Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Dawn  Kelly

Patrick Finlay t/a Slí Beatha Floathouse

Representatives

None

None

Act

Complaints Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967

CA-00077663-001

17/11/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00077677-002

17/11/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00077677-003

17/11/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00077677-004

17/11/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00077677-005

17/11/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00077677-006

17/11/2025

The Complainant commenced employment on 29 September 2020.  She worked an average of 26 hours per week over Thursday, Friday, Saturday and Sunday.  Her weekly pay was €394.87 (gross)/€347(net).  She claims the Respondent had no right to place her on layoff or short-time as there was no provision or agreement with respect to same.  She claims her position became redundant in October or November 2025 and that she is entitled to a redundancy payment.  She also alleges several breaches of her statutory employment rights.  She commenced employment with another employer on 2 February 2026.  The Respondent refutes all claims and submits the Complainant resigned from her employment.

CA-00077663-001 - Complaint under the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967

On 27 September 2025 Mr Finlay told the Complainant that he may have to place her on layoff.  On 29 September 2025 the Complainant told Mr Finlay that layoff was not an option for her for financial reasons.  On 3 October 2025 the Complainant was given written notice of layoff.  She was told that lay-off would continue until January 2026.  She was then informed that she was required to work on 23 and 24 October 2025.  On 21 October 2025 the Complainant went to Intreo to submit additional documents in relation to her claim for social welfare in respect of the layoff.  Intreo told her that she could not work the 23 and 24 October 2025 without that affecting the claim she had already made in respect to her layoff.  She informed Mr Finlay who told her he was changing her status from lay-off to short-time working.  The Complainant refused to work on 23 and 24 October 2025.  She  was not offered any further shifts.

The Complainant outlined that she was placed on lay-off at a time when work was available.  Mr Finlay continued to work himself and another employee was retained working their normal hours and also some of the Complainant’s hours.  This indicated to the Complainant that the layoff was not genuine and that hours of work still existed. 

The Complainant outlined that she subsequently discovered on 6 December 2025, after speaking to FLAC, that Mr Finlay had no right to place her on lay-off in the first place.  She disputed the lay-off from the outset and never accepted being placed on lay-off.  The Complainant posted the  RP9 Form to Mr Finlay on 7 November 2025 after four consecutive weeks of layoff.  Mr Finlay served counter notice on 12 November 2025, however, this counter notice was not valid as it did not offer a return to her normal hours of work.  Mr Finlay wrote to her to say that she would be returning to work 0-3 days per week “sometime in December”.  No date was specified for her return.  No guaranteed hours were offered.  There was no return to her normal working pattern.  Rather, Mr Finlay had proposed an indefinite period of short-time, which is the same scenario that gave rise to her right to claim a redundancy payment in the first place.  Bank holidays were also included in the proposed hours.  The Complainant outlined that she could not afford to return to the hours being proposed as they were below her normal hours of work.  This is why she argued that the counter-notice was not valid counter notice.  She asked what would happen if she refused this offer of short-time work and she was informed she would lose her entitlement to a redundancy payment. The Complainant contends that she was unlawfully denied her statutory redundancy payment.  She outlined that she had no option but to find another job.  She commenced employment with another company in February 2026.   

CA-00077677-002 - Complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

In October 2021, the Complainant brought it to Mr Finlay’s attention that she was not receiving the correct entitlement for public holidays.  This was immediately addressed.  However, the Complainant contends that she was not remunerated for public holidays between 29 September 2020 and October 2021.

CA-00077677-003 - Complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

The Complainant outlined that despite working for the Respondent for over five years, she never received a contract of employment.  In December 2025, the Respondent emailed a statement of terms of employment to her.   

CA-00077677-004 - Complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

The Complainant was required to close the premises at 9:30pm or 10:00pm on Fridays and, on alternate Saturdays, to reopen the premises at 8:00am the following morning.  Therefore, she did not get 11 hours consecutive rest on these days.  Only two persons opened on a Saturday – the Complainant or one other (named) employee.

