Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

A Manager

A Financial Bank

Representatives

Abbot Solicitors

William Maher BL instructed by Hayes Solicitors

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00067478-001

18/11/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00067478-002

02/01/2025

The Complainant was employed as a Manager/Vice President from 6/6/2023 until he was summarily dismissed following a review, on 28/3/2024 for stating he was at work on a number of days  when the office log in system showed he was not. The Complainant resides approximately two hours from his workplace and understood he had an agreement with a Manager not to attend work as his wife needed his car as hers was broken.  This was contested by the Respondent in their initial submissions.

The Complainant submitted his complaints under the Employment Equality Act to the WRC on 19/11/2024 almost two months after the 6 months allowed under the Acts to make a complaint. The Unfair Dismissal complaint was subsequently added on Jan 2nd 2025 as it was pointed out by the Complainant that he had expected it would be included as he had mentioned unfair dismissal in his complaint form. The Respondent, on the basis the complaints were out of time, sought a Decision on the preliminary matter of jurisdiction before it would engage in a Hearing on the substantive issue. The Complainant stated he had reasonable cause for the delay in submitting the complaints on medical and other grounds and sought the Adjudicator to exercise his discretion regarding time limits under the Acts and admit the substantive complaints for adjudication for reasonable cause.  In most cases the preliminary issue of an extension of time is dealt with as part of the overall Hearing into complaints, however the Respondent was not prepared to engage on the substantive issue without a decision on the preliminary issue first and there has been precedent where the preliminary matter can be decided as an initial issue where the cost and time involved of dealing with the substantive complaints can be substantial.  It is important to set out the series of events and correspondence which the Adjudicator has relied upon to come to his Decision on the preliminary matter.

The Complainant stated in his complaint form he was employed by the Respondent from June 2023 until 28 March 2024 in a managerial role. He stated his employment was terminated with immediate effect on 28 March 2024, following a phone call and written confirmation from his Branch Manager. The stated reasons were misrepresentation of his office attendance and concerns about his performance. He  believed the termination was discriminatory and procedurally unfair, and he filed a complaint under the Employment Equality Acts 1998–2015, citing discrimination based on race, religion, and disability (dyslexia). The Complainant submitted his complaint form on November 18th 2024. The Complainant submitted to the Hearing he understood the dismissal did not take effect for three months. The Complainant who represented himself at the time he submitted the complaint form and at the above Hearing, submitted a comprehensive complaint setting out in detail his complaints and quoting employment law and the WRC Code of Practice re Harassment within the complaint. No mention of or grounds for an extension of time were provided in the Complaint form or accompanied the submission of the Complaint form by the Complainant.

The Respondent made these submissions further to the oral testimony by the Complainant at hearing on 22 May 2025, and in response to the written submissions lodged by the Complainant on 13 August 2025 at the direction of the Adjudicator.

Prior to adjourning the hearing on 22 May 2025, the Adjudicator directed the Complainant to address the following matters in writing to the Respondent:

a)    Confirmation of the number of times you visited Dr X  in relation to the alleged cognitive difficulties between your termination date of 28 March 2024 and the date of your complaint submission, 19 November 2024;

b)    Confirmation of the medications, if any, that were prescribed to you by Dr. X during this period of time;

c)    A medical report confirming a diagnosis of dyslexia;

d)    Confirmation of all dates and times on which you brought your dyslexia diagnosis to the attention of the Respondent;

e)    Confirmation of any and all occasions where you requested reasonable accommodations from the Respondent;

f)     Notification of having engaged legal representation once you have done so, and who you have engaged.

The Complainant purported to respond by letter dated 8 July 2025 but apart from confirming the identity of the Complainant’s new legal representatives and from making a generalised claim about his giving notice of his supposed condition at interview, the Complainant failed to properly respond to questions posed.  Furthermore, the Complainant failed, refused and/or neglected to respond to a further notice from WRC Adjudication Services dated 9 July 2025 seeking a proper response to the Adjudicator’s direction no later than 31 July 2025.  In the circumstances, the Complainant has failed to comply with the direction of the Adjudicator and had failed to properly make out his case for an extension of time within the allowed time.  

