Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Richard  Buckley

Infosys Bpm

Representatives

Self-represented

Respondent senior legal Counsel

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Schedule 2 of the Protected Disclosures Act, 2014

CA-00068073-001

12/12/2024

The complainant has presented a complaint of a contravention of section 12(1) of the Protected Disclosures Acts 2014–2022 (“the PDA”)

The complainant was employed as customer service, technology support executive in the respondent’s company which offers technology support service for its clients.

The complainant was employed from 01/08/2022 until his resignation on 15/07/2024.

He earned €508 for a 40-hour week.

He submitted his complaint to the WRC on 12/12/2024.

The respondent maintains that the WRC lacks jurisdiction to hear this complaint based on two preliminary points. The respondent made this case both before and after hearing the complainant’s evidence.

The respondent requested that two preliminary points be addressed in the first instance and   that a decision should issue on these two points determining if the WRC has jurisdiction, and in the event that the adjudicator decides that the WRC do have jurisdiction to hear this complaint, a further hearing should, as a consequence, take place in which the respondent will provide witness evidence.

Preliminary Point 1.

Statutory time limits.

The respondent submits that the complainant has failed to meet the statutory time limits and the WRC, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to hear the complaint.

Preliminary Point 2

The complainant did not make any protected disclosures. The issues which he reported to his manager were remarks which were made not to him but to other individuals. None of those individuals made a complaint to their managers.

No relevant wrongdoing was reported.

The complainant reported a series of interpersonal grievances, workplace dissatisfaction, bullying allegations and HR-related complaints, none of which constitute “relevant wrongdoing” within the meaning of section .5 of the PDA.

The respondent submits that though the complaint is styled as a penalisation claim, the complainant does not identify any protected disclosure, nor does he allege that any act of penalisation occurred because of such a disclosure. Accordingly, the claim is misconceived, vexatious in form, and must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Statutory Framework

The respondent points to section 5 of the PDA, which requires that a protected disclosure must contain “relevant information” which, in the reasonable belief of the worker, tends to show “relevant wrongdoing” and must be communicated in accordance with the Act.

The list of “relevant wrongdoing”, includes criminal offences, breaches

of legal obligations (excluding contractual matters), danger to health and safety, misuse of public funds, gross mismanagement by a public body, and breaches of EU law.

The legislation and official guidance explicitly confirm that “workplace grievances which are exclusively personal” do not constitute relevant wrongdoing.

Th respondent asserts that the complaint discloses No “Relevant Wrongdoing” matching the list provided in section 5 of the PDA.

The complainant alleges:

• bullying;

• inappropriate comments;

• poor management;

• stressful environment;

• inadequate handling of medical-leave information;

• lack of HR responsiveness;

• departure from the company under stress.

None of these matters fall within any statutory category of wrongdoing under section 5(3)of the PDA.

 The alleged behaviour if true would fall within internal grievance, dignity-at-work, or

bullying/harassment policies. However, the PDA expressly excludes “exclusively personal

employment grievances” from its remit.

Legal Submission.

The respondent relies on Eiger Securities LLP v Korshunova [2017] ICR 561, a UK case, but has persuasive value and is cited by Irish decisions. It held that a worker must identify a legal obligation allegedly breached; a belief that conduct is “wrong”, “unfair”, “immoral”, or “undesirable” is insufficient.

The respondent also relies on Breban v Catch Security Systems [2025] IEHC 366

The High Court highlighted the increasing mischaracterisation of internal employment

complaints as “protected disclosures” and reaffirmed the centrality of s.5(1) to determining whether a matter falls within the PDA.

The complainant’s allegations in the instant case fall squarely within the category the Court warns against.

Conclusion

No “Disclosure” was made within the meaning of the Act

A valid protected disclosure must involve the communication of information tending to show wrongdoing, not simply the raising of concerns, dissatisfaction, or HR issues. 

The complainant’s emails described grievances, not disclosures.

To establish a PDA claim, the complainant must show that he suffered penalisation “for having made” a protected disclosure. The respondent submits that as no protected disclosure was made, the penalisation claim fails automatically.

There is no suggestion that any manager treated him adversely because he made a disclosure. His allegations are of:

• deteriorating team morale,

• poor management style,

• inadequate HR follow-up,

• stressful environment.

No penalisation of the complainant occurred.

The complaint is a personal grievance not a PDA Claim.