CA-00077677-005 - Complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

The Complainant was normally rostered to work 6.5 hours on average on Thursday, Friday, Saturday and Sunday each week.  There were no official breaks during the working day.  As the Complainant mainly worked alone on shift, she could not take an uninterrupted break.  She was told to take breaks as and when the business allowed.  The Complainant was still required to answer calls and monitor the safety of clients using the float tank.  There was no designated area to take a break. The reception area was the only place to eat.  Any complimentary float sessions availed of by the Complainant occurred outside of working hours and were not undertaken during the course of the working day.  The kitchen facilities were limited to making tea and using a microwave.  There was no seating.  The Complainant refutes that she put calls through to Mr Finlay in order to take an uninterrupted break.

CA-00077677-006 - Complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

The Complainant outlined that she was never provided with payslips unless she asked for them.   

CA-00077663-001 - Complaint under the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967

The business was quiet and was experiencing financial difficulties.  Mr Finlay spoke to the Complainant to tell her that he needed to take measures to protect jobs and he discussed the possibility of layoff.  He asked the Complainant to go to Intreo and let him know if there were any concerns.  The Complainant worked until 10 October 2025 and requested confirmation of the lay-off so she could take a letter regarding same to Intreo.  She did not refuse to be placed on lay-off.  There was no objection to lay-off when it was confirmed in writing to her on 3 October 2025.  He told the Complainant that she would need to cover two shifts on 23 and 24 October 2025.  Intreo told the Complainant that she could not claim social welfare for lay-off and work occasional shifts.  Mr Finlay changed the situation to one of short-time so that the Complainant could work occasional shifts when these shifts became available.  The Complainant looked for a letter of cessation in September 2025, but this was refused as the job was not redundant. 

Mr Finlay arranged for a HR consultant to speak to staff but before this meeting took place the Complainant submitted an RP9 Form.  He countered this notice and offered the Complainant hours which exceeded short-time.  He was doing his best to get staff back to work but the Complainant refused to return to work.  This left the business in a precarious position with insufficient staff especially as work had resumed as normal by January 2026.  Mr Finlay outlined that he just needed to get through November and December.  He thought he had a great relationship with his staff.  He fully expected business to resume as normal in January 2026, which it did.  It is trading as normal since this time.  There was work for the Complainant albeit on a short-time basis for the months of November and December, with an assurance of normal hours resuming in January 2026.  The Complainant’s position is not and was never redundant.  Had the Complainant agreed to the short-time hours offered, there would have been no issue, and she would be back at work as normal now.  A replacement was found for the Complainant after she resigned in February 2026.  The business is trading as normal now with the same number of staff as before this issue first arose.

CA-00077677-002 - Complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

Any anomalies in relation to payment for public holidays was rectified.

CA-00077677-003 - Complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

Mr Finlay outlined that he accepts that a contract of employment was not issued until December 2025.  However, at no time during the Complainant’s employment did she raise this issue.  Had she done so it would have been immediately rectified.

CA-00077677-004 - Complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

Mr Finlay accepts that there may have been an odd occasion when the Complainant got 10.5 hours consecutive rest as opposed to 11 hours consecutive rest.  While it is accepted the Complainant worked Friday nights, she did not open every Saturday.  This was shared between 3 or 4 people.  The business operated on a trust basis and was extremely flexible and accommodating of staff availability and needs.  In 10 years of operating there was never a complaint from an employee.  It was a lovely place to work and staff were very happy.

CA-00077677-005 - Complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

Mr Finlay outlined that it was not true to say the Complainant did not receive an uninterrupted break as calls were put through to him.  Only 3 to 4 floats were booked per day to allow staff time to take a break.  The Complainant frequently left the premises for breaks, took smoking breaks every hour, and also availed of float sessions herself during the working day. There was a room for staff to take breaks and a kitchen area.  While breaks were not formally recorded, this has since been rectified.  Mr Finlay outlined that while he accepts it is the responsibility of the Respondent to record breaks, the Complainant never brought it to his attention that she was unable to avail of her statutory breaks.  The business was quiet so there was plenty of time to avail of breaks.

CA-00077677-006 - Complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

Mr Finlay outlined that payslips were always available on request.

CA-00077663-001 - Complaint under the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967

Relevant Law

Section 11 of the 1967 Act provides:

“(1) Where an employee’s employment ceases by reason of his employer’s being unable to provide the work for which the employee was employed to do, and— (a) it is reasonable in the circumstances for that employer to believe that the cessation of employment will not be permanent, and (b) the employer gives notice to that effect to the employee prior to the cessation, that cessation of employment shall be regarded for the purposes of this Act as lay off.