It is respectfully submitted that the Adjudication Officer has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the complaint as the Complainant is out of time for submitting his claims.  The Complainant’s employment ended on 28 March 2024, and it is submitted that the relevant time period for the Complainant to submit his complaint was between that date and 27 September 2024. The complaint was not received until the 19 November 2024.  Consequently, the Complainant’s preliminary application must fail.

Without prejudice to the foregoing, in his written submissions of 13 August 2025, the Complainant claims he was delayed in submitting his WRC complaint form for the following reasons: 

a.                   Employer Conduct;

b.                   Medical Condition; 

c.                   Lack of Legal Representation; 

d.                   Fear of Retribution; and

e.                   Ongoing Engagement with Employer.

 “Employer Conduct” 

 The Complainant does not make out any examples of such alleged continuous harassment, intimidation and toxic work environment and behaviour. The Respondent refutes this assertion entirely. The Complainant did not lodge any grievances, formally or informally, with the Respondent. The Complainant did not make the Respondent aware of any alleged medical condition; he made no requests for reasonable accommodation or requests for representation to the Respondent; and fails to provide any examples of his being mocked, harassed and intimidated by the Respondent.  

“Medical Condition”

 The Complainant’s submissions refer to the Complainant’s medical condition as being “recognised in law as a disability” but the Complainant fails to provide any evidence of a formal diagnosis of dyslexia. The Respondent again refers to its solicitor’s letter dated 28 May 2025, and the WRC Adjudication Services’ reminder dated 9 July 2025, and the Complainant’s failure to provide a medical report confirming a diagnosis of dyslexia.  Instead, the Complainant submitted evidence from Dr X  by way of letter dated 5 December 2024, 12 May 2025 and 5 August 2025. In Dr X’s letter of 5 December 2024, she states that “Mr A experienced significant anxiety and emotional distress”. Dr X does not refer to the alleged dyslexia at all in this letter. Dr X  states in her letter of 5 August 2025 that the Complainant attended her practice on certain dates presenting with work related stress and “Incidentally, he suffers from Dyslexia”.   

It is respectfully submitted that this medical certificate does not amount to a diagnosis of dyslexia and none of Dr X’s letters state that the Complainant’s alleged dyslexia was the cause for the delay in making the complaint. Furthermore, there is no medical evidence supporting the assertion that the Complainant suffered depression.  

“Lack of Legal Representation”

The Complainant fails to explain why he did not have access to legal advice “at the material time” and fails to explain why this is reasonable cause for the delay. 

 “Fear of Retribution”

The Complainant fails to explain a reasonable basis for a “genuine apprehension of further victimisation or job loss” where the Complainant’s employment was terminated on 28 March 2024.  There was no communication between the Respondent and the Complainant after the date of termination. The Complainant fails to explain why this alleged “fear of retribution” dissipated on 19 November 2024 on the date he lodged the complaint. 

“Ongoing Engagement with Employer”

 This is entirely inaccurate. There were no such attempts to resolve matters internally. 

 OTHER MATTERS ARISING

 There are inconsistencies in the submissions made on 13 August 2025 with what was submitted by the Complainant in the complaint form and his evidence at the hearing of this matter on 22 May 2025. The Complainant stated that he misunderstood the Notice in Lieu. Aside from the fact that ignorance of the law is not an excuse, the letter of termination dated 28 March 2024 states clearly that the decision to terminate the Complainant’s employment is “effective immediately”.  By any reasonable reading of this correspondence, the Complainant could not have been under any illusion but that the date of termination was 28 March 2024.

 The Complainant asked the Adjudication Officer to take into account the fact that once he became “aware of the urgency of submitting” his complaint he acted promptly to have it filed. Therefore, it is submitted that there was no impediment on the Complainant to lodge his claim once he was aware of the urgency.  This submission directly contradicts theComplainant’s own position that he was under a disability at the material time and was somehow unable to submit his application in accordance with a deadline.  It is respectfully submitted that the Complainant has still not provided actual evidence that provides any reasonable explanation for his delay in submitting his application. 