The WRC guidance makes clear that interpersonal conflicts, workplace culture complaints,

bonus disputes, HR errors, and performance-management concerns fall outside the PDA.

Accordingly, the WRC lacks jurisdiction under Schedule 2 PDA to hear this matte

Preliminary Point 1.

Statutory time limits.

The complainant submitted his complaint on the 12/12/2024.

He cited protected disclosures submitted to the employer on the 22 June 2022, 3 February 2023, August, 8/6/2024, 11/6/2024 and 12/6/2024.

The complainant represented himself

I explained the statutory time limits as per section 41 (6) and 41(8) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 within which a complainant must operate. I gave the complainant an opportunity to address in a further submission and on the basis of evidence submitted at the hearing why time should be extended as per section 41(8) of the Act of 2015.

The complainant’s original submission referenced his health issues.

The complaint made a submission post- hearing on 5/2/2026, which referred to the fact that he  had suffered from Stage 3 cancer, resulting in periods of medically certified absence from work, including surgery in December 2023, followed by after care and chemotherapy treatments and recovery time.

Preliminary Point 2

Evidence of Complainant given under affirmation.

The complainant states that his complaint concerned the health and safety of staff and is a protected disclosure.

Disclosure  No 1.

On 22 June 22 the complainant spoke with his then manager about issues of trans / hateful comments of an external person working in a live Teams chat with open reach, an external network supplier. Her conclusion was it was a 'cultural difference' and that he was over reacting.

 Disclosure No 2.

On 17/08/2022,  the complainant made a report to the training instructor in regard to the rights of transgender persons and disparaging comments made in a Teams chat about an American transgender media ‘celebrity’. This prompted the training instructor to enter the Teams chat, and she changed the subject without any mention of what he had reported to her. He found these remarks to be distressing. A member of staff participating in this chat was transitioning at that time.

Disclosure No 3.

On 3 February 2023, he made complaints to his team leader concerning a discussion on Microsoft Teams platform about an agent in another company as to whether this agent was male of female or both. He reported this discussion, which he maintains was a protected disclosure within the meaning of section 5 of the Act to his team leader who told him that he had misunderstood the discussion. The complainant ‘s complaint of penalisation is that nothing was done about his complaints.

Disclosure No 4.

On 6 or 7 June 2024, he witnessed questions raised in a group Teams chat as to whether a female colleague, 19- 24 years of age, engaged in sexual activities. The date of the disclosure of these comments was the 8/6/2024. When asked at the hearing by the adjudicator, the complainant advised that the recipient of these remarks made no complaint to the employer to convey if and how these remarks had harmed her.  His evidence was that she was distressed. He also was distressed.

The act of penalisation occurred 1- 2 days after this on 9 and 10 June. The penalisation was ignoring him and failing to engage with him on a one-to-one basis after he had made the disclosure.

Post Hearing submission of 5/2/2026.

I did give the complainant an opportunity to make a submission as to why I should accept that his reports to his employer enjoy the status of a protected disclosure within the meaning of section 5 of the PDA and to make out the case that he was penalised in terms of adverse treatment as contained in section 3 of the PDA. This of necessity required a consideration of the interpretation of the PDA put forward by the respondent and how he did not meet the requirements of the Act. His additional evidence is considered in my Findings and Conclusions.

The complainant asks that the Workplace Relations Commission:

1. Accept jurisdiction under the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended);

2. Find that he  made protected disclosures within the meaning of Section 5;

3. Find that he was subjected to penalisation contrary to Section 12;

4. Determine that he was constructively dismissed under Section 14(1);

5. Grant such redress as the Commission deems appropriate.

 Preliminary issues.

The complainant requests that I find his complaint of penalisation for having made a protected disclosure to be well founded, but in the first instance, I must decide on the preliminary jurisdictional points.

 In  Donal Gillespie and Donegal Meat Processors UD/20/135 the Labour Court dealt with a preliminary matter by expressing the view that in asking for the substantive issue and the jurisdictional issue to be dealt with together was “akin to asking the court to exercise its jurisdiction before it determines whether or not it has jurisdiction in the first instance.”

The Court decided to hear the preliminary matters in the first instance.

Preliminary Point 1.

Compliance with statutory time limits.

The respondent used the date of the 8/6/2024 which was the date of the disclosure to maintain that the complaint was out of time.