(2) Where—

(a) for any week an employee’s remuneration is less than one-half of his normal weekly remuneration or his hours of work are reduced to less than one-half of his normal weekly hours,

(b) the reduction in remuneration or hours of work is caused by a diminution either in the work provided for the employee by his employer or in other work of a kind which under his contract the employee is employed to do.

(c) it is reasonable in the circumstances for the employer to believe that the diminution in work will not be permanent and he gives notice to that effect to the employee prior to the reduction in remuneration or hours of work,

the employee shall, for the purposes of this Part, be taken to be kept on short-time for that week.”

(Emphasis added)

Section 12 of the 1967 Act provides:

“(1) An employee shall not be entitled to redundancy payment by reason of having been laid off or kept on short-time unless—

(a) he has been laid off or kept on short-time for four or more consecutive weeks or, within a period of thirteen weeks, for a series of six or more weeks of which not more than three were consecutive, and

(b) after the expiry of the relevant period of lay-off or short-time mentioned in paragraph (a) and not later than four weeks after the cessation of the lay off or short-time, he gives to his employer notice (in this Part referred to as a notice of intention to claim) in writing of his intention to claim redundancy payment in respect of lay-off or short-time . . . ”

Section 13 of the 1967 Act provides:

“(1) Subject to subsection (2), an employee shall not be entitled to a redundancy payment in pursuance of a notice of intention to claim if, on the date of service of that notice, it was reasonably to be expected that the employee (if he continued to be employed by the same employer) would, not later than four weeks after that date, enter upon a period of employment of not less than thirteen weeks during which he would not be laid off or kept on short-time for any week.

(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply unless, within seven days after the service of the notice of intention to claim, the employer gives to the employee notice (in this Part referred to as a counter-notice) in writing that he will contest any liability to pay to him a redundancy payment in pursuance of the notice of intention to claim.

(3) If, in a case where an employee gives notice of intention to claim and the employer gives a counter-notice, the employee continues or has continued, during the next four weeks after the date of service of the notice of intention to claim, to be employed by the same employer, and he is or has been laid off or kept on short-time for each of those weeks, it shall be conclusively presumed that the condition specified in subsection (1) was not fulfilled.

(4) For the purposes of section 12 and for the purposes of subsection (3)—

(a) it is immaterial whether a series of weeks (whether it is four weeks, or four or more weeks, or six or more weeks) consists wholly of weeks for which the employee is laid off or wholly of weeks for which he is kept on short-time or partly of the one and partly of the other;

(b) no account shall be taken of any week for which an employee is laid off or kept on short-time where the lay-off or short-time is wholly or mainly attributable to a strike or a lock-out, whether the strike or lock-out is in the trade or industry in which the employee is employed or not and whether it is in the State or elsewhere.”

Findings

The Complainant outlined in her oral evidence that at the time she was placed on lay-off and or short-time working, she was unaware that the Respondent had no contractual entitlement to impose such arrangements.  Accordingly, she submits that she was entitled to a statutory redundancy payment from that point.  She asked Mr Finlay for a letter of cessation of employment on 29 September 2025; however, this request was refused and she was told she was being placed on lay-off with effect from 10 October 2025.  The Complainant proceeded to apply for social welfare on the basis that she had been placed on lay-off from that date. 

I am satisfied that placing an employee on lay-off without an express contractual provision, established custom and practice, or by agreement may be a breach of contract and or may give rise to other statutory claims depending on the circumstances, but it does not automatically entitle the employee to a redundancy payment as contended for by the Complainant.  This complaint has been brought under the 1967 Act.  Sections 12 and 13 of the 1967 Act expressly state that an employee is not entitled to a redundancy payment by reason of having been laid off or kept on short-time unless certain conditions as set out under each of those sections have been satisfied.  The 1967 Act does not require consideration of whether an employer was entitled to impose the lay-off or short-time working arrangement.