 THE LAW

The test for extending that six-month time period is whether or not the failure to present the complaint within the initial period “was due to reasonable cause”. The Respondent made legal submissions regarding the issue of reasonable cause.

In Salesforce.com –v- Alli Leech Determination2, the Labour Court set out in detail the legal principles to establish whether reasonable cause has been shown for an extension of time.  The court stated “the established test for deciding if an extension should be granted for reasonable cause shown is that formulated by this court in Labour Court determination DWT0338 Cementation Skanska –v- Carroll.”   Here, the test was set out in the following terms:   

“It is the Court’s view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the Claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay.  The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd.  In the context of which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the fact and circumstances known to the Claimant at the material time.   The Claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon, hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the Claimant should satisfy the court, as a matter of probability, that had the circumstances not been present, he would have initiated the claim on time”.

In that case, and in subsequent cases in which the question arose, the Court adopted an approach analogous to that taken by the superior courts in considering whether time should have been enlarged for “good reason” in judicial review proceedings pursuant to Order 84 Rule 21 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986.  That approach was held to be correct by the High Court in Minister for Finance –v- CPSU and Others . The test formulated in Cementation Skanska –v- Carroll draws heavily on the decision of the High Court in Donal O’Donnell and Catherine O’Donnell –v- Dun Laoghaire Corporation4.  Here Costello J (as he then was) stated as follows:- 

 “The phrase “good reasons” is one of wide import which it would be futile to attempt to define precisely.  However, in considering whether or not there are good reasons for extending the time I think it is clear that the test must be an objective one and the court should not extend the time merely because an aggrieved plaintiff believed that he or she were justified in delaying the institution of proceedings.  What the Plaintiff has to show (and I think the onus under Order 84 Rule 21 is on the Plaintiff) is that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford a justifiable excuse for the delay.  It is clear from the authorities that the test places the onus on the Applicant on an extension of time to identify the reason for the delay in and to establish that the reason relied upon provides a justifiable excuse for the actual delay.   Secondly, the onus on the Applicant to establish a causal link between the reason proffered for the delay and his or her failure to present the complaint in time.  Thirdly, the court must be satisfied, as a matter of probability, that the complaint would have been presented in time were it not for the intervention of the factors relied upon as constituting reasonable cause.  It is the actual delay that must be explained and justified.  Hence, if the factors relied upon to explain the delay ceased to operate before the complaint was presented, that may undermine a complaint that those factors were the actual cause of a delay.  Finally, while the established test included a relatively low threshold of reasonableness on an applicant, there is some limitation on the range of issues which can be taken into account”.   In particular, as was pointed out by Costello J in the passage quoted above, a court should not extend a statutory time limit merely because the Applicant subjectively believed that he or she was justified in delaying the institution of proceedings.   

In that case, the court found that the complainant had failed to establish a causal link between the factors relied upon by her and the delay in presenting the claim and, accordingly, the court held that the complainant had failed to adequately explain the delay and provide a justifiable excuse for the delay.

In this complaint, the Complainant has similarly failed to establish a causal link between the contended reasons for the delay in presenting his claim and his failure to do so.

It is respectfully submitted that the claim is out of time, and the WRC has no jurisdiction to hear the complaint as the Complainant has failed to provide any credible reasonable cause which both explains the delay and affords an excuse. 

 I have considered the submissions by both parties. The preliminary matter for determination by the Adjudicator is an application from the Complainant for an extension of time for adjudication of his complaints.

On October 15th 2025 the Adjudicator wrote to the Parties stating “Unless the WRC hear from either party prior to October 24th 2025 requesting a further Hearing the Adjudicator will prepare and issue his Decision on the preliminary matter.” The Respondent Representative replied it had no further submissions and awaited the Adjudicator Decision and an email was received from the Complainant late November seeking the Decision.