Section 41(6) of Workplace Relations Act provides as follows:

“Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates.”

It is the date of the contravention which in this case is the act of alleged penalisation from which time runs, and which determines whether the complaint has been lodged within the statutory time limits.

The complainant submitted his complaint to the WRC on the 12/12/2024. Subject to section 41(6), only instances of alleged penalisation occurring between the 13/6/2024 – 12/12/2024 are admissible.

Dates of disclosures and alleged instances of penalisation.

In his evidence given under affirmation the complainant stated that the dates on which penalisation occurred were:

1.On 22 June 22 the complainant made a disclosure to his manager of trans / hateful comments made about an external person working in a live chat with open reach external network supplier, the conclusion was it was a 'cultural difference' and that he was over reacting.  The complainant ‘s complaint of penalisation is that nothing was done about his complaints.

2.On the 17/08/2022 demeaning statements were uttered by a manager and staff about trans rights in general, and about a well-known American transgender ‘celebrity’ in a Teams meeting. The complainant made a protected disclosures to the training instructor within the meaning of Section 5(1) and Section 5(3) maintaining that such comments were an abuse of employees’ rights and which he found very distressing. She said she would address but did not.

3.On 3 February 2023, nothing was done about his complaints made to his team leader concerning a discussion on Microsoft Teams platform about an agent in another company as to whether this agent was male of female or both. He reported this discussion, which he maintains was a protected disclosure within the meaning of section 5 of the Act to his team leader who told him that he misunderstood the discussion. The complainant ‘s complaint of penalisation is that nothing was done about his complaints.

These instances of disclosures and acts of alleged penalisation took place in excess of 12 months prior to the referral of his claim.

I find that they are statute barred.

The next protected disclosure occurred on either the 9/6/2024 or 10/6/2024 to his manager concerning comments made on a Team’s meeting on the 8/6/2024 about the sexual activities of a young female employee, aged between 19-24, her social life, and her life at weekends. The staff member was very upset about the team leader’s comments about her. The manager gave him no feedback.

On 11 June 2024 the complainant’s team leader withdrew from any one-to-one engagement with the complainant. The team leader would say good morning, but nothing else until someone else came into the room. Previously the complainant and team leader had frequent one to one discissions. The team leader at this time also told the complainant that he wasn’t meeting the required metrics in terms of his performance.

These amount to acts of penalisation following on the protected disclosure of wrongdoing which the complainant had made on either the 9/6/2024 or 10/6/2024.

He made a further protected disclosure on the 12/6/2024 when he informed the manager of the team leader’s penalisation of him by way of refusing to engage with him on a one-to-one basis other than for good morning greeting. The manager stated that she would look into it to which the complainant -as per his own evidence at the hearing - advised her not to bother as he intended to leave the company.

The complainant at the hearing referred to his resigning from the company on the 15/7/2024 brought about by the inaction of the respondent to his protected disclosures. Furthermore in his submission prior to the hearing he stated that the employer’s engagement with another staff member whom  he stated was told to consider his role in the company, was questioned as to who else would hire him, to mind his mouth, shut up and get on with his job  was the final straw for the complainant and he left not long after, in July 2024.

Submissions received on 5/2/2026 post the hearing concerning statutory time limits

I gave the complainant an opportunity to address why, based on the evidence submitted by him at the hearing on the 27/1/2026, time should be extended as per section 41(8) of the Act of 2015. The complainant in his submission of 5/2/2026 elaborated on his illness, surgery, hospitalisation and chemotherapy treatment following on surgery in December? 2023.

The instance of alleged penalisation which occurred on 11/6/2026 is out of time by two days. I note from the evidence before the hearing that the complainant was on certified sick leave from 12-14 June 2024. The evidence submitted prior to the hearing also revealed that the complainant had undergone treatment for cancer some months previously.

Section 41(8) of the Act of 2015 provides:

“an adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than 6 months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause.”

I consider on the basis of the evidence that reasonable cause exists for the failure to submit the complaint of alleged penalisation within the 6 months’ time limit and permits me to extend the period to 12 months. It is a finding on compliance with statutory time limits and not a finding that it constitutes penalisation; that is a later exercise.

I have already found that the instances of alleged penalisation which the complaint states occurred in February, June and August 2022, and which he characterises as a failure to deal with his disclosures are inadmissible as per section 41(8) of the Act of 2015.

