Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Joe  Quigley

AMP Engineering Ltd

Representatives

D. Mussett Mhakayakora

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00071370-001

06/05/2025

The Complainant worked as a General Operative with the Respondent from 8 May 2017 until 22 April 2025 and was paid €18.00 for a 39 hour week at the time of his dismissal. His complaint centres on events surrounding a pay‑rise dispute, perceived unfair treatment, and the Respondent’s subsequent decision to treat his actions as a resignation. The Complainant maintains that he never resigned, and that he was unfairly dismissed.

Throughout early 2025, the Complainant stated that he had repeatedly raised concerns with management about his rate of pay. He believed that his length of service entitled him to parity with other colleagues whom he felt were being paid more than him. He also had unresolved concerns about the poor condition of the canteen facilities, which he says contributed to his growing frustration and sense of unfair treatment at work.

On 16 April 2025, in what he describes as a moment of upset and anger, he handed a handwritten note to his line manager. The note set out three “options” for increasing his pay, reflecting his attempt to negotiate a raise he believed he had been promised at the beginning of the year. In his evidence, he emphasised that the note was written “in the spur of the moment”, out of frustration, and that he never intended it as a resignation. He considered it part of an ongoing pay negotiation with his line manager.

However, the Respondent interpreted one line of the note—“agree by end of day or won’t be back after wedding holidays”—as a resignation. That same afternoon, HR issued him a letter stating they were “accepting” his resignation. According to the Complainant, this shocked him, as he had no intention of resigning and had never stated that he wished to leave.

He demonstrated this lack of intention clearly on 17 April 2025, when he reported for work at the usual time of 7 a.m., in uniform and ready to work. He stated that his line manager allowed him to continue working that day while awaiting guidance from HR, and he completed a full shift until 5 p.m. This, he stated, showed that he believed his employment was continuing as normal.

Following the bank holiday weekend, the Complainant again reported for work on Tuesday 22 April 2025. Shortly after arriving, he was called to a meeting with HR. At this meeting, he was informed definitively that the company had treated his note as a resignation and that he was required to leave the premises immediately. He was instructed to collect his belongings and exit the building through the front office. He stated that he was told not to return—an instruction he understood to mean that he had been dismissed rather than having resigned.

On 24 April 2025, the Complainant wrote to the Respondent formally objecting to their interpretation of the note as a resignation. In this correspondence, he explained the context of his note: that it reflected his upset and frustration at what he perceived as unfair differences in pay, especially compared with colleagues with less service, and further compounded by issues about canteen conditions. He reiterated that nothing in his note indicated an intention to resign, and that he was shocked the company had treated it as such. His account highlighted that he continued reporting for duty in the days that followed, which he argued is the clearest evidence that no resignation was intended.

The Complainant asserted that the real reason for his dismissal was that he had repeatedly raised concerns about his pay and workplace conditions, and that management did not want to address these issues. He believes he was dismissed because he continued to push for the pay rise he was promised earlier in the year, and because his efforts were perceived as challenging or inconvenient.

The Respondent stated that the employment relationship had been stable until early 2025, when the Complainant began to raise concerns about his rate of pay. On 21 January 2025, he met with management to discuss the matter. During this meeting, he was informed that his correct hourly rate was €17.00, not €16.50 as he had believed. Management also confirmed that his requested pay increase had been approved, with his hourly rate due to rise to €18.00 from February 2025. This was properly processed and implemented through payroll. Despite this, the Complainant continued to express dissatisfaction, insisting that he was being paid less than other employees, even though no such disparity existed.

Around this time, the Complainant also raised issues about the condition of the Assembly canteen. The Respondent explained that while quotes for upgrades had been obtained, they could not be approved due to financial constraints. A fully equipped main canteen, located behind the Stores, remained available to all staff. Nevertheless, the Complainant chose not to use the main facility and instead installed his own equipment in the Assembly area without permission, contrary to workplace procedures.

Matters escalated significantly on 16 April 2025. On that day, the Complainant handed the Production Manager a handwritten note outlining three “pay options.” The first demanded an increase to €19 per hour, along with a backdated payment of €0.50 per hour for the preceding two months. Crucially, it included the ultimatum: “Agree by end of day or won’t be back after wedding holidays.” The other two options were even more excessive, adding demands for 60 litres of fuel per month, or—if he were to leave and return to employment—€23 per hour plus 60 litres of fuel per week. Immediately after delivering this note, the Complainant left work early at 1:00pm without notifying management.

