no merit in analysing if and how the respondent’s circular letters were applied/ misapplied, an exercise undertaken extensively by the complainant, as this Act has no function in examining this element of the complaint. The only matter for determination in a complaint of discrimination is a difference in treatment, or a difference in the application of the respondent’s circular letters and rules between the complainant and persons without a disability or a different disability. Is the treatment less favourable than the way an employee s without a disability or with a different disability is, has been or would be treated? Failure to identify a comparator. The complainant has failed to nominate a comparator. The complainant has submitted data received from the respondent demonstrating that a cohort of staff did receive SLWP for post-COVID illness in July 2022 and were still on SLWP in April 2024, highlighting the long-term effects of the illness. But these are not employees without a disability or with a different disability. They are in the same cohort, suffering from SARS-CoV-2/Long- Covid, deemed, unlike the complainant, to have met the criteria. The complainant believes this to be uunfair,and it is very regrettable that she sustained such a debilitating illness, but she is unable to demonstrate less favourable treatment when compared to an employee without a disability or with a different disability. While contracting Covid-19 virus was undeniably a horrendous outcome for staff working in hospitals in 2020, my function is to determine if the evidence and facts of this complaint align with the obligations resting upon a complainant to raise an inference of discrimination. Having regard to the forgoing, I find that the Complainant did not establish facts from which it may be presumed that she was treated by the respondent less favourably than a person who does not have a disability or who has a different disability is, has been or would be. Accordingly, I find that the Complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the grounds of disability in respect of the last instance of alleged discrimination falling within the statutory time limits. I am unable, therefore, to consider the earlier instance of alleged discrimination falling outside of the statutory time limits The complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and her complaint cannot succeed.
CA-00061839-005. Complaint under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 Reasonable accommodation. I must now decide if the respondent has discriminated against the complainant by failing to provide her with reasonable accommodation within the meaning of section 16(3) of the Act when they denied her the option of an on line occupational health assessment thus obviating the need for her to fly from Spain to Ireland for the purposes of assessing her current state of fitness to resume work and/ or her eligibility for SLWP. The complainant was residing in Spain at the time and stated in evidence that a flight to Ireland to enable this examination would be painful. Her medical certificates omit any reference to her inability to fly. Relevant Law. Section 16 provides a s follows: “(3) (a) For the purposes of this Act a person who has a disability is fully competent to undertake, and fully capable of undertaking, any duties if the person would be so fully competent and capable on reasonable accommodation (in this subsection referred to as "appropriate measures") being provided by the person’s employer. (b) The employer shall take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to enable a person who has a disability— (i) to have access to employment, (ii) to participate or advance in employment, or (iii) to undergo training, unless the measures would impose a disproportionate burden on the employer.” Preliminary Point: Section 16 (3)(b) of the Act is designed to provide reasonable accommodation to persons for the purposes of enabling access to employment. The Act makes no reference to any obligation an employer may have about payment of sick leave entitlements. While an assessment may have identified the complainant’s fitness to resume employment, the complainant’s evidence is exclusively concerned with the need for an online assessment to confirm that she is still suffering from SARS-CoV-2/Long- Covid and therefore eligible for payment of SWLP. Her statement that a flight would be painful was a mere statement and was dwarfed in her written and oral evidence by the amount of analysis on the misapplication of the respondent’s circular letters ;her belief in the unfairness of the respondent’s withdrawal of online assessments, available to her up until 2022, and their failure to correctly apply their own circulars in fair manner. None of her oral or written evidence references a wish for an online assessment for purposes of identifying a pathway for her return to work. There was no reference in the respondent’s circular letters at the material time of an entitlement to an online assessment. All her medical certificates from Spain state that the complainant is unfit to work due to the ongoing symptoms of Covid 19, make no recommendations regarding accommodation or how she can be facilitated in the workplace and were silent on her medical inability to take a flight from Spain to Ireland. Nor was any such evidence submitted to the respondent. The complainant has misunderstood the purpose of reasonable accommodation which is about enabling a person to return to work. This complaint is misconceived. I find that the respondent did not discriminate against the complainant by failing to provide reasonable accommodation.