Preliminary point 2.

Do the communications to the respondent of the 11/6/2024 and the 12/6/2024 constitute a protected disclosure and meet the threshold required by virtue of section 12 of the PDA.

The respondent denies that the complainant made a protected disclosure and further that there was any penalisation of the complainant.

Relevant Law

The Protected Disclosures Act 2014 came into force (by way of S.I. No. 327 of 2014) on the 15th of July 2014. It was amended by the Protected Disclosures (Amendment) Act 2022 which came into force (by way of S.I. No. 510 of 2022) on the 1st of January 2023 and later by S.I. No. 375 of 2023 which came into operation on 22 July 2023. 

These amendments were in force when the admissible complaints occurred.

Definition of a Protected Disclosure.

 “12(1) For the purposes of this Act “protected disclosure” means, subject to [subsection (6)] and sections 17 and 18, a disclosure of relevant information (whether before or after the date of the passing of this Act) made by a worker in the manner specified in section 6, 7, 7B, 8, 9 or 10.

(2) For the purposes of this Act information is “relevant information” if—

(a) in the reasonable belief of the worker, it tends to show one or more relevant wrongdoings, and

(b) it came to the attention of the worker F13[in a work-related context].

(3) The following matters are relevant wrongdoings for the purposes of this Act—

(a) that an offence has been, is being or is likely to be committed,

(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation, other than one arising under the worker’s contract of employment or other contract whereby the worker undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services,

(c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur,

(d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered,

(e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged,

(f) that an unlawful or otherwise improper use of funds or resources of a public body, or of other public money, has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur,

(g) that an act or omission by or on behalf of a public body is oppressive, discriminatory or grossly negligent or constitutes gross F14[mismanagement,]

F15[(h) that a breach has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, or]

F16[(i) that information tending to show any matter falling within any of the preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be concealed or destroyed or an attempt has been, is being or is likely to be made to conceal or destroy such information.]

(4) For the purposes of subsection (3) it is immaterial whether a relevant wrongdoing occurred, occurs or would occur in the State or elsewhere and whether the law applying to it is that of the State or that of any other country or territory.

(5) A matter is not a relevant wrongdoing if it is a matter which it is the function of the worker or the worker’s employer to detect, investigate or prosecute and does not consist of or involve an act or omission on the part of the employer.

(5A) A matter concerning interpersonal grievances exclusively affecting a reporting person, namely, grievances about interpersonal conflicts between the reporting person and another worker, or a matter concerning a complaint by a reporting person to, or about, his or her employer which concerns the worker exclusively, shall not be a relevant wrongdoing for the purposes of this Act and may be dealt with through any agreed procedures applicable to such grievances or complaint to which the reporting person has access or such other procedures, provided in accordance with any rule of law or enactment (other than this Act), to which the reporting person has access.]

(6) A disclosure of information in respect of which a claim to legal professional privilege could be maintained in legal proceedings is not a protected disclosure if it is made by a person to whom the information was disclosed in the course of obtaining legal advice.

(7) The motivation for making a disclosure is irrelevant to whether or not it is a protected disclosure.

(8) In proceedings involving an issue as to whether a disclosure is a protected disclosure it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that it is.

The respondent maintains that the complaints submitted by the complainant discloses no “relevant wrongdoing”.

In Aidan & Henrietta McGrath Partnership v Anna Monaghan PDD 2/2016 it was held that:

“The Court must first establish that a protected disclosure has been made before it can examine whether a penalisation within the meaning of the Act has occurred.”

In Conway v The Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine, IEHC, 665, a case where the appellant made a protected disclosure alleging that the appointment process of vets by the respondent was in breach of EC regulation 854/2004, Hyland J states at Par 71:

 “ the obligation is to consider whether penalisation has taken place and the cause of same. That exercise sometimes takes place in a number of steps i.e. to identify the act or omission, to consider whether it constitutes detriment and then to examine whether the cause of such detriment was the making of a protected disclosure. But the wording of the Act identifies that what is prohibited is penalisation for having made a protected disclosure. To reach a conclusion as to whether s.12(1) has been breached, all three concepts identified above must be considered.”