The Complainants employment ended by dismissal on March 24th 2024..The Complainant lodged a complaint under the Employment Equality Act to the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) on 18th November 2024 and a subsequent email to the WRC on January 2nd 2025  advised the Complainant had submitted a complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act. Therefore, the relevant period for consideration by the Adjudicator  in assessing a contravention under the Acts, having regard to the six-month statutory time frame set down by the Workplace Relations Act 2015 and at Section 77(5) of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 is the period from March 24th 2024 to September 23rd 2024 . The initial complaint was submitted approximately two months after the 6 month deadline.

Should the Adjudicator find a reasonable cause for the delay in lodging the claim, the timeframe for considering when a contravention occurred can be extended from six months to twelve months. The Complainant in this case seeks an extension of the timeframe for lodging his complaint to twelve months. The application for extending time is made on the basis that his failure to present a complaint within time was due to reasonable cause.

The established test for deciding if an extension of time can be granted for reasonable cause is that formulated by this Court in Labour Court Determination DWT0338, Cementation Skanska (Formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v Carroll.  The test was set out as follows:

“It is the Court's view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.”

The test formulated in Cementation Skanska (Formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v Carroll draws heavily on the decision of the High Court in Donal O’Donnell and Catherine O’Donnell v Dun Laoghaire Corporation [1991] ILRM 30. Here Costello J. (as he then was) stated as follows:

“The phrase ‘good reasons’ is one of wide import which it would be futile to attempt to define precisely. However, in considering whether or not there are good reasons for extending the time I think it is clear that the test must be an objective one and the court should not extend the time merely because an aggrieved plaintiff believed that he or she was justified in delaying the institution of proceedings. What the plaintiff has to show (and I think the onus under O. 84 r. 21 is on the plaintiff) is that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford a justifiable excuse for the delay.

The burden of proof in establishing the existence of reasonable cause rests with the Complainant. To discharge that burden, and for an Adjudicator to grant an extension of time, the Complainant must both explain the delay and offer a justifiable excuse for the delay.  The Complainant must establish a causal connection between the reason for the delay and the failure to present the complaint in time. Finally, the Adjudicator must satisfy itself that the complaint would have been presented in time if not for the factors relied upon as reasonable cause. It is the actual delay that must be explained and justified.

In particular I note Costelloe J’s words “Thirdly, the court must be satisfied, as a matter of probability, that the complaint would have been presented in time were it not for the intervention of the factors relied upon as constituting reasonable cause”. This, in effect, means that the factors relied upon for the delay must have ceased (or significantly diminished) when the complaint was eventually submitted.

The Solicitor acting for the Complainant submitted that there was both a valid reason and a justifiable excuse for the delay in lodging the claim in circumstances where the Complainant had a medical condition which made him particularly anxious and unable to complete minor administrative tasks. The Complainant advised he suffered from dyslexia through a note from the Complainants GP that stated “incidentally he has dyslexia”. He also argued he did not access a legal Representative until some nearly fifteen months after his dismissal.

It was  submitted that illness related to the Complainant’s medical condition, together with his general vulnerability to dyslexia , prevented him from lodging his complaint to the WRC in time.

In coming to my conclusions it is important to examine the sequence of events in this case;

The Complainant is an Irish national and was a Manager in a Bank.

The Complainant was dismissed with immediate effect for alleged gross misconduct on 28/3/2024.

The Complainant submitted his initial complaint on 18/11/2024.

On November 26th 2024 the WRC wrote to the Complainant advising his complaint was out of time stating “The complaint/disputeappears to have been presented after the expiration of the statutory timeline of six months from the time of the contravention.” and advising the Complainant of his right to seek an extension of time under the Act.

By email dated January 2nd 2025 the Complainant advised the following; “as I had originally ticked the Unfair Dismissals Act alongside the Employment Equality Act. I would have therefore expected that both these Acts would have been included. I would be very much obliged if the original complaint could therefore be amended to include this.”  The Adjudicator instructed the WRC to open an Unfair Dismissal complaint effective January 2nd 2025. Taking this date or the date the complaint form was initially submitted is not very relevant as both dates involve the Unfair Dismissal complaint being submitted outside six months..