The Complainant further submitted that the lay-off and or short-time was not genuine.  The Complainant’s oral testimony was that she was placed on lay-off at a time when work was available.  As provided for at s. 11 of the 1967 Act, an essential feature of lay-off and or short-time is the employer’s belief that the employee will return to work and that the cessation of employment is not permanent.  Having considered the evidence presented at the hearing, I am satisfied, on an objective basis, that the Respondent held a reasonable belief that the lay-off and or short-time working arrangements were temporary in nature. I am also satisfied that the initial notice of lay-off rather than short-time working, together with later roster adjustments to ensure the Complainant worked in excess of half her normal hours, resulted from a misunderstanding of the meaning of lay-off and short-time rather than an absence of a genuine temporary requirement for these arrangements. 

The Complainant further contends that she is entitled to a redundancy payment following the service of her notice claiming such payment, which was served on the Respondent on 12 November 2025 by way of an RP9 Form, on the basis that the Respondent’s counter-notice, served on the Complainant on 12 November 2025 by way of an RP9 Form, was invalid.

It is common case the Complainant was placed on lay-off from 10 October 2025.  On 21 October 2025, Mr Finlay changed the arrangement to short-time.  The Complainant wrote to Mr Finlay stating that he had no right to place her on short-time.  She refused to work any hours because it would invalidate her social welfare claim which she had already commenced on the basis that she was on lay-off.  Lay-off provided her with greater financial certainty at a time when she had her own financial commitments to meet.  As a result, by not accepting any work, she effectively remained on lay-off.  The Complainant waited until the 4-week period provided for at s. 12(1)(a) of the 1967 Act elapsed.  She then served notice of her intention to claim a redundancy payment.  It is not in dispute the Complainant met the requirements of s. 12 of the 1967 Act. 

It is common case Mr Finlay served counter-notice on 12 November 2025 and that this counter-notice was issued in accordance with the requirements set out at s. 13(2) of the 1967 Act.

The Complainant contends the counter-notice did not meet the requirements of s. 13(1) of the 1967 Act as: (i) she was not offered a return to normal hours of work; (ii) there was no definite date of return to normal hours of work; (iii) public holidays were incorrectly included as hours of work; and (iv) the Respondent proposed indefinite short-time.  Thus, a further question that falls to be determined in this complaint relates to the proper interpretation of s. 13(1) of the 1967 Act and specifically whether the counter-notice served by the Respondent meets the requirements of s. 13(1) of the 1967 Act. 

For the reasons set out below, I am satisfied that the counter-notice issued to the Complainant by the Respondent was in compliance with s. 13(1) of the 1967 Act, and therefore I find the Complainant is not entitled to a redundancy payment. 

In cases of lay‑off or short-time working, the 1967 Act seeks to strike a balance between an employee’s right to claim a redundancy payment and an employer’s need to retain employees where the interruption to work is reasonably expected to be temporary.  Section 13 of the 1967 Act concerns the right of the employer to give counter-notice following an employee’s notice of intention to claim a redundancy payment following lay-off or short-time or a combination of both.  Section 13(1) of the 1967 Act provides that an employee is not entitled to a redundancy payment if on the date of service of that notice, it was reasonably to be expected that, not later than four weeksafter that date, work would resume for a period of at least 13 continuous weeks without the employee being laid off or put on short‑time in any week during that 13-week period.  The Complainant’s oral testimony was that she posted the RP9 Form on Friday 7 November 2025.  It was Mr Finlay’s evidence that it was received by him on Wednesday 12 November 2025.  Accordingly, I am satisfied that the RP9 Form was served on the Respondent on 12 November 2025 and therefore, the question is whether, on 12 November 2025, it was reasonably to be expected that the Complainant would, by no later than 10 December 2025, enter upon a period of at least 13 weeks' continuous employment during which she would not be laid off or kept on short-time in any week of that 13 week period.

The Complainant elected to use an RP9 Form to give notice of an intention to claim a redundancy payment, and the Respondent, in turn, issued its counter-notice using the same RP9 Form.  While an RP9 Form is not a statutory form, it is an official administrative form created by the Department of Enterprise, Tourism and Employment to operate the statutory redundancy scheme in practice.  Mr Finlay completed and signed Part C of the form as follows:  “I contest any liability to pay you a Redundancy Lump Sum on the grounds that it is reasonable to expect that within four weeks of the date of service of your notice, namely, 12 November 2025, you will enter upon a period of employment of not less than thirteen weeks during which you will not be on lay off or short time any week” (my emphasis). I am satisfied that, by completing the RP9 Form, the Respondent provided a clear and unequivocal assurance that work would recommence within 4 weeks for a period of not less than 13 weeks during which the Complainant would not be laid off or placed on short-time within the meaning of the 1967 Act. 