Given the explicit wording of the ultimatum and the Complainant’s early departure, the company interpreted the note as a resignation in the event that his demands were not met. Later that same afternoon, the Respondent sent him a written response by email, advising that the demands could not be accommodated and confirming that his wording was being treated as a formal resignation.

When the letter was presented to him the following morning, 17 April 2024, the Complainant responded by saying, “Just give me €19 per hour and we’ll call it quits.” This reinforced the company’s view that he was attempting to make his continued employment conditional on demands that were unreasonable and financially unsustainable.

A final meeting took place on 22 April 2025, attended by HR and the Production Manager. At this meeting, the Respondent formally confirmed its interpretation that the Complainant had resigned through his ultimatum. He was advised that he would be paid for his outstanding holiday entitlements and was requested to collect his belongings. In line with standard procedure, he was instructed to clock out and exit through the front office. The Complainant complied and left the premises.

Two days later, on 24 April 2025, the Complainant emailed the company disputing the Respondent’s interpretation and asserting that he had not intended to resign. The Respondent replied, reiterating that he had already received the agreed pay increase and that his ultimatum—particularly the statement that he would not return unless his demands were met—left the company with no reasonable alternative but to treat it as a resignation.

Did the Complainant Resign?

The first question for determination is whether the Complainant’s actions on 16 April 2025 amounted to an unambiguous and voluntary resignation. The Respondent relied heavily on the handwritten note containing three “pay options,” asserting that the statement “Agree by end of day or won’t be back after wedding holidays” constituted a clear resignation.

Having considered the evidence, I do not accept this assertion. A resignation must be clear, explicit, unambiguous, and unconditional. It must demonstrate a genuine and settled intention on the part of the employee to end the employment relationship. Irish case law has repeatedly held that ambiguous, conditional, or impulsive statements do not amount to resignation, particularly where context indicates frustration or an attempt to negotiate terms rather than an intention to depart. This principle was recently reaffirmed in Anatoliy Ludchenko v Harp Renewables Limited (ADJ-00039137), where, in finding that the complainant had not resigned, the Adjudication Officer stated: “It is up to the employer to confirm a resignation, which must be clear and unambiguous. The onus is on the employer to take such steps as necessary to establish that there was a genuine resignation, for example, requesting the employee to confirm in writing that they wish to resign.”

The note in question was plainly part of a pay negotiation, however clumsily worded. The Complainant set out demands—unreasonable or otherwise—with an ultimatum. An ultimatum in the context of pay negotiations does not equate to a resignation. If employees lose the protection of the Unfair Dismissals Act every time they make an unrealistic or poorly phrased demand, the statutory framework would be fatally undermined.

Crucially:

• The note did not state “I resign.”
• It proposed terms for continued employment.
• It expressed a desire to remain employed if certain conditions were met.
• The Complainant’s conduct the next day—stating “Just give me €19 per hour and we’ll call it quits”—shows he clearly believed the employment relationship continued.

A conditional threat (“I won’t return unless…”) is not a resignation. At most, it is an ill‑judged bargaining tactic. The Respondent had an obligation to seek clarification, particularly given the gravity of treating an employee as having resigned. They did not do this however. Instead, they acted immediately and conclusively, interpreting a pay dispute as a termination of employment, without any inquiry, cooling‑off period, or discussion.

I find therefore that the Complainant did not resign.

2. Whether the Respondent Dismissed the Complainant?

Having found that the Complainant did not resign, the next question is whether the Respondent’s actions on 17–22 April 2025 amounted to a dismissal.

I noted that:

• The Respondent sent a letter to the Complainant stating it was treating him as having resigned.
• When the Complainant objected, the Respondent maintained this position.
• On 22 April 2025, the Complainant was instructed to gather his belongings, clock out, and leave the premises.
• He was not permitted to continue working.
• His employment ended due to the Respondent’s decision, not his own.

In Irish law, a dismissal includes not only express dismissal but also situations where the employer treats the contract as terminated, regardless of the employee’s intentions.

By escorting the Complainant off the premises and processing his exit, the Respondent clearly and unequivocally dismissed him.

3. Was the Dismissal Fair?

Under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, once a dismissal is established, the burden shifts to the employer. Section 6(6) of the Act states:

“In determining for the purposes of this Act whether the dismissal of an employee was an unfair dismissal or not, it shall be for the employer to show that the dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from one or more grounds specified in subsection (4) of this section or that there were other substantial grounds for justifying the dismissal.”

