ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00064014
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Sven Strauss | Tiktok Ltd. |
Representatives |
| Kevin Bell B.L. instructed by A&L Goodbody LLP |
Complaint:
Act | Complaint Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973 | CA-00078024-001 | 27/11/2025 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 22/07/2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Pat Brady
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaint and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaint.
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
The Complainant’s written and oral evidence was as follows. On September 22nd, just about four weeks before the probation period end date, his Team Leader (TL) informed him that he needed to undergo an Informal Coaching Plan since some of his Key Performance Indicators did not match expectations and required improvement. He reassured the complainant that this was just to support him in reaching his targets, even though he only missed one. Nevertheless, he was given an additional goal, a specific metric that was neither mentioned in the project plan, nor required of his co-workers.
Over the following weeks they had meetings where figures were checked and it turned out that the only target he slightly underperformed before was reached. The only goal he did not reach was the newly added one.
On October 13th, his TL mentioned that his probation period was extended for three weeks until November 17th, as a result of the coaching plan. Neither was he informed about how he should react on this situation, nor was it given in writing to acknowledge that he received a full explanation.
October 27th was a Public Holiday and as his TL was on leave, there was no meeting. On November 10th, the ICP was finalised and his TL informed him that he had not reached the one specific goal and that a meeting with the HR Business Partner) would follow.
On November 12th, the meeting was scheduled. he prepared a presentation with all his achievements, and the reached targets. However, he was told his contract would be terminated. He argued against this and the meeting ended with the agreement to get together again the next day.
On November 13th, he was orally informed about the termination but did not receive a written notice.
OnNovember18th,hesentanemailtotheHRBPrequestingwrittennotice and also a written statement regarding the extension of the probation period. he did not receive any response and sent another email on November 25th,
Eventually, on November 26th, he received an email from DocuSign with the written notice of termination, backdated to November 14th. He is claiming the one month notice payment as per his contract. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
The complainant was employed as a Quality Insurance Specialist from April 28th, 2025, until the termination of his employment on November 14th, 2025. He received one week’s pay in lieu of notice upon the termination of his employment.
He has submitted a claim under the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act 1973 alleging that he did not receive all his rights during his notice period contrary to s.5 of that legislation.
In fact, he received his full statutory and contractual entitlement to pay in lieu of notice, and where his employment ceased immediately upon being given notice on November 14th, 2025, there was no notice period during which his rights could have been infringed.
The provisions of s.5 and the Second Schedule of the 1973 Act, therefore, have no application whatsoever to the complaint. In fact, his WRC complaint form dated 27 November 2025 does not identify even a single alleged breach of any provision of the 1973 Act.
It appears from the Complaint Form that he seeks to use these proceedings to agitate grievances regarding “the approach/procedure of his (former) employer regarding his dismissal”.
However, he is precluded from doing so as the scope of his action is confined to the provisions of the 1973 Act. Complaints regarding the fact and timing of the extension of his probation period are beyond the scope of the WRC complaint and do not properly arise in these proceedings.
A complaint that the written confirmation of his termination was delayed does not constitute a breach of any provision of the 1973 Act and therefore does not properly arise in the context of these proceedings. His attempt to assert an entitlement under his contract of employment to an enhanced notice payment of one month is misconceived in the context of a statutory complaint.
The complainant was in continuous service for less than two years and received one week’s pay in lieu of notice, in line both with the provisions of his contract of employment and with s.4(2)(a) of the 1973 Act quoted above.
Even if the Respondent had breached the Complainant’s contract of employment in respect of an enhanced entitlement to pay in lieu of notice, which is denied, such an allegation could not be litigated on foot of a statutory complaint brought under the exclusive aegis of the 1973 Act.
This position is supported by the decision of the Labour Court in Ringsend Community Services Forum Clg v Sueann Moore (Appeal of Adjudication Officer Decision No.: ADJ-00034982 (CA-00045756-004)). In that case, the complainant asserted an entitlement to a period of notice greater than her statutory entitlement by reference to her contract of employment. In rejecting that contention, the Labour Court confirmed that a complainant’s entitlement is to notice in accordance with the 1973 Act, holding as follows: “The Act contains no provision to increase a person’s entitlement to statutory notice having regard to their contract of employment. Therefore, the Court finds that the Complainant is entitled in accordance with the Act to four weeks paid notice.” Therefore, where no alleged breach of the 1973 Act has been identified in the Complaint Form, where the complainant received his full statutory and contractual entitlement to pay in lieu of notice and where his employment ceased immediately upon being given notice, the Respondent respectfully submits that the within action should be deemed not to be well-founded and dismissed |
Findings and Conclusions:
The facts in this case and the narrative leading to the termination of the complainant’s employment are not in dispute.
Specifically it is not in dispute that the complainant was given notice in writing, if somewhat delayed and paid the statutory entitlement to notice.
His argument at the hearing was that what he alleged to be a flaw in the giving of the notice resulted in his moving beyond probationary status and triggering a provision in his contract which would have entitled him to one month’s notice.
This is a quite different argument and, whatever its merits, it does not give rise to a valid complaint under this legislation.
The complainant did not dispute that he had been paid one week’s wages in lieu of notice having been given both oral and written notice of the termination of his employment.
Accordingly, complaint CA-00078024-001 is entirely misconceived and is not well founded. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint(s)/dispute(s) in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
Complaint CA-00078024-001 is not well founded |
Dated: 30 July 2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Pat Brady
Key Words:
Minimum Notice |