On 26 November 2025 Mr Finlay wrote to the Complainant stating: “I am now in a position to bring you back from layoff and to resume offering work.  We are beginning the gradual return to operations in December, with the intention of restoring normal weekly hours from January onwards as business levels continue to improve”.  Mr Finlay then set out the Complainant’s days and hours of work commencing 10 December 2025.  These hours were modified by Mr Finlay on 3rd and 9th December 2025 following emails from the Complainant.  I accept the submission of Mr Finlay that s. 13(1) of the 1967 Act does not require that exact hours be fixed at the point of service of the counter notice.  Accordingly, I find there was nothing prohibiting Mr Finlay providing a roster of hours subsequent to the serving of the Complainant’s intention to claim, provided the Complainant resumed work on or before 10 December 2025 and was not placed on lay-off or short-time in any week of the 13-week period that followed.

I am satisfied that s. 13(1) of the 1967 Act does not require a period of employment of not less than 13 weeks of “normal” employment as contended for by the Complainant.  There is no reference to ‘normal’ or contractual hours in s. 13(1).  On a plain reading of s. 13(1), it requires that there is no lay-off or short-time in any of those 13 weeks.  ‘Short-time’ has a specific definition for the purposes of the 1967 Act.  It is defined at s. 11(2) of the 1967 Act as referring to a temporary situation where in any week an employee’s remuneration is less than one-half of their normal weekly remuneration or their hours of work are reduced to less than one-half of their normal weekly hours.  The hours of work and or remuneration proposed for the 13-week period of employment (and beyond), as communicated to the Complainant on 9 December 2025, although below her usual hours and or remuneration for the first 3 weeks of the 13-week period, were nonetheless more than half of her normal working hours and or remuneration.  The Complainant was assured of her normal hours from 2 January 2026 onwards. 

I am satisfied there is nothing to preclude an employer counting a public holiday for the purposes of satisfying the requirements of s. 13(1) of the 1967 Act.  Section 11(2), in defining ‘short-time’ for the purposes of the 1967 Act, refers to “remuneration” or “hours”.  While the 1967 Act does not define remuneration for the purposes of s. 13 of the 1967 Act, I am satisfied that holiday pay is generally regarded as remuneration for most employment statutes (for example, “wages” for the purposes of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991, and comes within the meaning of remuneration as  being “any consideration” as defined within the Employment Equality Act, 1998 and the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act, 1994).  Further, the Complainant was rostered to work the relevant public holidays that fell within the first few weeks of the 13-week period. As each of those public holidays fell on her normal working days, she would have worked them had the business not been closed on those days. 

I do not accept the Complainant’s contention that the counter notice was invalid because there was no definite date of return.  Firstly, there was a definite date of return, namely, 10 December 2025.  Second, as noted above, there is no requirement on the employer to give a definite date of return to ‘normal’ work.  The requirement is that the employee not be placed on lay-off or short-time in any week within that 13-week period. In any event, the Respondent did give a definite date of resumption of normal working as the Complainant was informed that she would return to working her normal hours after 1 January 2026.  Further, given there was a definite date given for the resumption of her normal hours of work, I do not accept the Complainant’s contention that the proposed hours of work from 10 December 2025 to 1 January 2026 inclusive equated to “indefinite short-time”. 

In conclusion, taking all the foregoing into consideration, I am satisfied that on 12 November 2025, it was reasonably to be expected, that the Complainant would, by the 10 December 2025 (the date the four week period provided for at s. 13(1) would have expired), enter a period of employment of not less than 13 weeks during which she would not be laid off or kept on short-time for any of those weeks.  Accordingly, I am satisfied the Respondent met the requirements of s. 13(1) of the 1967 Act so as to disentitle the Complainant to a redundancy payment within the cognisable period for this appeal.  I am also satisfied that s. 13(3) of the 1967 Act does not apply in this case as the section only applies if the Complainant remained on lay-off or on short-time for the entirety of the four-week period ending on 10 December 2025.  As she was rostered to return to work on 10 December 2025, she was not on lay-off for the entirety of the 4th week.  The Complainant refused to return to work on 10 December 2025 despite work being available for her.