By email dated December 9th 2024 the Complainant submitted the causes for the delay in submitting his complaints and provided a supporting letter from his GP, dated December 5th 2024. The GPs letter ended by stating “ I believed these circumstances constitute reasonable cause and should be taken into consideration”. By submitting this wording the GP had expanded their contribution from a medical diagnosis of the Complainant to one which sought to have an impact on my deliberations. This contribution is significant as will be pointed out later regarding the submission of a document/medical note versus evidence given under oath.  The GP stated that she felt the Complainant had suffered significant anxiety and emotional distress and that this anxiety was characterised by excessive worrying which impaired concentration and he had difficulties with decision making. She also stated that the sudden loss of his Father in law on August 13th 2024 contributed to his lack of ability to manage administrative tasks.

The 4 causes included in the Complainants request for an extension of time were;

1.    “Misunderstanding of the Notice in Lieu;

 When my employer terminated my employment, they stated that they were giving me notice of three months' which would be paid in lieu. I interpreted this as meaning my official termination date was three months later, at the end of the notice period, and that I had additional time to submit my complaint. This misunderstanding of the notice directly contributed to the delay in my submission.

2.    Dyslexia and Communication Barriers;

 I have dyslexia, which was noted in my initial letter of complaint. My condition makes it more difficult for me to process and interpret written communications, including the terms of my dismissal. This further contributed to my misunderstanding of the termination date and my failure to submit the complaint on time.

3.    Emotional Distress, Impaired Concentration, and Decision-Making;

The unexpected nature of my dismissal caused significant anxiety, emotional distress, and impaired my concentration and decision-making abilities during this period. These challenges were compounded by personal circumstances, including the passing of my father-in-law on 13 August, which added to the emotional burden I was experiencing at the time. These mental health challenges are supported by a letter from my doctor, which confirms the emotional distress and its impact on my ability to process decisions during the relevant period.

4.    Action After Realising the Deadline;

 Once I became aware of the urgency of submitting my complaint, I acted promptly to ensure it was filed. It has always been my intention to pursue this matter, and I respectfully ask the WRC to consider the exceptional circumstances that delayed my submission.”

At the Hearing on May 22nd 2025 the Complainant represented himself and was asked to give his grounds for reasonable cause which equated to the above. The Complainant stated he needed clear instructions from the Adjudicator as to what he had to do following the Respondents submission and their seeking of evidence to support the Complainants request for an extension of time. The Complainant was put on notice by the Respondent that they would be seeking the Adjudicator to subpoena Dr. X to give evidence under oath and be cross examined about her diagnosis of the Complainant and why it contributed to her view he had reasonable cause for an extension of time. The Complainant advised the Hearing he would be engaging a legal Representative.

 In response to both parties positions the Adjudicator requested the Respondent to set out in writing for the Complainant  and his Representative (who was to be appointed) what queries they had in connection with this request for reasonable cause and they wrote to the Complainant dated May 28th 2028 as follows;

“We refer to the above matter and the hearing of 22 May last, in which the Adjudication Officer directed that we should set out in writing to you the documentation we have requested that you provide. We therefore request that you provide the following documentation as soon as possible and in any event, prior to the next hearing date:

Confirmation of the number of times you visited Dr X  in relation to the alleged cognitive difficulties between your termination date of 28 March 2024 and the date of your complaint submission, 19 November 2024;

Confirmation of the medications, if any, that were prescribed to you by Dr X during this period of time;

A medical report confirming a diagnosis of dyslexia;

Confirmation of all dates and times on which you brought your dyslexia diagnosis to the attention of the Respondent, as well as any and all occasions where you requested reasonable accommodations from the Respondent;

 Notification of having engaged legal representation once you have done so, and who you have engaged.”