The Respondent did not attempt to justify the termination by reference to any of the permitted grounds in Section 6(4) of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 which provides as follows:

4) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, not to be an unfair dismissal, if it results wholly or mainly from one or more of the following: (a) the capability, competence or qualification of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do, (b) the conduct of the employee, (c) the redundancy of the employee, and (d) the employee being unable to work or continue to work in the position he held without contravention (by him or by his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under any statute or instrument made under statute

None of these grounds were relied upon by the Respondent. The Respondent did not allege capability or performance issues; it did not allege misconduct; redundancy was not in question; and no statutory restraint prevented the Complainant from working. The Respondent’s sole justification for the termination was its belief that the Complainant had resigned. As I have already found that resignation occurred, this justification falls away entirely.

The Respondent also failed to establish any “other substantial grounds” under Section 6(6). Acting on a mistaken interpretation of a poorly‑phrased note, without clarification or due process, cannot be considered a substantial ground for dismissal. No investigation was conducted, no procedure was followed, and the Complainant was never afforded an opportunity to explain himself. Procedural fairness was wholly absent. A dismissal based entirely on assumption, without any inquiry, cannot meet the standard of reasonableness required under Irish employment law.

Accordingly, I find that the dismissal was both substantively unjustified and procedurally unfair.

I find that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed for the reasons set out above.

Section 7 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, in relevant part, states that:

(1) Where an employee is dismissed and the dismissal is an unfair dismissal, the employee shall be entitled to redress consisting of whichever of the following the adjudication officer, considers appropriate having regard to all the circumstances:

(a) re-instatement by the employer of the employee in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal on the terms and conditions on which he was employed immediately before his dismissal together with a term that the re-instatement shall be deemed to have commenced on the day of the dismissal, or

(b) re-engagement by the employer of the employee either in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal or in a different position which would be reasonably suitable for him on such terms and conditions as are reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or

(c) (i) if the employee incurred any financial loss attributable to the dismissal, payment to him by the employer of such compensation in respect of the loss (not exceeding in amount 104 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of this Act) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances,

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, in determining the amount of compensation payable under that subsection regard shall be had to—

(a) the extent (if any) to which the financial loss referred to in that subsection was attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employer,

(b) the extent (if any) to which the financial loss referred to in that subsection was attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employee,

(c) the measures (if any) adopted by the employee or, as the case may be, his failure to adopt measures, to mitigate the loss aforesaid,

(d) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the procedure referred to in subsection (1) of section 14 of this Act or with the provisions of any code of practice relating to procedures regarding dismissal approved of by the Minister,

(e) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the said section 14,

(f) the extent (if any) to which the conduct of the employee (whether by act or omission) contributed to the dismissal.

3) In this section—

“financial loss”, in relation to the dismissal of an employee, includes any actual loss and any estimated prospective loss of income attributable to the dismissal and the value of any loss or diminution, attributable to the dismissal, of the rights of the employee under the Redundancy Payments Acts, 1967 to 1973, or in relation to superannuation;

“remuneration” includes allowances in the nature of pay and benefits in lieu of or in addition to pay.

Findings:

In considering the appropriate redress, I have considered all three remedies available under the Act as set out above: reinstatement, re‑engagement, and compensation and note that the Complainant is still unemployed and is seeking a return to his role.

The circumstances of the termination involved a breakdown in communication and trust between the parties. The Respondent interpreted an emotionally worded note, written in frustration, as a resignation, despite its ambiguity and despite the Complainant’s immediate actions showing that he intended to continue working. The Respondent then persisted in that interpretation, even when the Complainant expressly rejected it. The dismissal was implemented abruptly and without fair procedures.

For reinstatement or re‑engagement to be viable, there must be a reasonable prospect that the employment relationship can continue in a functional and mutually respectful way. That is not the case here. The Complainant feels deeply wronged by the Respondent’s handling of the matter and asserted that he was dismissed merely for seeking a pay rise he believed he had been promised. The Respondent, on the other hand, stated that they regarded the Complainant as having resigned, and both the HR Manager and the Managing Director gave cogent reasons to explain why they could not countenance his return to the workplace.

This is a relatively small business and these individuals would be central to any ongoing working relationship, and the events in question have left a significant level of tension and mistrust. Requiring the Complainant to return to a workplace where two of the core management personnel view him as the author of his own departure would not, in my view, support a stable or constructive employment environment.

Considering the foregoing, I am satisfied that reinstatement or re‑engagement would not be a practical or appropriate remedy in this case. The employment relationship has broken down to such an extent that its restoration is neither feasible nor conducive to the welfare of either party.

Compensation is therefore the appropriate form of remedy, and I must assess what sum is just and equitable, taking into account financial loss, mitigation efforts, and all surrounding circumstances.