Accordingly, in circumstances where I am satisfied that the counter-notice issued to the Complainant by the Respondent was in compliance with s. 13 of the 1967 Act, I find the Complainant is not entitled to a redundancy payment and accordingly, I disallow the Complainant’s appeal.

CA-00077677-002 - Complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

This complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 was presented to the WRC on 17 November 2025.  The WRC’s jurisdiction is confined to assessing contraventions that may have occurred in the six-month period prior to that date.  The period for consideration is therefore limited to 18 May 2025 to 17 November 2025. 

This complaint concerned public holiday entitlements between 2020 and 2021 and is therefore outside the cognisable period for the complaint.  Accordingly, I find I do not have jurisdiction to inquire into this complaint. 

CA-00077677-003 - Complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

This complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 (“the 1994 Act”) was  presented to the WRC on 17 November 2025.  The WRC’s jurisdiction is confined to assessing contraventions that may have occurred in the six-month period prior to that date.  The period for consideration is therefore limited to 18 May 2025 to 30 October 2025.  However, it is well established that where an employee does not receive the statements provided for at s. 3 of the 1994 Act, they suffer a subsisting breach of their statutory rights until the statements are provided (or their employment ends).

Section 3 of the 1994 Act provides:

“(1) An employer shall, not later than one month after the commencement of an employee’s employment with the employer, give or cause to be given to the employee a statement in writing containing the following particulars of the terms of the employee’s employment . . . 

(1A) Without prejudice to subsection (1), an employer shall, not later than 5 days after the commencement of an employee’s employment with the employer, give or cause to be given to the employee a statement in writing containing the following particulars of the terms of the employee’s employment . . .

Section 7 (2) of the Act provides:

“(2) A decision of an adjudication officer under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 in relation to a complaint of a contravention of section 3, 4, 5, 6, 6C, 6D, 6E, 6F or 6G, shall do one or more of the following, namely—

(a) declare that the complaint was or, as the case may be, was not well founded,

(b) either—

(i) confirm all or any of the particulars contained or referred to in any statement furnished by the employer under  section 3, 4, 5, 6, 6C, 6D, 6E, 6F or 6G, or

(ii) alter or add to any such statement for the purpose of correcting any inaccuracy or omission in the statement and the statement as so altered or added to shall be deemed to have been given to the employee by the employer,

(c) require the employer to give or cause to be given to the employee concerned a written statement containing such particulars as may be specified by the adjudication officer,

(d) in relation to a complaint of a contravention under change section 3, 4, 5, 6, 6D, 6E, 6F, or 6G, and without prejudice to any order made under paragraph (e) order the employer to pay to the employee compensation of such amount (if any) as the adjudication officer considers just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances, but not exceeding 4 weeks’ remuneration in respect of the employee’s employment calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977.

(e) in relation to a complaint of a contravention under section 6C, and without prejudice to any order made under paragraph (d), order the employer to pay to the employee compensation of such amount (if any) as the adjudication officer considers just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances, but not exceeding 4 weeks’ remuneration in respect of the employee’s employment calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977.”

It is not in dispute that the Complainant was not in possession of the statements provided for under s. 3 of the 1994 Act at the time she referred her complaint to the WRC.  Therefore, I am satisfied the Respondent contravened s. 3 of the 1994 Act.  Accordingly, I find this complaint is well founded.  The Complainant received a statement of terms in December 2025.

In accordance with s 7(2) of the 1994 Act, I award the maximum compensation of 4 weeks remuneration, which I consider just and equitable in the circumstances, as the Complainant was without a statement of terms of employment for several years.  I order the Respondent to pay to the Complainant compensation of €1,579.48 (which represents 4 weeks gross remuneration).

CA-00077677-004 - Complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

This complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 (“the 1997 Act”) was presented to the WRC on 17 November 2025.  The WRC’s jurisdiction is confined to assessing contraventions that may have occurred in the six-month period prior to that date.  The period for consideration is therefore limited to 18 May 2025 to 17 November 2025.  

Section 11 of the 1997 Act provides:

“An employee shall be entitled to a rest period of not less than 11 consecutive hours in each period of 24 hours during which he or she works for his or her employer.”