The Complainant Solicitor wrote to the WRC on July 8th as follows “;

1.                  Confirmation of the number of times Mr. A visited Dr. X will be provided along with his prescription or medication details in a medical note from the doctor prior to the hearing;

2.                  The appellant is prepared to request the medical report from specialist subject to Respondent bears or provide undertaking to reimburse the invoice of the GP and specialist;

3.                  Appellant confirmed that the employer was notified at the interview stage regarding his medical condition; and

4.                  Notification of legal representation / letter of authority is attached with this letter for the immediate attention of the WRC and Respondents”

By letter date  25 July 2025  the Respondent Representative replied as follows;

“For the benefit of the complainant’s legal representatives, who were not present at the first hearing, the Adjudication Officer, Mr Peter O’Brien, directed that the complainant provides the information sought at hearing, which Mr O’Brien asked this office to put in writing to the complainant. 

It is unclear why the complainant is unable to provide the information in respect of his attendance with his GP and what medication he was prescribed at that time. This would appear to be information which could readily be obtained by the complainant. 

In relation to the medical report, the respondent is not prepared to cover the cost of a specialist report or GP fees. The complainant has asserted that he is dyslexic, and the onus is on the complainant to provide evidence in respect of his own assertions. 

We look forward to receipt of information in relation to the complainant’s attendance with his GP during the relevant dates, confirmation of any medication prescribed, if any, to deal with the difficulties the complainant asserts he had during the relevant period and, information to attest to the complainant’s purported dyslexia diagnosis.” 

Following this letter the Complainant Representative submitted a note from the GP; dated 5/8/2025 which stated the Complainant visited the GP Clinic on ;

22nd April 2024

10th June 2024

30th August 2024 and

1st November 2024

and stated that he had not been prescribed medication and that he was advised regarding non medical supports and that “incidentally he is suffering from dyslexia”.

On August 13th the Complainant Representative set out the following;

“Applicable Law

 Pursuant  to  Section  77(5)  of  the Employment  Equality Act 1998 ,  a  complaint  must  be  lodged  within  six  months  of  the  alleged  discriminatory  act.  This period  may be extended to twelve months where  the Director is satisfied that there is  reasonable cause  for the delay.

 The present complaint was lodged outside the six-month statutory limit due to:

●     The conduct of the employer;

●     The Complainant’s medical condition (recognised in law as a disability); and

●     The absence of legal representation.

 We respectfully  request that the  Workplace  Relations  Commission  (“WRC”)  exercise  its  statutory  discretion to accept the complaint out of time.

Reasons for Delay

 The delay in filing arose from:

1.      Employer Conduct — Continuous harassment, intimidation, and toxic work environment.

2.      Medical Condition — The Complainant’s disability impaired his capacity to act promptly.

3.      Lack of  Legal Representation  — — The Complainant did  not have access  to  legal  advice  at  the  material time.

4.      Fear of Retribution — Genuine apprehension of further victimisation or job loss.

5.      Ongoing Engagement  with Employer — — Attempts to to resolve matters  internally  delayed  formal proceedings.

 The complaint was due by  28 August 2024  but was filed approximately 1 month and 25 days late .

Legal Authority and Precedent

●     Burns  v.  Governor  of  Castlerea  Prison  [2009]  IESC  33 :  The  Supreme  Court  held  that  while  legal  representation  in  internal  disciplinary  proceedings  is  the  exception,  it  should  be  permitted  where  fairness  requires  it.  In  this  case,  the  Complainant  was  denied  legal  representation despite his disability.

●     WRC Case ADJ-00030160 : The Commission accepted a late complaint where the delay was  due to a solicitor’s unavailability. In the present case, the Complainant was entirely without  legal representation.

 Given  these  authorities,  coupled  with  the  Complainant’s  medical  evidence,  the  delay  satisfies  the  “reasonable cause” requirement under  Section 77(5)  of the 1998 Act.  

 In  the  circumstances,  it  would  be  manifestly  unjust  to  reject  or  dismiss  this  complaint  on  technical  grounds  of  delay.  We  therefore  respectfully  request  that  the  WRC  accept  the  complaint  for  adjudication.