CA-00061839-006. Complaint under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997. Claim for accrued annual leave in respect of periods of certified sick leave from 30/3/2021 to 28/2/2024. Relevant Law. Section 86 of the Workplace Relations Act ,2015 amended section 19 of the Organisation of Working time Act to provide as follows: (1) The Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 is amended— (a) in section 19, by the insertion of the following subsection: “(1A) For the purposes of this section, a day that an employee was absent from work due to illness shall, if the employee provided to his or her employer a certificate of a registered medical practitioner in respect of that illness, be deemed to be a day on which the employee was— (a) at his or her place of work or at his or her employer’s disposal, and (b) carrying on or performing the activities or duties of his or her work.”, (b) in section 20, by the substitution of the following paragraph for paragraph (c) of subsection (1): “(c) to the leave being granted— (i) within the leave year to which it relates, (ii) with the consent of the employee, within the period of 6 months after the end of that leave year, or (iii) where the employee— (I) is, due to illness, unable to take all or any part of his or her annual leave during that leave year or the period specified in subparagraph (ii), and (II) has provided a certificate of a registered medical practitioner in respect of that illness to his or her employer, within the period of 15 months after the end of that leave year.”, and (c) in section 23, by the substitution of the following subsection for subsection (1): “(1) (a) Where— (i) an employee ceases to be employed, and (ii) the whole or any portion of the annual leave in respect of the relevant period remains to be granted to the employee, the employee shall, as compensation for the loss of that annual leave, be paid by his or her employer an amount equal to the pay, calculated at the normal weekly rate or, as the case may be, at a rate proportionate to the normal weekly rate, that he or she would have received had he or she been granted that annual leave. (b) In this subsection— ‘relevant period’ means— (i) in relation to a cessation of employment of an employee to whom subparagraph (i) of paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of section 20 applies, the current leave year, (ii) in relation to a cessation of employment of an employee to whom subparagraph (ii) of the said paragraph (c) applies, that occurs during the first 6 months of the current leave year— (I) the current leave year, and (II) the leave year immediately preceding the current leave year, (iii) in relation to a cessation of employment of an employee to whom subparagraph (iii) of the said paragraph (c) applies, that occurs during the first 12 months of the period of 15 months referred to in the said subparagraph (iii) — (I) the current leave year, and (II) the leave year immediately preceding the current leave year, or (iv) in relation to a cessation of employment of an employee to whom subparagraph (iii) of the said paragraph (c) applies that occurs during the final 3 months of the period of 15 months referred to in the said subparagraph (iii) — (I) the current leave year, and (II) the 2 leave years immediately preceding the current leave year.”. The complainant was on sick leave from 30/3/2021 – 28/2/2024. The complainant presented no coherent details of periods for which she was claiming accrued annual leave or periods for which she had received leave and was quite unclear about this matter. The respondent presented their analysis of the accrual of her annual leave subsequent to the hearing. The respondent’s calculations were based on their own circular letters plus the statutory entitlements. As this complaint is presented under the Organisation of Working Time Act,1997 the jurisdiction conferred on me requires me to gauge the complainant’s entitlements according to the terms of that Act and that Act alone. Meanwhile the respondent is perfectly entitled to come to whatever more generous arrangement they agree with the complainant based on their interpretation of their circular letters as long as they do not fall short of the entitlements contained in the Act. Leave year 1/4/22-31/3/2023. Fifteen months after that is 31/6/2024 during which the complainant was eligible to take the accrued leave. Based on section 86 of the Act, I find that the complainant has worked 1014 hours. In accordance with Section 19(1)(c) of the Act of 1997 and based on her entitlement to calculate her leave at 8% of her working hours, I find that the complainant is has accrued 81.12 hours. She works a 7.5-hour day. Leave year 1/4/2023- 28/2/2024. I find that the complaint has worked 930 hours up to the date of submission of her complaint. In accordance with Section 19(1)(c) of the Act of 1997 and based on her entitlement to calculate her leave at 8% of her working hours, I find that the complainant has accrued 74.4 hours. She works a 7.5-hour day. Payment in lieu of public holidays. The respondent addressed this matter in their post – hearing submissions. Time limits. Section 41(6) of the Act of 2015 states Section 41 (8) states that “an adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than 6 months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause”. The relevant public holidays fell from 30/3/2021- 31/8/2021. The complaint was submitted on 28/2/2024. I do not have jurisdiction to hear this complaint. I find the complaint concerning the loss of annual leave hours accrued during the annual leave years 2022- 2023 and 2023 -2024 to be well founded. The complainant is entitled to an accrued number of hours to the amount of 81.12 hours (in respect of the 2022-23 leave year) plus 74.4hours (in respect of the 2023-2024 leave year), a total of 155.52 hours to be granted in accordance with section 19 of the Act of 1997 as amended by section 86 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.
CA-00061839-007. Complaint under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 I must decide if the respondent’s failure to notify the complainant one month in advance of their refusal to pay her special leave without pay in accordance with the terms of CL 022/2022 amounts to a change in her terms and conditions of employment and in breach of section 5 of the Act of 1994. The breach occurred on 16/12/2022. Section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act,2015 states “Subject to subsection (8) an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint refers.” The date on which the contravention began was 16/12/2022. Based on section 41(8) of the Act of 2015, I do not have jurisdiction to hear this complaint.
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Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaints in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 82 of the Act.
CA-00061839-001. Complaint under Sick Leave Act, 2022. I decide that I do not have jurisdiction to hear this complaint CA-00061839-002. Complaint under Sick Leave Act, 2022. The complainant withdrew this complaint CA-00061839-004. Complaint under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998. The complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and her complaint cannot succeed. CA-00061839-005. Complaint under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998. I decide that the respondent did not discriminate against the complainant by failing to provide reasonable accommodation. CA-00061839-006. Complaint under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997. I decide that this complaint is well founded. The complainant is entitled to an accrued number of hours totalling 155.52, to be granted in accordance with section 19 of the Act of 1997 as amended by section 86 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. CA-00061839-007. Complaint under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994. I decide that I do not have jurisdiction to hear this complaint. CA-00061839-008 The complainant withdrew this complaint. |
Dated: 15th of January 2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Máire Mulcahy
Key Words:
Misconceived complaints; lack of jurisdiction. |