Section 27(3) of the 1997 Act provides:

“A decision of an adjudication officer under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 in relation to a complaint of a contravention of a relevant provision shall do one or more of the following, namely:

(a) declare that the complaint was or, as the case may be, was not well founded,

(b) require the employer to comply with the relevant provision,

(c) require the employer to pay to the employee compensation of such amount (if any) as is just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances, but not exceeding 2 years’ remuneration in respect of the employee’s employment.”

Mr Finlay acknowledged that on occasion the Complainant may have received 10.5 hours consecutive rest as opposed to 11 hours consecutive rest following her Friday night shift.  The Complainant was unable to identify the dates on which she did not get 11 hours rest; however, it was her sworn evidence that this occurred twice a month during the cognisable period.  Mr Finlay outlined that the Complainant had the flexibility to vary her start and finish times to ensure she got 11 hours consecutive rest, however, no evidence was opened to the hearing to support this contention.  He acknowledged that at the time of the referral of the complaint to the WRC, there was no formal recording of working hours.  The burden of proving compliance with the 1997 Act rests with the employer. 

Considering all the foregoing, I find this complaint under the 1997 Act is well founded and I require the Respondent to pay to the Complainant compensation of €550 which I consider is just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances.

CA-00077677-005 - Complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

Section 12 of the 1997 Act provides:

“(1) An employer shall not require an employee to work for a period of more than 4 hours and 30 minutes without allowing him or her a break of at least 15 minutes.

(2) An employer shall not require an employee to work for a period of more than 6 hours without allowing him or her a break of at least 30 minutes; such a break may include the break referred to in subsection (1) . . . . ”

The Complainant outlined that she could not take an interrupted break as she worked alone on her shifts. The Complainant refuted that she was permitted to put calls through to Mr Finlay and that she used the float and sauna during working hours.  No evidence was opened to the hearing to support Mr Finlay’s contention that the Complainant put calls through to him in order to take an uninterrupted rest interval.  Further, no evidence was presented to the hearing to support Mr Finlay’s contention that the Complainant took extended breaks during the day to use the float and sauna services.  The Complainant did not contest Mr Finlay’s oral evidence that she took frequent smoke breaks during the day or Mr Finlay’s evidence that business was quiet during the cognisable period and that therefore there was plenty of time to take breaks.  However, the duration of such smoking or other breaks was unclear.  Mr Finlay acknowledged that at the time of the referral of the complaint to the WRC, there was no formal recording of rest breaks during the working day.  Accordingly, it is difficult for me to find that the Complainant got an uninterrupted rest interval of at least 15 minutes after 4.5 hours of work, and a second period of 15 minutes (or a 30-minute total rest interval) given her working day exceeded 6 hours.  The burden of proving compliance with the 1997 Act rests with the employer.  Accordingly, on balance, I accept the evidence of the Complainant that the Respondent breached s. 12 of the 1997 Act.

Considering all the foregoing, I find this complaint under the 1997 Act is well founded and I require the Respondent to pay to the Complainant compensation of €300 which I consider is just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances.

CA-00077677-006 - Complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

The Complainant stated that she was not routinely provided with payslips and only received them upon request. I am satisfied the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 does not impose an obligation on an employer to provide payslips, as that matter is governed by the Payment of Wages Act, 1991.  Furthermore, even if the complaint had been brought under the Payment of Wages Act, 1991, or if an application to amend the statutory basis of the complaint had been made, an Adjudication Officer has no jurisdiction under the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 to adjudicate upon an alleged failure to furnish payslips.  Accordingly, I find this complaint is misconceived.

CA-00077663-001 - Complaint under the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967

I decide to disallow this appeal under the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967.  

CA-00077677-002 - Complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

I decide I do not have jurisdiction to inquire into this complaint. 

CA-00077677-003 - Complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

I decide this complaint is well founded and I order the Respondent to pay to the Complainant compensation of €1,579.48 (which represents 4 weeks gross remuneration).

CA-00077677-004 - Complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

I decide this complaint is well founded and I require the Respondent to pay to the Complainant compensation of €550 which I consider is just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances.

CA-00077677-005 - Complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

I decide this complaint is well founded and I require the Respondent to pay to the Complainant compensation of €300 which I consider is just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances.

CA-00077677-006 - Complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

I decide this complaint is misconceived and is not well founded.

Public holidays.  Redundancy payment. Counter notice. Rest intervals. Daily rest. Statement of terms and conditions.