I gave the complainant an opportunity to make a post hearing submission based on his evidence tendered at the hearing and in his pre- hearing submissions and to address the authorities cited and the respondent’s interpretation of the Act when set against his evidence as to why the disclosures which he made to the employer should enjoy the status of a protected disclosure. The complainant in his submission elaborates on the conversations which formed the subject of his disclosures which he characterises as protected disclosures but did not address the authorities cited or the respondent’s interpretation or his own of how the PDA applies to his evidence.His submission of 5/2/2026 states that his complaints were disclosures of relevant wrongdoing and satisfy the requirements of section 12 of the PDA.

The complainant cites two instances of a what he characterises as a protected disclosure which he alleges resulted in his penalisation.

Disclosure 1.

The complainant’s report to his manager of 9 or 10 June 2024 could meet the definition of a protected disclosure. In proceedings where a decision has to be made as to whether a disclosure is a protected disclosure, section 5(8) of the 2014 Act ( as amended) provides that it is presumed to be protected disclosure until the contrary is proven.  The respondent’s position is that what was disclosed was not relevant wrongdoing but, rather, bullying; inappropriate comments; poor management; stressful environment; inadequate handling of medical-leave information; lack of HR responsiveness; departure from the company under stress.

But the uncontested evidence at the hearing was that what was reported to the employer on 11/6/2024 contained the disrespectful, unprofessional, highly offensive comments made about an employee, comments constituting an offence to an employee’s dignity causing distress to the employee. The complaint’s evidence was that he was also distressed by these comments.

The Supreme Court in Baranya v. Rosderra Irish Meats Group Ltd. [2021] IESC 77 confirmed the broad interpretation of “relevant wrongdoing” in that an expression of a grievance by an employee that his or her own personal health and safety was endangered was capable of being a protected disclosure.

“It is perfectly clear from these words that the complaint does not have to relate to the health or safety of other employees or third parties: a complaint made by an employee that his or her own personal health or safety is endangered by workplace practices is clearly within the remit of the sub-section. Nor does the conduct in question necessarily have to amount to a breach of any legal obligation (although it would generally probably do so): it is sufficient that the employee complains that his or health or safety has been or is being or is likely to be endangered by reason of workplace practices, as this amounts to an allegation of ‘wrongdoing’ on the part of the employer in the extended (and slightly artificial) sense in which that term has been used by s. 5(2) and s. 5(3) of the 2014 Act. It follows that a complaint made by an employee that his or her own personal health was being affected by being required to work in a particular manner or in respect of a particular task can, in principle, amount to a protected disclosure”.

 I find that the complainant disclosed information which, in his reasonable belief, tended to show one or more relevant wrongdoings which came to his attention in connection with his employment

I find this to be a disclosure of wrongdoing.

I am satisfied the Respondent has not rebutted the presumption that this was a protected disclosure. 

Disclosure 2.

The second protected disclosure made by the complainant was his report to his manager on 12/6/2024 of the line manager’s ‘cold shouldering’ of him after he had made a protected disclosure, but these are matters peculiar to his relationship with his employer, that are amenable to a formal complaint by the complainant under the employer’s code.  I find that the status of this alleged protected disclosure is vitiated by virtue of section 5A of the Act (as amended) which states:

5A) A matter concerning interpersonal grievances exclusively affecting a reporting person, namely, grievances about interpersonal conflicts between the reporting person and another worker, or a matter concerning a complaint by a reporting person to, or about, his or her employer which concerns the worker exclusively, shall not be a relevant wrongdoing for the purposes of this Act and may be dealt with through any agreed procedures applicable to such grievances or complaint to which the reporting person has access or such other procedures, provided in accordance with any rule of law or enactment (other than this Act), to which the reporting person has access.”

Definition of Penalisation:

Section 12(1) of the PDA provides that:

 “An employer shall not penalise or threaten penalisation against an employee, or cause or permit any other person to penalise or threaten penalisation against an employee, for having made a protected disclosure.”

 Penalisation is defined in section 3(a) as meaning

 “any act or omission that affects a worker to the worker’s detriment, and in particular includes—

 (a) suspension, lay-off or dismissal,

(b) demotion or loss of opportunity for promotion,

I transfer of duties, change of location of place of work, reduction in wages or change in working hours,

(d) the imposition or administering of any discipline, reprimand or other penalty (including a financial penalty),

I unfair treatment,

(f) coercion, intimidation or harassment,

(g) discrimination, disadvantage or unfair treatment,

(h) injury, damage or loss, and

i) threat of reprisal”

For the sake of completeness, the instances of penalisation cited by the complainant concern the inadequacy as he sees it of the respondent’s response to his complaint of the 9 or 10 June 2023,  the line manager’s cold shouldering of him and his resignation on 15/7/2024.