 We  have  attached  herewith  the  following  evidence,  as  per  our  instructions  some  of  them  have  already  been submitted by the applicant in the past:-

 1.  GP  letter  dated  12.05.2025,  to  confirm  that  the  letter  dated  5.12.2025  based  on  his  professional  assessment.

2. GP letter dated 5.8.2025 confirmed the visits/appointments between March to November 2024;

3. Further documentary evidence prior to the hearing; and

4. Any materials required by the Respondent’s disclosure requests.”

The Legal Representative stated that the Complainant would only “request the medical report from specialist subject to Respondent bears or provide undertaking to reimburse the invoice of the GP and specialist;”.  In replying correspondence the Respondent refused this and stated it was a matter for the Complainant to pay for any costs to support his submission for an extension of time. In further correspondence, supplied through the Complainant Solicitor,  the GP advised she would not see her attendance at a Hearing as necessary.  

In this case.  

Where there is a long delay in lodging a complaint, the Complainant is under a greater onus to prove reasonable cause. As set out in Cementation Skanksa a short delay may require only a slight explanation whereas a long delay may require more cogent reasons to explain why the Complainant was prevented from lodging a complaint within the six-month time limit set out in the Act. It is important to note that each request for an extension of time is assessed on the merit of that request and no set formula applies to making the Decision to grant and extension of time or not. In the Adjudicators judgment no mention of any cause of delay was mentioned when the initial complaint was submitted and it was only when the WRC notified the Complainant of the situation did he supply a medical reason for the delay. The Respondent, in the circumstances wanted to test this in evidence and were denied the opportunity by the Complainant failing to pay for the GPs attendance at a Hearing.to give her evidence of the Complainants state of mind or his refusal to supply a medical assessment of his disability unless the Respondent paid for it. The Complainants Representative  set out his position on the attendance of his GP as follows;

“The respondent’s request to cross-examine my GP is disproportionate and procedurally unnecessary. Dr.X’s letter of 5 December 2024 is clear and professional. The respondent has submitted no contradictory medical opinion and has not identified any factual inaccuracy. Dr. X  has since confirmed in a follow-up letter dated 12 May 2025 that her original opinion remains unchanged. She further states that, unless additional clinical questions arise, she does not consider her attendance at the WRC hearing necessary. This updated letter is exhibited with my affidavit. Requiring a GP to attend for cross-examination in respect of a brief medical letter would place undue burden on public health resources, particularly where no genuine dispute exists.”

Since the Supreme Court ruling, Zalewski v Ireland and the WRC [2021] IESC 24 on the 6th of April 2021 the requirement in how an Adjudicator deals with WRC complaints has changed drastically. The primary way any evidence is gathered at a WRC Hearing is through the oral evidence given, under oath or affirmation, by the Witnesses. This evidence is subject to and tested under cross examination. This is the primary source of evidence which the Adjudicator relies on and the provision of a document (in this case the medical opinion offered by the GP) is admissible as a document but it is not evidence. The Respondent sought to examine the GP on her medical assessment and the GP offered the view she had no more to add to her original letter. This would mean that the medical letter has reduced value in the context of my investigation and the greater weight would be given to any oral evidence and cross examination on it, which was denied to the Respondent.

The Complainant received a dismissal letter that stated his dismissal was with immediate effect. His suggestion her did not understand the date of dismissal is not accepted as it was crystal clear in the letter.

I see no justification in the Complainant stating there was or could be “Continuous harassment, intimidation, and toxic work environment” as there was no ongoing engagement with the Employer. No evidence was supplied to the Hearing that could be equated to a fear of retribution.

The Complainant alleged that the unfortunate death of his Father in Law on August 13th 2024 impacted his ability  to submit the complaints on time. While I sympathise with the death of his Father in Law, this does not explain why the compliant was not submitted in the almost five months since the Complainant was dismissed to the unfortunate death of his Father in Law..