The “Financial Loss” Attributable to The Dismissal

In calculating the “financial loss” attributable to the dismissal from 22 April 2025, I note that Charleton J in Panisi, in assessing loss, stated as follows: 

My task is to assess the financial damage which the dismissal has brought about and then to place the measure of that damage against the maximum amount of compensation that is available. In the event that the compensation that is available, amounting to 104 weeks remuneration, is less than that sum, then that is the measure of damages. Where the quantum of damage is more, then the jurisdiction is limited to that maximum and the amount of damages must thus be reduced to that maximum sum. Where the measure of damages on dismissal is more than the maximum but contributory fault is found in respect of the dismissal against the employee, the reduction is on the totality of those damages, and not on the maximum award. If the result is to reduce compensation within the maximum award, that sum is appropriate. Where the reduction in total damages for contributory fault puts the damages above the maximum award, then the maximum award is the correct measure of compensation for unfair dismissal.

As set out above, I must therefore next assess the overall loss attributable to the dismissal.

-          The “financial loss” from the date of dismissal to the date of the WRC hearing

I examined the Complainant’s earnings at the time of dismissal. His hourly rate was €18, and he regularly worked a 39‑hour week, giving him a weekly earnings figure of approximately €702. Based on the eight‑month period between dismissal and the hearing, the Complainant experienced around 34 weeks of actual loss which results in a loss in the region of €24,000.

-          The “financial loss” after the WRC hearing

While it is quite straightforward “to assess the financial damage which the dismissal has brought about” (Charleton J in Panisi) in the period from the date of dismissal to the date of the WRC hearing, I am also required to consider the “estimated prospective loss of income”, namely the Complainant’s overall estimated future loss. The complications for an Adjudication Officer in making such an assessment are highlighted by Desmond Ryan BL in Redmond on Dismissal Law:

“The Workplace Relations Commission can face difficulty in calculating the amount of compensation under s 7 (1) ( c ) of the 1977 Act….. The Workplace Relations Commission is therefore faced with imponderables: it is required to put immediate cash values on items such as.. future loss of wages and the likelihood of re-employment”

While Charleton J did so by examining how long he believed the Complainant in that matter would likely have stayed in his employment following his unfair selection for redundancy when compared to a colleague who had not been dismissed on the redundancy ground, it is more difficult to estimate a figure in this instance because a redundancy situation did not arise and no comparator was presented.

However, based on the Complainant’s, skill set, the nature of the work, and the general availability of similar roles in the labour market—I am satisfied that his future loss is likely to be limited in duration and I therefore believe that his prospective loss should be no more than €5,000.

-          The Complainant’s statutory redundancy entitlements

As well as assessing both the Complainant’s actual and prospective financial loss, and having regard to the definition of “financial loss” set out in section 7(3) above, I must also recognise that the Complainant lost his accrued redundancy entitlements as a result of his unfair dismissal. This constitutes a separate and distinct category of loss. The assessment of actual and prospective loss concerns the financial impact arising from the date of dismissal onwards. By contrast, the redundancy lump sum entitlement is earned gradually over the entire period of service, accruing from the date the employee commences employment until the date that employment is lawfully terminated. As the Complainant’s employment was ended unfairly, he has been deprived of the redundancy entitlement that would otherwise have been available to him based on his length of service. Having regard to that service, I find that the Complainant has lost accrued redundancy entitlements in the region of €10,000.

Calculation of award

As set out above, I have found that the Complainant’s overall “financial loss” attributable to the dismissal is €39,000. I must now consider whether there is any basis for a “reduction … on the totality of those damages,” as articulated by Charleton J. in Panisi.

While the Complainant did make some efforts to secure alternative employment, the evidence demonstrates that these efforts were neither active nor sustained. In those circumstances, a substantial mitigation reduction is warranted. A deduction of 40% is, in my view, proportionate and fair having regard to the duty to mitigate and the level of effort actually made.

I do not consider that the Complainant contributed in any meaningful way to his dismissal. Although his handwritten note to his manager was ill‑judged and worded in a manner that created room for misunderstanding, it does not amount to conduct that would justify any reduction on contributory‑fault grounds. The decisive cause of the dismissal was the Respondent’s unreasonable interpretation of that note as a resignation and the absence of any procedural fairness thereafter.

Accordingly, taking into account the financial loss suffered, the limited mitigation efforts, and the requirement that the award be just and equitable, I determine that compensation in the amount of €23,400 is appropriate.

I therefore direct that the Respondent pay €23,400 to the Complainant in respect of the unfair dismissal.