The respondent’s response to his complaint of the 9 or 10 June 2023.

 In Conway v The Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine,IEHC 665  where the appellant made a protected disclosure asserting that that the appointment process of veterinary inspectors was in breach of EC regulation 854/2004, Hyland, J observed at par 30:

“I find that the Labour Court were correct in holding that the treatment by the respondent of the protected disclosure were not matters within its jurisdiction, in circumstances where it had already concluded no penalisation as defined by s.12 had been suffered by the appellant, and where the Act does not confer a jurisdiction on the Labour Court to evaluate the adequacy of an employer's response where penalisation has not been established by the complainant”

“It is also worth noting what is not in the Act. It does not contain any provisions in respect of the obligations of the employer who has received a protected disclosure. There are no time limits within which action must be taken; indeed, there are no obligations to take action at all, or to communicate with the person making the disclosure. As noted above, a limited obligation is placed upon public bodies under s. 21 to establish and maintain procedures for the making of protected disclosures by workers employed by the public body, to provide written information in relation to those procedures and to have regard to guidance issued by the Minister but that is the height of the obligation. There are no sanctions in the Act for failure to comply with these obligations.”

These judgments specify consideration of the alleged acts of penalisation before the adequacy or otherwise of the employer’s response to disclosures can be considered.

The line manager’s ‘cold shouldering’ of him.

The complainant’s own evidence is that when he reported this after one day to his manager she undertook to investigate it and return to him. He told her not to bother and that he intended to resign.

Given the respondent’s immediate response to this complaint about another employee’s  behaviour towards the complainant, this cannot be seen as an act of penalisation.

The constructive dismissal of the complainant on  the 15/7/2024.

Constructive dismissal falls within the ambit of dismissal as per section 1(b) of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977.

The complainant’s   evidence was that he resigned, that he dismissed his manager’s previous offer of 12 or 13 June 2024 to investigate his complaint about his line manager’s ‘ cold shouldering “of him, telling her “not to bother, that he planned to leave the company ”and that how his line manager spoke in an abusive manner to a colleague  within earshot of him was the final straw.

Penalisation is a detrimental act as per section 3 of the PDA, is not a free-standing act, and must be linked to and be a direct result of a protected disclosure. I have found that his final protected disclosure of 12/6/2024 is not a protected disclosure. I find that his disclosure of 9 or 10 June 2024 was a protected disclosure. But the complainant failed to establish a link between that disclosure and failed to establish that “but for” that protected disclosure, he would not have resigned and therefore would not have been penalised.

Aside altogether from that, to succeed in a   complaint of constructive dismissal, the complainant must be able to show that they made efforts to resolve the issues prior to resigning. In Murray V Rockabill Shellfish Ltd.UD1832/2010 it was affirmed that an employee must act reasonably in terminating his contract of employment. McCormack V Dunnes Stores and Conway V Ulster Bank, UDA 474/1981 underscore the requirement to use a grievance procedure prior to resigning. Resignation must not be the first option taken by the employee. In contrast, the complaint’s own evidence reveals that he dismissed the efforts to assist him to examine his concerns, and that by the time he made the disclosure he had intended to resign.

Based on the evidence and authorities, find that the complainant’s resignation does not amount to a constructive dismissal and cannot therefore be held to be an act of penalisation.

The complainant in his post hearing submission submitted an instance of what he states was penalisation in that he was called to a disciplinary meeting on 11 June 2024, in relation to his attendance. No evidence was presented at the hearing on the 27/1/2026 or in the initial submissions prior to the hearing about this reported disciplinary hearing matter. The respondent’s representatives who were present at the hearing were thus unable to respond to this matter and I deem it to be inadmissible.

The complainant’s submissions overall displayed a persistence in his belief that the respondent was in breach of section 12(1) but lacked an understanding of the requirements necessary to succeed in such a complaint.

While it is undoubtedly the case that the complainant operated in what was a fraught environment for him, I am unable to find that the complainant was penalised as alleged. 

I therefore find the complaint of a contravention of section 12(1) of the 2014 Act (as amended) to be not well-founded.   

I decide that this complaint is not well-founded.

Absence of penalisation.