With regard to the engagement of a Legal Representative the Complainant was notified in writing on November 26th 2024 by the WRC that there was an issue with his complaint being out of time. The Complainant attended the Hearing on May 22nd 2025 without any legal representation (which is his entitlement), some 6 months after being notified there was a serious issue with regard to the admissibility of his complaints. At the Hearing the objection to the complaint being out of time was made by the Respondent and the situation was explained fully by the Adjudicator to the Complainant, as it would in any similar circumstance. The Complainant is a professional employee and appears to have chosen to deal with the matter without legal representation until such time, as he it appears, he fully understood the requirements he had to comply with regarding seeking an approval of an extension of time, as put forward by the Respondent. He was not denied representation or a representative was not available to him (as per his Representative case precedents submitted above) and the ground regarding lack of legal representation does not have merit in this case.

It is well settled that an application for an extension of time must both explain the delay and provide a justifiable excuse for the delay. While the reasons submitted by the Complainant in this case may attempt to explain the delay, the Adjudicator finds that they do not afford a justifiable excuse for the delay and key to my Decision is the fact that there was no change suggested by the GP or the Complainant in the Complainants medical circumstances before the six months time limit and the actual date he submitted the complaint. Therefore the medical ground suggested cannot be a factor in the delay as it was continuing during the six month period after dismissal and present at the time the complaint was submitted (he attended the GP on November 4th 2024) .  Secondly, the Complainants position regarding the right of the Respondent, arising from the legislation post  the Supreme Court Decision in Zalewski, their request to cross examine the medical evidence supplied in support of the Complainants application for an extension of time is also key.  In addition, the Complainant exhibited knowledge of employment law when submitting his complaint, only got medical input for the case (and this was supported by the GP stating his condition should be considered for reasonable grounds suggesting the Complainant had set out for the GP exactly why he needed the medical assessment) when he became aware his complaints were out of time, lack of knowledge of the law is not a legitimate reason for reasonable cause, the Complainant was not on medication which could impair his decision making, only engaged a legal Representative some 15 months after he was dismissed and crucially, I see no explanation from the GP of any change (improvement) in the Complainants medical condition on the date he submitted his complaint compared to any time prior to the six months ending after his dismissal.. The issue of whether the Complainant had dyslexia or not was not put to the test and the Respondent was willing to give evidence it was not disclosed to them and the Complainant was not willing to pay for a medical assessment. The Respondent stated they were not informed about this condition at the Complainants initial job interview and questioned the Complainants account that he had notified the Respondent of the medical condition and I note that the Complainant had never appeared to raise the condition whilst employed (he suggested he only raised it at interview) or, it appears, sought any accommodation whilst employed for the condition. It does not make sense then that it could be a factor in influencing the date he submitted his complaint if had not effect on him whist employed.

The Adjudicator finds that the reasons provided by the Complainant are not sufficient to demonstrate reasonable cause for the delay in filing his complaints with the WRC. Therefore, the Adjudicator finds that the within complaints are out of time when they was presented to the Workplace Relations Commission and are accordingly statute barred. 

 For all the above reasons I do not grant the Complainants request for an extension of time. The Adjudicator cannot assume a jurisdiction which is not conferred to him. A failure on the part of a Complainant to present a complaint in time deprives the Adjudication Officer of jurisdiction to hear the claim. As a result, the Adjudicator finds that I have no jurisdiction to hear the complaint.

The Complainant requested that due to the disclosure of sensitive medical information regarding his condition that the Decision be anonymised. I have considered the medical information supplied and agreed to use my discretion to anonymise the decision due to the special circumstances presented.

Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the unfair dismissal claim consisting of a grant of redress in accordance with section 7 of the 1977 Act. The Adjudicator finds that the complaint is statue barred and I have no jurisdiction to hear the substantive complaint. CA-00067478-001

Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 82 of the Act. The Adjudicator finds that the complaint is statue barred and I have no jurisdiction to hear the substantive complaint. CA-00067478-002

Time Limits